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CHAPTER 4
CHURCHES: HISTORICALLY INSTITUTIONALISED ASSOCIATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS IN CIVIL SOCIETY
"Christianity and its institutions could no longer be viewed as being
imposed upon Africans, but rather as something now firmly
entrenched in its country and its society" (Henkel 1989: 205).
In this chapter, my argument will be that churches have become
institutionalised in civil society through their historical contribution to
people by providing mainly educational and health facilities and their role
in checking the state in "crises," and that churches are important actors in
the process of democratisation. In fact, especially Christian churches have
been regarded as one of the most important actors in democratisation
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1993), and their roles in this process of a
variety of countries have been documented (e.g., Gifford, 1994; Gifford ed.,
1995: Haynes, 1996). However, it is necessary ask why Christian churches
have been involved in the process of democratisation and what kind of
role they have played and will play in the process (both in the transition
and the consolidation phases). One of the important arguments on this
issue have just come from Haynes as follows:
"...[Christian] leaders have on occasion, in the absence of
alternatives, become the focal point of opposition - the mouthpiece
of public opinion, speaking on behalf of citizens who may well
regard democratic change as a sine qua non for the achievement of
both individual and collective material improvements" (1996: 107,
original emphasis).
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Basically, Christian churches's concern about democratisation derived
from their interest in human development and human rights (see, e.g.,
CCZ, EFZ, and ZEC, 1987), which will be argued later in this chapter.
As stated in chapter 2, the main focus of this chapter will be the
mainline Christian churches. Therefore, the roles of Christian
fundamentalism, known as the New Right of American origin in
southern Africa (Gifford, 1988), which are themselves very important
issues in political and religious studies in the region, will beyond the scope
of the current study. However, it is worthwhile to refer to that the new
religious movements were to play an insignificant role in the process of
democratisation (democratic transition), and even these churches were
actively hostile to democratic movement (Ranger, 1995: 25)1.
It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "church" in this
chapter. By the term "church," I mean the religious organisations and
institutions whose faith is rooted in the Christian faith. Although there
are adherents of religious faiths other than Christianity such as Muslim
and Hindus in southern Africa, they are not included in the argument
because their numbers and influences are not so significant in Zambia and
Botswana.
This chapter deals with (1) churches' involvement in development
activities, (2) churches' political involvement, from the historical point of
view to clarify their significance both in development and political affairs,
although the main focus will be on the post-colonial era.
4.1 The Case of Zambia
1 According to Foston Sakala, the President of the Reformed Church of Zambia, and
Chairman of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), "(s)everal fundamentalist
groups denounced the participation of church leaders in the [election] monitoring, stating,
that politics was strictly an earthly affair and should be of no concern for true Chris-hams"
(quoted in Ranger, 1995: 25-26).
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There have been a variety of studies of religion and churches in
Central and Southern Africa and Northern Rhodesia from historical and
anthropological points of view, including, for instance, a series of works by
Ranger (e.g., Ranger and Weller, (1975), Van Binsbergen (1981), Weller and
Linden (1984) and Gifford (1988). There are also studies which focuses on
specific churches. On the issue of church union efforts focusing on the
United Church of Zambia (UCZ), Bolink (1967) documented details of the
process of the formation of UCZ. Johnson's case study was the African
Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) (Johnson, 1977). In addition, the
Reformed Church of Zambia (RCZ) was a detailed study by Verstraeleu-
Gilhuis (1982). Furthermore, churches' involvement in social services,
like education and health care have been documented in more recent
studies (e.g., Ragsdale, 1986; Henkel, 1989).
Therefore, it is not necessary to repeat these descriptions in this
chapter at length. Neither is it my intention to describe the historical
activities of various churches in detail. Rather it is to consider the
activities and policies of the main present church bodies, namely the
Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), the Zambia Episcopal Conference
(ZEC), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ), with a special
attention to the CCZ in terms of practice in the first half of the case of
Zambia. In the second half, Christian Churches' political involvement
will be considered from a historical point of view.
Here it is necessary to briefly refer to general religious situation of
Zambia. As stated in the previous chapter, Zambia is considered to be a de
facto Christian nation, considering the fact that a majority of people (72
percent) are Christians (Barret, 1982). This was a result of the wide
infiltration of missionaries into central Africa. In this process, churches in
Zambia have also been institutionalised as one of the most important
actors in civil society through their economic and political involvement.
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4.1.1 Church Groupings in the Contemporary Era in Zambia
There are three coordinating or mother bodies in Zambia, which
are, the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC), the Christian Council of
Zambia (CCZ), and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ).
ZEC, which is the administrative body of the Catholic Church in
Zambia, was founded in 1935 for the purpose of coordinating Catholic
missionary work (Henkel, 1989: 53). The Catholic Church in Zambia
consists of seven dioceses and two archd:oceses (Lusaka and Kasama),
which coincide with the nine Zambian provinces, and 26.2 percent of the
population of Zambia was estimated to regard themselves as the Catholic
Church (Barrett, 1982: 765). As Henkel showed, Catholics are evenly
distributed over the country, but they are heavily concentrated in the rural
dioceses of Kasama and Mansa and the urban dioceses of Ndola and
Lusaka2 . Day-to-day Church's activities are coordinated by the Catholic
Secretariat in Lusaka.
In Zambia, the Catholic Church is notable in that it still has many
foreign priests and other workers. In comparison with other African
countries, Africanisation began much later in Zambia (Henkel, 1989: 53).
The Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) is an umbrella body of
Christian denominations which are more ecumenically oriented (See table
2-5 in chapter 2 for membership of the CCZ). The core of the CCZ are the
United Church of Zambia (UCZ), the Reformed Church, the African
Methodist Episcopal Church, the Salvation Army and the Lutheran
Church (Henkel, 1989: 53). The Organisational form of the CCZ will be
2 Therefore, Henkel concluded that Catholicism has influenced most strongly on the Bemba
area (Henkel, 1989: 54-55).
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considered in detail later. The CCZ also functions as the official link
between member churches and the World Council of Churches (WCC).
There is another umbrella body, the Evangelical Fellowship of
Zambia (EFZ), members of which are mainly evangelically-oriented
denominations (see table 2-6 for membership of the EFZ). In addition, one
of the characteristics of the EFZ is that it is a loose union of the evangelical
churches (Henkel, 1989: 69). Among the membership of the EFZ, the
Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA), which began in 1905 in Zambia and
which is today the third largest Protestant denomination, is the main
member. This group is supposed to be less political, in the sense that the
EFZ is not so much interested in national political issues, in comparison
with the other two. Even so, the EFZ has also collaborated with the others,
when they faced political "crisis," as stated later in this chapter. Although
the magnitude of the involvement in development schemes is still low, it
has its own secretariat coordinating developmental activities.
Jehovah's Witness and the New Apostolic church are not included
the above groups (Henkel, 1989: 77-80). Though Jehovah's Witness, which
is known as "the Watch Tower," has been occasionally confronted with
the state and repressed by the state 3, the church has continued to grow. On
the other hand, the New Apostolic church seems to work more quietly to
keep its profile lower that other churches (Henkel, 1989: 80). Therefore
little is known on this church.
According to Barrett (1982: 765), at the time of survey around 1980,
there are about 70 active indigenous (or independent) churches, many of
which have been brought to Zambia from other countries. About 7
percent of the total population is supposed to belong to these churches
(Henkel, 1989: 80). The largest independent churches are the African
313etween 1967 and 1969, for instance, there were clashes between jehox ah's 1,,N itne,ns, and
members of UNIP, as the Witness refused to accept the new flag, to sing National Anthem,
to become party members or to vote in elections (Henke(, 1989: 79).
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Gospel Church and the Watchman Healing Mission, each with an
estimated 60,000 adherents. Historically speaking, the best known
independent church is the Lumpa Church led by Alice Lenshina because
of its confrontation with the state (see e.g., van Binsbergen, 1981: 266-317)4.
4.1.2 Churches' Involvement in Development Activities: Historical
Achievements
There have been many efforts of churches in the area of
development, such as education and health as well as economic
development, since various missions arrived in central Africa.
At the beginning it will be suffice to show several examples
concerning missions' or churches' contributions and attainments both
before and after Zambia's political independence in the fields of education
and health in order to show their significance in comparison with the
state.
Following tables show us that churches have been one of the
indispensable components in the fields of education and health service at
least since the colonial era. In fact, almost all missions considered the
schools to be their most important means of Christianisation (Henkel,
1989: 125). Table 4-1 shows that education was almost offered by mission
schools.
At the level of aim of education, Catholics and Protestants have had
different perception of the role of education. The Catholics provide
education to develop the whole person, while the Protestant do for the
converts to read the Bible on their own (Henkel, 1989: 127). This
difference can be "understood in the context of the respective missions
4There are some other works on independent churches in Zambia by Dillon-Malone 119.Saa,
1983b).
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aims: The Catholics wanted to incorporate their converts into the Roman
Catholic Church, founding for this only a new church province, whereas it
was the aim of the Protestants to found independent.., churches run by
Africans, which, ..., were to be independent of the European missionaries"
(Henkel, 1989: 127). As stated later, the fact that education was provided by
churches also means that churches produced political elites.
Table 4-1 Numbers of Schools and Pupils in Northern Rhodesia: 1935-1954 (aided and
unaided)
1935
schools	 pupils
1945
schools	 pupils
1954
schools	 pupils
Paris Evangelical	 77	 4,524 119 11,339 116 13,096
Mission
Christian Mission in	 76 5,297 116 11,846 59 8,552
Many Lands
London Missionary	 98 4,269 99 9,362 47 8,642
Society
Methodist Mission	 85 2,500 62 5,412 41 5,067
Church of Scotland	 286 8,556 231 17,149 72 10,700
Mission
Dutch Reformed	 492 29,294 346 19,291 98 10,085
Church Mission
Universities Mission	 74
to Central Africa
2,853 115 6,946 62 7,084
South Africa General	 46 1,396 48 2,826 43 4,155
Mission
Seventh-Day
	
66 2,983 83 7,004 79 9,874
Adventists
Brethren in Christ	 19 8% 31 1,928 31 3,327
Salvation Army	 9 397 35 3,561 28 3,288
South African	 6 256 7 727 9 947
Baptists
Pilgrim Holiness 	 6 266 19 930 27 2,810
Church
Church of Christ	 13 393 19 1,670 17 2,007
African Methodist 6 415
Episcopal Church
Scandinavian 2 314 6 507
Baptists
United Missions to 8 5,179
Copperbelt
White Fathers	 501 23,040 463 29,447 255 32,085
Jesuit Fathers	 116 4,100 121 8,376 85 11,386
Capuchin Fathers	 6 259 88 8,797 89 9,705
Franciscan Fathers	 14 264 16 1,410 24 2 558
All Mission Schools	 1,190 91,516 2,034 153,9587 1,188 145 874
Government and Local 	 12 1,268 51 10,727 193 41 102
Education
Authorities Schools
All Schools	 2,002 92,784 2,085 164,684 1,265 186 9-b
Source: Henkel, 1989 Table 7 p.128.
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After independence, however, under the leadership of Kenneth
Kaunda, who was a mission teacher himself, the government started to
invest a lot in the development of the educational system because the
government could secure enough fund to run primary schools. In this
development effort, many primary schools, which were originally run by
churches, were handed over to the government just after independence,
though some churches and organisations are still running some primary
schools in collaboration with the government like Nahumba in Choma.
While in 1963 two thirds of primary schools were in the hands of the
missions, by 1967 the situation has reversed and two thirds were
government school (Henkel, 1989: 137). And only the Pilgrim Holiness,
the Brethren in Christ Mission and the Catholic, Anglican and Reformed
Churches retained their school at this stage, but they too transferred their
school later. This transfer was convenient for churches because some
churches could get rid of the personnel and financial burdens. But it was
also true that other churches feared the loss of influence in this area.
In contrast, as is shown in table 4-2 and 4-3, in secondary education,
churches are still running schools in cooperation with the government or
they are still managing without any material support from the
government. In fact, in contrast to the primary school, only few secondary
schools were transfered to the state. Alongside the churches, the
government also concentrated effort of the expansion of the secondary
education. However, the government's effort in secondary education was
not qualitative but quantitative expansion, in the sense that the quality of
education was not satisfactorily maintained (Henkel, 1989: 136). As a
result, especially Catholic churches have had good reputation in their
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quality of education 5 . In addition, churches have been involved in
running pre-school educational institutions, and deaf schools.
Table 4-2 Categorisation of Secondary Schools in 1987
Province Govern-
ment
Aided Self-help Private
	 Other Total
Central 7 3 10 2 - 22
Copper-belt 23 3 7 13 9 55
Eastern 8 2 4 1 6 21
Luapula 6 2 4 1 3 16
Lusaka 10 5 2 15 3 35
Northern 10 3 6 1 30 50
North- 4 1 5 - 2 12
Western
Southern 9 14 3 5 6 35
Western 5 4 4 1 3 17
Total 80 37 45 39 62 263
*Grant Aided School which are run jointly by churches and the government support
+ Self-Help Schools are not financially supported by the government. Some of them are
run by churches.
@ These schools fall under either the fifth Education Project or other development
programmes.
Source: CCZ 1987, p34.
In this area, what can be pointed out is that after the weakening
government financial situation, the churches, especially the Catholic,
have been requested by the government to take over their former primary
schools again (Henkel, 1989: 137). This episode also clearly tells us
churches significance in this area.
5According to Henkel, who refereed to the Catholic magazine "Impact" (No.48, 1973),
reported that in the 1972 exam five of the six most successful schools were Catholic and
that as regards the success rate, 17 out of 22 Catholic schools were in the top 30 of the
country's 95 school at that time (Henkel, 1989: 136).
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Table 4-3 Secondary School Run By Members of the Christian Council of Zambia Enrolement
1984-1985
Province 1984 1985 1986
School Boys Girls Total	 Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total
(Church)
Central 495 495 497 497 489 489
Chipembi
(UCZ)
Copperbelt 197 187 384 -
Nd ola
Modern (UCZ)
St. Barnabas 95 107 202	 84 75 159 32 24 56
(Anglican)
Muflira 94 86 180	 73 55 128 55 57 112
(Anglican)
Eastern 102 102 104 104
St. Mary's
Mosoro
(Anglican)
Lusaka 728 668 668 714 714
Kafue (UCZ)
Ebenezier 103 97 200	 146 146 292 214 269 483
(AME)
Southern 839 839 803 803 888 888
Njase (UCZ)
Chikankata 333 185 518	 339 199 538 350 216 566
(Salvation)
Choma(BIC) 606 345 951	 612 354 966 710 380 1090
Kabanga 76 56 132 136
(COC)
Masuku 91 96 187	 81 106 187 -
(Wesly an)
Mosi-Oa- 71 340 411	 85 315 400 90 350 440
Tunya Macha
(BIC)
St.Marks 680 680	 512 512 775 775
Choma
Western 387 368 755	 494 494 427 349 776
Sefula (UCZ)
Total 3188 2958 6146	 3611 2950 6561 3471 3022 6855
Source: CCZ 1987 p.36. * National Total Enrolment.
In the field of health, as table 4-4, 4-5, 4-6(a), 4-6(b) show, hospitals
managed by churches under the Churches Medical Association of Zambia
have played a substantial role. Table 4-4 shows that missions' medical care
facilities have been relatively well provided in North-Western, Southern
and Eastern Provinces, where there are major church hospitals at katete
(Eastern Province) by the Anglicans and at Chikankata (Southern
Province) by the Salvation Army (Henkel, 1989: 149). Table 4-5 shows that
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churches' medical facilities are still substantial in terms of numbers in the
case of hospitals, and also in terms of facilities (numbers of beds) in the
case of rural health centres. Tables 4-6 (a) and 4 6 (b) also suggest the
importance of churches in this field. In the issue area of health, the
government and churches can be considered to be complementary.
Table 4-4 health Care Provision in 1964 and its Development to 1981
Province New beds between 1964 and 1981
Beds Population/b State and Churches	 Total
ed 1964 Mining
Companies
Copperbelt 2,699	 216 526 270 7%
Luapula 640	 552 506 151 657
Lusaka 648	 333 534 168 702
Northern 942	 596 827 307 1,134
North- 934	 230 421 317 738
Western
Eastern 1,190	 408 665 483 1,148
Southern 1,359	 347 734 555 1,299
Western 775	 477 770 271 1,041
Central 703	 451 477 -70* 407
Zambia 9,889	 361 5,460 2452 7,912
* Facilities handed over to the Government
Source: Henkel, 1989 Table 15 p.150.
Table 4-5 Distribution of Medical Facilities in 1985
Category Hospitals
Number
	 Beds
Rural Health Centres
Number	 Beds
Government 53 11687 629 5701
ZEC 13 1724 25 920
CCZ(Members) 7 1320 10 350
EFZ(Members) 1 118 7 84
Evangelical Christian of 2 296
Zambia(Members)
Independent Churches 6 805 8 220
Other Missions' Rural - - 70 -
Health Centre
Total 82 15950 694 7275
% of Churches' Contribution 35.4 26.7 10.1 21.6
Attendance (New cases of out-
patients)
3,946,243 10,112,643
% of children treated under
	
44.7	 53.8
out-patients
Source: Compiled from CCZ, 1987. Table 3.13 p.48.
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Table 4-6(a) Comparison Between Church and Government District Hospitals
Church Government
Name Number of Beds Name Number of Beds
Chavuma 60 Chinsali 84
Chikankata 263 Chipata 419
Chingola 220 Chitembo 128
Chitokoloki 178 Choma 310
Kalene Hill 210 Gwembe 56
Kamoto 82 Isoka 75
Kasaba 85 Kabompo 78
Kishikishi 184 Kab we 556
Katondwe 112 Kafue 62
Katete 432 Kalabo 99
Loloma 94 Kamuchanga 80
Luampa 132 Kaoma 57
Lubwe 103 Kasama 329
Lukulu 121 Kawambwa 47
Macha 208 Livingstone 420
Mangango 110 Luwingu 49
Minga 142 Lundazi 137
Monze 225 Mansa 257
Mpanshya 82 Mazabuka 169
Mpongwe 118 Mbala 233
Mtendere 75 Mbereshi 150
Mukinge 165 Mongu 347
Mwami 184 Mpika 53
Mwandi 110 Mporokoso 95
Nyanje 157 Mumbwa 97
Sichili 145 Mwinilunga 78
St. Theresa Luanshya 115 Namwal a 59
Yuka 79 Nyimba 73
Zimba 68 Petauke 65
Senanga 140
Serenje 62
Sesheke 120
Si avonga 60
Solwezi 167
Thompson 115
Zambezi 122
Total 4258 Total 5529
Source: Compiled from CCZ 1987, pp. 52-53.
Table 4-6(b)Comparison between Church and Government District Hospitals
Range	 Church
	 Government
Number	 Number of	 Number	 Number of
Beds	 Beds
Small: Up to 80 beds	 5	 367	 14	 870
Medium: 80-120 beds 	 10	 1047	 7	 690
Large : 120-200 beds	 8	 1286	 6	 846
Big Hospitals 200+ Beds	 6	 1558	 9	 3123
Total	 29	 4258
	 36	 5529
Source: CCZ undated, p.53.
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Just after independence, health care received a high priority in the
first development plans of the new government. In this context, it was
possible for churches to receive a much larger share of enlarged budgets
for health service from the government. In fact, in comparison with the
colonial period when average 5 percent of the total budget was subsidy to
the churches, the percentage rose to 13 per cent in 1967 and 15 per cent in
1968, averaging 10 per cent between 1964 and 1975 (Henkel, 1989: 151). At
that time, when the state could secure sufficient fund for health care, the
missionary societies, which were drown together into the UCZ, slowly
withdrew more and personnel and finance from this area and Zambian
church no longer had the means to run its medical facilities. Therefore,
several hospitals 6 were handed over to the state.
Especially after the deterioration of the Zambian economy,
however, the government could no longer afford to carry out its plan to
expand the health facilities. It is also true that the government could not
get necessary staff, medicine and equipment. Therefore also in this area,
there have been attempts to return hospitals to the sponsorship of the
churches whose hospitals are relatively well managed by the recruitment
of mission doctors and so on (Henkel, 1989: 152).
Apart from education and health, there is another area in which
churches have played an important role in terms of assisting members to
engage into production for the purpose of income generation. Therefore
they have been involved in projects providing skill training to the
disadvantaged and the youth so that they can be self-reliant. We now turn
to ongoing churches' project in the next section.
4.1.3 Ongoing Projects and Policies of Churches: With Main Attention to
the case of the Christian Council of Zambia
6The hospitals transferred were hospitals in Mbereshi, Chitambo and Senanga.
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4.1.3.1 Projects
As stated in the previous section, a variety of churches have been
involved in development activities especially in the areas of education
and health. Although their emphases are different for theological reasons,
churches in Zambia are supposed to share common attitudes toward
development activities as will be shown in this part of the chapter.
In comparison with the Catholic Church which is composed of nine
autonomous dioceses in their development activities even in terms of
finance, the development activities of the CCZ are not so widely
distributed in geographical terms (Henkel, 1989: 198). Even so, their
activities have been by far more diversified and distributed than the EFZ
whose activities have just recently started by its small secretariat.
The origin of the CCZ can be traced back to a loose confederation
under the general Missionary Conference (GMC) which existed between
1914 and 1944. The members of the GMC were missionary societies
working in Northern Rhodesia at that period. The role of the GMC was to
forge cooperation among missionary societies and to work together in the
fields of education, medical services and religious broadcasting. In
addition, the GMC's role included to advise the colonial government on
national issues because it was then dominated by missionaries from
abroad. At this stage, there were few efforts to integrate native Africans
into the administration of the GMC, though they not only had interests in
the problem of "backwardness" of natives but also considered to treat with
it, as can be found in the paper titled "The Future of the Native" read at
the conference at Kafue in 1929:
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"...We call the natives the backward races; and rightly so in many
opinion. We need first to find out what is the cause of this
backwardness".
"If Christianity is to save Africa it seems to me that it must be the
Christianity of Christ in its simple form" (ZNA, RC/365, pp.9-10).
In 1944, the GMC was changed to the Christian Council of Northern
Rhodesia (CCNR), which was used until 1963 just before Zambia attained
independence. This was the crucial period when Northern Rhodesia was
struggling for independence. Attitude of the CCNR to the liberation
struggle will be mentioned later in this chapter.
Even at this stage, natives were excluded from the CCNR's
activities, though the CCNR had experienced pressure and need for native
Africans to be involved in the CCNR. This is also the period when the
CCNR struggled to solve internal problem of inimical sectionalism on the
issue of "racism" within the members particularly in the Copperbelt.
It was at the first pre-independence meeting held in Kitwe that the
members of various denominations formally formed the Christian
Council of Zambia (CCZ). This was the first time when S.H. Chilehse, an
African, was elected chairman and four Africans were also elected
members of the first executive committee. In 1965, Rev. P. Kazhila was
elected general secretary, and the CCZ has been administrated by Zambians
since then.
Since its inception, it has passed through three distinctive stages
(CCZ, 1987:2-3): (1) From 1964 to 1971, (2) from 1972 to 1984, and (3) from
1985. In the first stage, the efforts the CCZ were devoted to promote
cooperation, fellowship, unity and Evangelical work within Zambia.
During this formative period, the CCZ played an active role in promoting
dialogue with Government on matters related to stability, freedom of
worship, health, social welfare, race relations, human rights and dignity of
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mankind. The strengthening of Local Christian Council in Zambia was
given top priority. In the second stage, however, the main focus of the
CCZ was shifted to promote it to be known in the international scene and
exert its involvement in such World Christian bodies as the World
Council of Churches, All Africa Conference of Churches. In the country,
its activities include education, skills training, women activities, refugee
work, construction of the Church House, and creation of the Local
Christian Councils. Even though members churches and organisations
were deeply involved in development work, the CCZ has not yet got its
development policy at this stage. It was in the third stage when the CCZ
and other church organisations were pressed to answer the call of people
in the worsening economic situation in Zambia that they stressed the need
for embarking on "total liberalisation process". In this process, the CCZ
organised a workshop for member churches and organisations with other
mother bodies in October 1986 to plan together a new development
strategy, which resulted in a booklet Christian Liberation Justice and
Development: The Churches' Concern for Human Development in
Zambia, which is the basic but crucial document which contains churches'
recognition of deteriorating economy and their way of involvement to
solve problems. Also the CCZ itself issued a Development Projects for the
period of 1986-1988 towards People's Liberation Through Social Justice and
Development with more than hundred pages.
The organisational structure of the CCZ is shown in figure 4-1.
The General Conference, which is represented by two delegates
from member churches, plus a proportion based on Church membership,
and one delegate for associate members like Christian organisations, is the
top decision-making body and is held at least once in every three years.
The Executive Committee carries out the general policy of the Council
with the assistance of the Standing Committee which is appointed by the
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Executive Committee. There are other Committees which are appointed
in the General Conference that deal with special matters like women's
work, refugee work, development involvement, education and youth
work. The General Secretary, who is the chief executive for the Council, is
responsible for implementation of the decisions of the Council and the
day to day running of affairs. Under the General Secretary, various
departments are carrying out projects.
In spite of the involvement in some refugee projects including
education, general assistance, and awareness building, the three main
areas in which member churches of the CCZ and the CCZ itself have been
involved are education, health and income generating activities.
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Among various projects carried out by the Project Department of
the CCZ, the "Twafwane Programme" (Twafwane, in Cibemba meaning
"Let us work together") has been quite important in some ways. This
programme began in its pilot stage in 1975, and it has been expanded since
1980 when the Projects Department was established to revamp the
activities of the programme for school leavers, a programme aimed at
training of school youths with skills for self-employment in their
communities of origin. "The Twafwane experience has clearly
demonstrated that for a programme as radical in approach as the
Twafwane programme, a limitless amount of commitment by the
implementing staff is necessary" (CCZ, undated: 6). Two identified
components of approach through this project's experience in
implementing school leavers projects are (1) the organisation of the local
Committee of the CCZ for the purpose of conscientising the local
community on the development process, and (2) the identification of
appropriate training structure, relevant in content to the local conditions.
In 1990, there had been 52 school leavers projects established by using the
Twafwane approach in such areas as agriculture, carpentry, and tailoring.
These projects had successfully trained and settled youths in their
communities of origin. Therefore the first importance of this project is
that this project has fostered community relation patterns among youths
and has promoted an awareness of their isolation and deprivation of
institutional allocation of resources. The second importance of this project
is its influence on a change of government structure and policy. By
adopting this approach as the official policy of youth training, the
government created the Ministry of Youth and Sport during the Third
National Development Plan (TNDP) between 1979 and 1983, after failing
to establish the Department of Youth under the Ministry of Education
during the Second National Development Plan (SNDP). When we read
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the section of the youth development in the TNDP, we can find the
similar programme as the Twafwane, namely production skill training,
community-based skill training, youth settlement schemes (TNDP: 412).
Therefore, it can be considered that CCZ kept some influence on state
policy in this regard.
Another important project of the CCZ, the Small Projects Fund, was
initiated in 1983 with assistance from the EZE of West Germany. It is a
programme that offers grants and a wide range of community
development services for poor rural, pen-urban and urban people as well
in the areas of agriculture, livestock, carpentry and cottage industry. This
has been designed to provide a fast flexible response for local self-help
activities to overcome poverty and shortcomings for further development
and has funded 43 projects around the end of 1980s. We can read the
premise and vision behind this programme as follows:
'The Small Projects Fund is based on the premise that for a vast
majority of population to have poverty is a social sin. It is immoral
because the style and structure that continue to maintain man in
dehumanised stance are created by man. It is from this view that we
recognise that the onslaught against poverty can need be achieved
by radical changes in societal structure. Hence the need to mobilize
the small local groups at the grassroots for effective control of
social-political-economic structures that influence their
destiny"(CCZ, undated leaflet, The Small Projects Fund Programme:
"Tool for Development": 4).
Here, in order to consider Zambian churches' philosophy of
development activities, I return to and review briefly the booklet
Christian Liberation justice and Development: The Churches' concern for
Human Development in Zambia (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987), in which the
leaders of the Christian churches in Zambia expressed their responsibility
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and concerns as members of their society. Their basic stance is shown as
follows:
The mission of the churches is religious but, for Christians, religion
is not merely a private or spiritual matter reduced to acts of
Evangelical piety or ritual. Indeed, from this religious mission comes
a light, an insight and an energy which contribute greatly to the
development of human societies. The churches have a vision of the
individual dignity of men and women and the Christian society of
shared interests and social justice"(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 14).
They recognised their roles and limitations by writing:
"The churches have always been involved in the fields of social
welfare, health, education and the promotion of human
development. However, it can be argued that their role in the overall
development of the country has not been comprehensive enough. Many
feel that the determination of the churches to protect human rights
and religious freedom has not always been sensitive enough to the
many forms of social and economic exploitation and injustice from
which people seek liberation" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 10).
One of the important concerns of churches in Zambia shown explicitly in
this document is criticism of the tendency of the widening gap which
separates the 'haves' from 'have-nots.' They interpret this "crisis"
through class analysis, when they wrote that:
"Economic and social classes ... reflect institutionalized injustice...
Instead of increasing divisions in the nation between rich and poor,
they should aim at a more equal distribution of the national wealth.
They should also strive for a more just sharing out of the sacrifices
which need to be made. No one sector of the population should be
expected to have to bear a disproportionate burden"(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC,
1987: 26).
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Their concern is thus to relieve this kind of injustice by being involved in
programmes for the disadvantaged, especially peasant farmers in rural
areas. They feel the necessity to participate in bodies responsible for the
planning and monitoring of rural development at local or district level
(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 28) and the importance of allocating additional
resources including health, education, transport and recreational facilities
in order to make rural life more worthwhile and more attractive (CCZ,
EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 29). These attitudes can be summarised in a following
paragraph:
"As it is an essential dimension of the church's mission to uphold the
rights and interests of the under-privileged, we shall give our full
support to measures designed to reduce the gap between the rich and
the poor, and to alleviate the hardships of low-income groups"
(CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 31).
Considering these dimensions of churches' concerns, it is possible for us to
find that several features of churches' approach for development projects.
In fact, churches' terminology like peasant farmers, under-privileged, and
the poor have to be clarified. In a part of the document, titled "Suggestions
for Special Areas of Concern," more specific target groups are mentioned.
They are small peasants who did not have any organisational forms of
"pressure groups," and female-headed household (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987:
26-27). They were considered to be "voiceless" and becoming more and
more vulnerable and marginalised (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987). In fact, projects
of the CCZ are almost situated in rural areas 7. In the case of Catholic
Churches, however, their development projects are geographically more
widely distributed and include some urban projects like homecraft centre
7Henkel's conclusion that all projects are in rural areas in the case of the CCZ (1989: 200) is
now misleading because there is a women's project in the semi-urban area of Kaunda Square.
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in the Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces. Therefore, churches' target
groups are poor urban dwellers as well as poor peasants.
Even so, Zambian churches have been more ideologically oriented
and active in political affairs, because they sometimes use "language"
containing political connotations. This tendency is more apparent when
they talk about churches' relationship with the state to which I turn
shortly.
4.1.3.2 Financial Resources
The mainline churches' financial resources are mainly from
"ecumenical partners" overseas. This fact offered relative strength of these
churches financial position in Africa. In this section, their financial
dependence on "ecumenical partners" will be briefly considered by
refering to the case of the CCZ (see Table 4-7).
The CCZ received funds from "ecumenical partners" through its
projects and individual department not through the central
administration. Therefore, there are multiple channels in the organisation
of the CCZ in terms of receiving funds.
According to an available report of auditors of the CCZ (1982),
which details of sources of grant can be identified; almost all income for
general administration for the CCZ, apart from rent income of the Church
House, derived from its "ecumenical partners," namely the World
Council of Churches (WCC), the Methodist Church (USA), the United
Church of Canada, United Presbyterian Church (USA), and the United
Methodist Church (USA). Also in the Department of Refugee, the WCC
contributed 30 per cent of its funds. Unfortunately, the date appeared in
the document was not completed. However, roughly speaking, between 25
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to 30 per cent of total budget for activities of the CCZ was covered by
grants from these "ecumenical partners."
Table 4-7 Ecumenical Partners of the CCZ
Agricultural Missions, New York
All Africa Conference of Churches, Nairobi
Bread for the World, Stuttgart
Christian Aid, London
CODEL, New York
CUSO Projects, Lusaka
Dan Church Aid
Diakonisches Wer EK-D, Germany
Dienste in Urbarse, Stuttgart
Discipline of Christ, Dutch, Indianapolis
EMW Communication Commission
ESP, Stuttgart
EZE, Germany
Gossner Mission, Germany (then East)
Heifer Project International, Arkansas
ICCO, Netherlands
Inter Church Aid Evangeliches, Netherlands
Lutheran World Federation, Uppsala
Lutheran World Federation, Lusaka
National Council of Churches, USA
National Council of Churches of Christ, New York
Netherlands Missionary Council
Norwegian Church Aid
Presbyterian Hunger Programme, Atlanta
Presbyterians in the USA, New York
The Hunger Project, New York
United Church of Canada
United Church of Christ
United Methodist Church
United Presbyterian Church, USA
World Council of Churches
World Vision International
Source: Compiled from CCZ, 1987:68
Apart from them, rent income was a major part of financial
resources, and other sources of income were donations from member
churches, fund gained as a result of raising activities, grants from other
international organisations like UNHCR.
It is also necessary to refer to government grants. In fact, the
financial year of 1982, there was quite limited grants (only 60 kwacha to the
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Multi-purpose centre) from the state, which was almost nothing
considering the total amount of income of this year (341,905 Kwacha).
4.1.4 Political Involvement of Zambian Churches
In this section, I will deal with Zambian churches involvement in
political affairs. Firstly I will briefly take the case of churches' concern
about the issue of the Central African Federation before independence.
Secondly, my focus will shift to the case of controversy of introduction of
"scientific socialism" in educational institution. And thirdly I will
consider the political involvement of churches in the process of transition
to multi-party politics.
4.1.4.1 From Colonial Period to Political Independence
The Churches' concerns about "national affairs" have been
concisely documented (Weller & Linden, 1984: 191-200). These include the
effective campaign by missionaries against the tax systems which were
imposed on Africans by the British Colonial Office in early colonial
administration days, and the opposition to the Federation. Their limited
political characteristics can be observable concerning the case of their
concern about the issue of Federation. At the fifth meeting of the Christian
Council of Northern Rhodesia in 1953, member churches resolved that:
'The Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia recognises that it is
primarily the right of every Christian to hold his own view on the
issue of Federation in the light of his own conscience, but it wishes to
express deep concern that the Government has found it necessary to
proceed with Federation while African opinion remains so strongly
opposed to it. The Council respectfully requests Government to issue
such a declaration of Rights for all men within the territory as
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shall remove all doubts as to their future well-being within the
State. The Christian Council hopes that Africans will be given an
increasing share in the educational, industrial and political life of
the State... The Christian Council reminds all sections of the
Community of the importance of avoiding any action which might
possibly lend to violence and of promoting goodwill between races in
every possible way" (CCNR, 1953: 13).
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This resolution can be read that the Council was not united on the matter,
and in fact this is a period when the unity of the Missionary Conference
was beginning to show cracks, even though this showed churches' protest
against the idea of the Federation to some extent, writing that "African
opinion remains so strongly opposed to it." Therefore this limited
involvement actually "did not prevent a deep and wide feeling of betrayal
among African Christians" (Weller & Linden, 1984: 197).
It was when Federation was not fulfilling the promises that were
made when it was imposed at the end of the 1950s and the Federation's
leaders were campaigning for Dominion status that the churches
expressed explicitly their political position seeking independent status of
the Northern Rhodesia (Weller & Linden, 1984: 198-199), as was shown in
a Kenneth Kaunda's remark; "there is one bright light in Northern
Rhodesia; the churches have come out and said what they think is
wrong," when he read a statement of the Executive of the Christian
Council in 1959:
"Under normal circumstances the Church is bound to support the
State and the forces aimed at preserving law and order, but this
obligation is qualified by the Church's higher loyalty to the law of
God. Where the State is misguiding its stewardship of power; where
it is not adequately fulfilling its function of protecting the God-given
freedom of all citizens; where it is favouring one section of the
community to determinant of the others, then Christian is called to
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protest and to take whatever action is compatible with the
Christian Gospel" (quoted in Weller & Linden, 1984: 199).
This position can be also ascertained in the eighth meeting of the Council
held in the same year, when they resolved that:
"The Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia (recognising the
opposition to the concept of Federation which already exists among
the great majority of the inhabitants of Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland), believes that any increase . in the powers of Federal
Government forward complete autonomy within the Commonwealth
may only rightly be granted when it is based upon the full consent of
the majority of the people of the Federation"(CCNR, 1960).
With the achievement of political independence, the opportunities for
Christian influence became greater than ever, because President Kaunda
"showed himself willing to seek the advise, not only of Colin Morris 8, and
of other trusted missionaries, but also of the Zambian leaders who were
now achieving position of authority in all the churches" (Weller &
Linden, 1984: 199-200). In fact, there have been regular consultations which
President Kaunda has held with clergies (Tasie & Gray, 1978: 8) and as in
the case of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the churches' network
has provided as effective bridge between the local communities and the
wider, national leadership (Cook, 1978: 288-293). Therefore, it is possible to
consider that mainstream Christian churches gained a influential position
vis-a-vis the ruling elites in post-colonial Zambian politics. This shows us
a dimension of mainstream churches' institutionalisation in Zambia.
8 Cohn Morris, who was a minister of one of congregations in Chingola of the United Church
of Central Africa in Rhodesia, played an important role in the political life of the country
before and after independence. He was the only person who was willing to incur
unpopularity from members of one party, who gained the confidence of the opposing one,
and who gained the confidence of African nationalists to a remarkable degree. After
independence, he was one of most trusted advisers of the new president, Kenneth Kaunda.
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Here it is also necessary to briefly refer to the role of churches'
contribution to elite formation. It is generally well known that the
mission had a influence on, especially the first generation of, national
elites who got political power after political independence. Zambia is also
the case. For instance both Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, the former vice
President and founder of the banned United Progressive Party, were pupils
at Lubwa mission school and teachers at mission schools. In historical
terms, Munali and Chalimbana are most famous schools where the first
generation national elites attended. According to Henkel (1989: 138), there
is a degree of balance between the denominations in state leadership in
comparison with Malawi, where the Presbyterian Church is dominant in
upper leadership level. As we see below, relatively close link between
churches and political elites has sustained churches' influence on
Zambia's political affairs.
4.1.4.2 Church's Opposition to the Introduction of "Scientific Socialism" in
the Educational System
As Haynes characterised, Zambia is supposed to be a case that:
"it was highly important even for apparently stable regimes to have
a reasonable working relationship with mainstream religious
organizations, because otherwise the latter may form their own
alliance with important interest groups to engineer a situation where
the government finds itself under heavy pressure to amend its
policies" (1996: 102).
Therefore, generally speaking, churches' approach to the state was not
necessarily hostile, but basically collaborative as far as their interests were
not in danger of being damaged. It is only particular times when not only
churches but also the country faced "crisis" that church leaders "felt
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compelled to speak out ... on issues for national development" (CCZ, EFZ,
ZEC, 1987: 44).
The case of churches' strong resistance against the UNIP
government's introduction of "scientific socialism" in all educational
institution within the context of the nationwide educational reform
between 1976 and 1982 is a dramatic example of the upsurge of civil society
against the one-party state and its ideology. This event had basically two
aspects. On the one hand, seemingly, it was a debate concerning the
philosophical interpretation of "Zambian Humanism", the official
ideology of Zambia. On the other hand, it was a power game between the
state and churches. It was agreed that it was the churches that won over
the game 9, considering the outcome of this controversy that the
government did not introduce scientific socialism as a subject in the
educational system. In other words, churches seceded in preventing the
introduction of scientific socialism by effectively resisting against the state.
In this controversy, in my view, the most important factor working
during this debate was not moral superiority on the side of the churches
but the political power of Zambian churches as actors in civil society,
which I will prove in this section.
Problems which prompted the UNIP government to initiate
educational reform, which resulted in a government document Education
for Development: Draft Statement on Educational Reform in 1976,
included the shortage of places for education at various levels of the
school system which caused problems of drop-outs and unemployment of
youth. Originally churches were in favour of the reforms and participation
in the debate. But two problems occurred at this stage, heightening
churches' criticism. There were (1) the exclusion of religious education
9 It was when President Kaunda banned open discussion on this issue in '1982 that this debate
itself was practically over (Lungu, 1986: 400).
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from the proposed curriculum, and (2) uses of all suitable churches and
church buildings as classrooms to alleviate the shortage of school
accommodation. The first problem was related to the shift to a socialist
interpretation of Zambian Humanism. Against this proposal, churches
used a theological interpretation of churches' building as "holy places",
which could not be allowed to be used for secular purposes. On the first
problem, which was supposed to mar the church's interests, churches
developed their own interpretation of Zambian Humanism as an ideology
which safeguarded selected aspects of Zambian traditions as well as
Christian norms and values (Draisma, 1987: 344-346) in order to prevent
the intrusion of atheistic tendency of communism and Marxism. As will
be clarified soon, this was also one of the tactics of churches' opposition to
the introduction of "scientific socialism" in the following years (cf. Lungu,
1986: 399). As a result, a new draft of proposal, which came out in 1977,
Educational Reform: Proposals and Recommendations took churches'
opinions into consideration and included spiritual and moral education
among important areas of learning.
In 1979, there arose another, more severe, tension between the
state and churches after several statements of a plan for the introduction
of "scientific socialism" as a subject at all educational institutions. For
example, in one of the addresses made by UNIP Secretary General Mainza
Chona, who was charged to lead the debate on Scientific Socialism as an
instrument to achieve Humanism, at Lusaka's Roman Catholic Cathedral
to mark World Peace Day in January 1979, he expressed his view of the co-
existence of Christianity and socialism. In addition, in late 1978 when the
Union of Working Class Youths was set up by UNIP, the union's publicity
secretary Njekwa Anamela announced the Party's intention to arm the
working class youth with revolutionary theory founded on the basis of
scientific socialism (National Mirror, February 1979: 1). Therefore,
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seemingly, there was division among leadership within UNIP (e.g.,
Draisma, 1989: 417). The church was suspicious and concerned about this
issue because scientific socialism is identified with Marxism which
condemns Christianity as the "opium of the masses" in their
interpretation, a view which the churches felt was also shared by some
UNIP advocates.
The churches' effective reaction to this problem was initiated with
the issue of a pastoral letter from the leaders of the Christian Churches,
which has been sometimes used as a tool by Zambian churches to inform
people of important issues, entitled Marxism, Humanism and
Christianity. It was published in August 1979 by leaders of three mother
bodies of churches in Zambia, including two archbishops and seven
bishops of the Zambia Episcopal Conference, General Secretary of the
Christian Council of Zambia, and James Hess of the Zambia Evangelical
Fellowship. This is a document in which the church explicitly showed the
areas of disagreement between scientific socialism and Zambian
Humanism.
In this document, leaders of churches argued that the "Scientific
Socialism," which the UNIP government planned to introduce as a subject
of education, is completely contradictory to UNIP's official philosophy,
Zambian Humanism. The churches' basic stance can be read that
"Zambian Humanist Socialism has a completely different basis from
Scientific Socialism"(Marxisin, Humanism and Christianity: 11). They
showed their understanding of Zambian Humanist Socialism by quoting a
paragraph of Kaunda's Humanism in Zambia, Part 1 as follows: in
Zambian Humanism,
"Man is the centre of all human activity. All of us are God's creatures
and this is a firm enough foundation to see us through what we are
about to do -- that is to lay down a solid foundation on which to build
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One Zambia and One Nation. The world, then, and all that is in it
must serve man, while man himself is centred on God" (Marxism,
Humanism and Christianity: 9).
On the other hand, scientific socialism, in this document, was interpreted
to be
"thoroughly opposed to Christianity and even to a simple belief in
God" (Marxism, Humanism and Christianity: 7),
because it is "uncompromisingly atheistic" (Marxism, Humanism and
Christianity: 6). Therefore,
"... We differ profoundly from Marxists in our understanding of the
human person, so that Marxist Humanism is also radically different
from Christian Humanism" (Marxism, Humanism and
Christianity:12)
and
"The Christian Churches find it necessary to reject only those forms
of Socialism which do not respect the dignity and religious
dimension of man and which, therefore, can never lead to real
humanism. Scientific Socialism is one of these" (Marxism,
Humanism and Christianity: 4).
In conclusion, this pastoral letter gave the clear message to Zambians,
which implied strong stances against the oppressive political system
related to the view of "liberation theology" developed in Latin America:
"Dear Brothers and Sisters, we must warn you that, if Zambia
follows a Marxist-Leninist, Scientific-Socialist path, then the
freedoms enshrined in our constitution will be threatened. We can,
indeed, expect the kind of pressure on religion and personal freedom
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that is found wherever this inhumane doctrine is applied. Before it
is too late, we call on all our Church members to take a stand so as to
protect our present liberties. Many members and leaders of the
Ruling Party are Christians. We ask them to do all in their power to
keep the Party true to its own principles. Now is the time for every
one to take political life seriously and not ,o allow an oppressive
system to be introduced because of their indifference and inactivity"
(Marxism, Humanism and Christianity: 21-22).
Also in 1979, on the church-owned monthly newspaper, the National
Mirror, there appeared various articles on Marxism, including its history
(no. 80) and relationship with Christianity (no. 81). One of Kaunda's
responses to this issue can be found in his address to the 14th UNIP
National Council (National Mirror, no. 88). In this address he argued
several topics related to the churches' concerns, including problems of
capitalism, relationship between Marxism and Christianity, and denial of
the replacement of Humanism by scientific socialism. But he did not
mention relationship between Humanism and scientific socialism which
was the main churches' concern. What he suggested was that he found the
Marxist condemnation of religion as the opium of the masses "an
interesting and important case for deeper study and analysis insofar as I
understand religion in the form of Christianity", and that "Marxists and
church leaders should meet from time to time and discuss matters of
common interest" (National Mirror, no. 88). Apart from this address,
there had not been any comments on this issue from the UNIP side for
some two years, although there appeared several articles related to the
topic of Christianity, socialism and Zambian Humanism in the National
Mirror (e.g., no. 124, no. 132, no. 133). In addition, in one issue, there
appeared an article entitled "Marxism Scores", which took the issue of the
Syllabus for Political-Ideological Education published by the Ministry of
education and Culture for Teacher Training College containing a section
299
of political education at every level (National Mirror, no. 137), to which
church leaders were opposed in the following year.
It was in 1982 when the first church leaders' seminar on
Humanism and Development was held at Mulungushi Hall that
President Kaunda again gave voice to the issue of the introduction of
scientific socialism in schools with the intention that this was "an exercise
to try and get to the root cause of our misunderstanding" (Daily Mail, 29
April 1982). He addressed that
"We will start the teaching of scientific socialism in schools
not because of fear but out of conviction. We want our children
to know what scientific socialism is all about because it exists
and this will be part of their political education,"
and stressed that the Party has no intention to indoctrinate young people
with scientific socialism and would not suppress all youth organisations
in favour of the Young Pioneers (Daily Mail, 19 March 1982). At this time,
the reaction from church leaders' was quite similar as that in 1979. They
"reiterated that in order to better Zambian society, we accept
Zambian Humanism as opposed to Scientific Socialism as the
vehicle to organise our society. We do not need any other form
of socialism to support or even achieve the Humanism we
have accepted. Therefore, we totally reject 'Scientific
Socialism'. Further, we endorse the open letter written by our
Church leaders. In that letter they have spelt out clearly our
opposition. We would like to avoid a stage where class
conflict, loss of basic human rights and mutual trust, and
violation of conscience by coercion in the development of our
society" (Christian Responses made at the First Church
Leaders' Seminar on Humanism and Development: 18,).
In the same year, another churches' response on this issue came from the
United Church of Zambia (UCZ) to which Kaunda himself belongs. They
expressed their disagreement quite frankly as follows:
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"We the Synod of the UCZ fear that the embracing of the
foundation principles of scientific socialism will lead to the
Marxist system being imposed on our nation. With its rigid
doctrine governing not only social, political, and economic
theory, but hampering Christians as it has been imposed upon
people of other nations. The UNIP Party claims that
"believers of Marxist/Leninism of communism are allies of
those who believe in Humanism." We do not accept believers
in Marxist/Leninism of communism as our allies, because of
their treatment of Christians. While this does not mean the
UNIP will automatically follow the examples of the Marxist
parties, it is not foolish of the church to worry that might
become true in some future" (UCZ, 1982: 10-11).
And they warned and suggested that:
"... we would like to reiterate our fears of the Party's
intentions to introduce Scientific Socialism at primary schools
and teacher training colleges. This approach is similar to the
strategy that has been adopted in countries which have
Marxist/Leninist Parties who try to influence tender minds
beginning at kindergarten levels and systematically going up
the educational system. Our concern is that if we emulated
this programme blindly and introduced it into our educational
system, we shall be sowing seeds of contradictions in the
nation's thought process, and consequently destructive
political instability would become the order of the day"
(UCZ, 1982: 14).
and that
"The Synod of the United Church of Zambia is disappointed
at the lack of Zambia's self-confidence and consistency in
developing its own philosophy. Instead, the political leaders
seem to be vacillating between and being swayed hither and
thither by foreign ideologies. We should have thought that
as a non-aligned country, we should retain this alignment in
political ideologies as well. Our approach would have been to
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incorporate into the philosophy of Humanism a balanced
assortment of constructive concepts and practices from other
nations and which fit into our unique experiment of nation
building" (UCZ, 1982: 15).
In this controversy, we should not overlook another aspect of
conflict between the state and the church. It is that of control of churches
by the state. In the opening address of the seminar held at Mulungushi
Hall, Kaunda said that:
"We regard religious organisations and you the leaders as important
instruments of the Party and its task of transforming our present
society into a Humanist one" (Daily Mail, 19 March 1982, emphasis
added).
and after mentioning that the Party has no intention to indoctrinate
young people with scientific socialism and would not suppress all youth
organisations in favour of the Young Pioneers, he continued to say that:
"If this were so, organisations such as scouts, girls guides, boys'
brigade and others would be banned. what the Party is doing is to get
all these other organisations affiliated to the Party Youth League"
(Daily Mail, 19 March 1982).
The United Church of Zambia sharply opposed this interpretation
of the role of the church in society when they said that:
"It is our concern that UNIP in its statements misunderstands the
role of the church in a society... We the Church owe our existence to
God alone. On Him alone are we dependent. We are not the
instrument of a political party or a government... If the task that we
have received from God coincides with the interests of a Party or a
government, the relationship between the church and the state will
be one of mutual benefit. If the task received from God differs from
the interests of the Party, there will be conflict when the Party or
government seeks to impose its will on the independent church.
Conflict will also arise when each seeks to influence the direction of
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a nation. If the state recognises the independence of the church, the
conflict over direction will be creative and will benefit the nation"
(UCZ, 1982: 10, emphasis added).
This clearly shows us the churches' intention to keep their
autonomy from the state in both political and economic fields. This can be
taken as the basic churches' idea of their relationship with the state in
Zambia.
What is important in this case is that, as Lungu pointed out (Lungu,
1986: 400), churches' reactions were not confined to these letters and there
were several prayer meetings against socialism. Christians in the country
was called to pray and fast by church leaders on 29 May 1982 to reflect on
the proposed introduction of scientific socialism in schools (Daily Mail, 27
May 1982). Actually "hundreds of Christians on Saturday converged at
Ndola's Cathedral of Christ the King for ecumenical service to pray, reflect
and fast against the proposed teaching of scientific socialism in schools"
(Daily Mail, 31 May 1982).
One episode which shows us the unpopularity of the introduction
of scientific socialism in the period was that one of lecturers of Zambia
Institute of Technology (ZIT) was shouted down when he supported its
introduction in schools (Daily Mail, 17 May 1982).
In fact, there was no clear end of this debate. Apparently, this
controversy faded away without any clear compromises between the
church and the state. Even churches' leaders do not clearly know the
result (Personal Interview with the Acting General Secretary of Zambia
Episcopal Conference, 16th January 1992), but the fact is that "scientific
socialism" was not introduced. In the process of this debate, even issues to
be discussed were not so clear, because the churches resisted the ideology
of scientific socialism itself in its relationship with Zambian Humanism,
while Kaunda's argument was limited to the introduction of scientific
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socialism as a subject. It is unclear that "what exactly the Zambian
advocates of introducing scientific socialism in education have in mind"
(Draisma, 1987: 421) at this stage.
What is interesting is that, in 1987, there appeared a work by Henry
Meebelo, a "brain" and politician of UNIP, titled Zambian Humanism and
Scientific Socialism: A Comparative Study, in which he wrote that "the
type of socialism referred to in Zambian Humanism is neither the so-
called African Socialism nor democratic socialism or social democracy, ...
but Scientific Socialism" (Meebelo, 1987: 6, original emphasis). This fact
eventually shows us that there was no confirmed idea of the relationship
between Zambian Humanism and various kinds of socialism, especially
scientific socialism as early as 1982 among top UNIP members as
mentioned above, which tells us a reason of ambiguity of the intention of
advocates in the UNIP. This was why the controversy in 1982 seemed not
to be a philosophical debate per se.
Therefore, it is possible to assume that there were other reasons for
the apparent victory of the church. Now we are turning to the reasons
from which churches' power in its relation to the state has been derived.
As pointed out by Lungu (1986: 400-401), several reason can be identifiable.
What he pointed out were (1) the strong Christian background of the
leadership, (2) churches' role in social development, and (3) the churches'
style of criticism against the state. The first point is quite true, taking into
consideration the fact that Kaunda himself is a practicing member of UCZ
and other high-ranking politicians are either Catholic or Protestant. This is
a natural result of the missions' involvement in the field of education.
Especially Kaunda came from the "mission milieu" and had his closest
advisers from missionaries (Henkel, 1989: 138). Also Kaunda's Humanism
clearly has a religious aspect, whose origin can be traced back to his close
association with G.A. Krapf, a German theologian working at the Mindolo
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Ecumenical Centre (Henkel, 1989: 138) as some scholars have pointed out
(e.g., Dillon-Malone, 1989). Furthermore, churches are supposed to play
important roles for the attainment of Humanism. We can find this
tendency when Kaunda said, at the 25th anniversary of the Mindolo
Ecumenical Foundation in 1983, that:
"As we move to the high stage of Humanism in the next five years, I
see the Church as the living spiritual fountain of this nation. No
other institution can play this role because no other institution is
adequate even to claim this role itself" (National Mirror, no. 187).
There is another episode which shows churches' influence derived from
leaders' Christian background. In fact, there was suggestion from top
politicians to Kaunda to arrest some church leaders during the period of
this controversy. But Kaunda himself declined this suggestion (Personal
Interview with Rev. F. Sakala, 23rd December 1991). Therefore top
politicians also had to seriously take the meaning of "prayers" which are
seemingly "symbolical" forms of resistance of Christians.
The second factor is also important because the state and the church
in Zambia have played complementary roles in development activities
both in attitudes and practices. The churches themselves appreciate "the
importance of good relationships and collaboration between the churches
and the state for well-being of the nation," and they ''have indeed been
loyal in our collaboration with the state especially in the fields of health,
education and rural development" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 14), as already
stated in the earlier part of this chapter. Actually this attitude of churches
was confirmed even in practical terms by my interviews with some
church leaders and officers working for churches' development projects.
Responding to my questions if there have been any conflicts between the
government and churches in development fields, and if there have been
any interventions from the government in churches' development
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projects, all respondents said "no." This involvement certainly has
institutionalised churches as indispensable component in Zambian
society, 'which has been appreciated by the government. Also in
weakening financial conditions, churches became more important
vehicles in developmental activities.
The third factor is quite manifestly shown in the letters issued in
1979 and 1982. Churches "praised the government for introducing what
amounts to Christian Humanism, and even join the leadership in
condemning exploitative capitalism, yet politely but firmly rejected
scientific socialism" (Lungu, 1986: 401). In the second republic, churches
repeatedly praised and appreciated Zambian Humanism because it "has its
root in our traditional values. It has helped the Zambian people to
rediscover their identity. It is person-centred but not materialistic. It fits
our idea of development as being progress from what is less human to
what is more human" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 4). But it is quite doubtful if
all church leaders really appreciated the Zambian Humanism, when we
can find a passage written by a church leader, who is General Secretary of
the EFZ:
'The political ideology of Humanism was attacked by the church as
a philosophy which puts man at the centre of society, instead of
God, this never works. Humanism is a disaster. Most Zambians don't
even understand humanism anyway" (Rev. Imakando, 1992: 3).
This was written after Zambia's multi-party election in October 1991, when
the UNIP's one-party rule was over, and Humanism was almost
abandoned as national policy. Even so this interpretation is completely
contradictory to the previous one. This contradiction itself tells us that
churches have acted based on political calculations, and thus how they can
be institutional critics of the state in Zambia. Therefore the "style" of
criticism is considered to have been deliberately created. But there is what
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we should not miss. It is that the usage of "letters" and especially "prayers"
have never been only religious "symbols" which are used to express
churches' concerns. But these have been used by church leaders as
"political tools" to influence the state. This experience of controversy
confirmed churches' tactics in order to respond to national crises.
Another factor which should be taken is churches' mobilisational
power. In any sense, forms of opposition such as letters and prayers have
to be substantially supported by a large number of people in order to be
influential. On this point, churches have quite vast networks all over the
country. Moreover a majority of Zambians are Christians. Therefore, as it
happened in cases of "prayers" against the introduction of socialism,
churches can gather a lot of support among members, when the main
three church bodies take concerted actions.
These factors were also working in the process of transition to
multi-party politics in Zambia, to which we turn next.
4.1.4.3 The Churches' Role in the Transition Period to Multi-party Politics
and in the Third Republic
Since the controversy of the introduction of scientific socialism was
over, there had not been conflicts between the state and Christian
churches. In the meantime, however, Christian churches continued to
express its concerns in the form of pastoral letter. One of the most
important documents in this period is Christian Liberation : Justice and
Development, prepared by the CCZ, the EFZ and the ZEC in 1987, which
was already refered to in the present study. This document covered wide
aspects of human life, including such issues as socio-economic
development, democracy and human rights and duties. However,
Christian churches did not explicitly criticise Zambia's one-party political
system. In general, Christian leaders deliberately chose words so as not too
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critical of the government. However, they emphasised the importance of
"civil society," by refering to the meaning of freedom of the press (pp. 41-
42) and public opinion as well as the importance of political participation,
namely "regular consultations between the Party and its government on
the one hand and the rest of the national community .' 0 on the other"
(p.37). In this document, there is a following passage:
'They [members of national community] also minimize any
possible tendency within the party to suppress constructive
opposition by demanding total allegiance from citizens or by
unduly voting candidate vetoing candidates for election. In
spite of the tensions which sometimes result from such
discussions, the positive value of constructive criticism should
not be underestimated... They [citizens] should rather make
use of every opportunity to contribute to the building of the
country In this way, they restrict the power of the state by
constantly influencing the decisions of the government' (CCZ,
EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 37)
This passage shows us that Christian churches have had concerns for a
"more democratic" political regime where more participation is allowed.
Against this background, in the process of transition and beyond,
the church has played various roles. These include conscientisation
through church publications like the National Mirror and the Icengelo,
advocacy of the re-introduction of multi-party system, their involvement
in the formation of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD),
organisation of political seminars, reconciliation between UNIP and the
MMD, monitoring of elections, and consolidation of democracy in the
Third Republic.
10 By national community, leaders refered to families, PTAs, trade unions, churches, and
other intermediary groups and voluntary associations (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 37).
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It was around early 1990 when the debate on the referendum to test
public opinion on whether or not Zambia should go back to the multi-
party system arose. Among churches, particularly the Catholic Church
showed its support to the proposal of re-introduction of multi-party
system. The first favourable stance to the multi-party system was explicitly
shown in the Roman Catholic Bemba magazine Icengelo in its issues in
April, May and June. The editor of the Ndola-based publication, Father
Umberto Davoli, said that the magazine was promoting the interests of
advocates of the multi-party system in Zambia (National Mirror, no. 347:
1). But generally speaking, the church was discreet at this early stage. The
CCZ, for example, just showed their welcome to the President willingness
to allow people to express themselves through the referendum (National
Mirror, no. 361: 1), and two other bodies, namely the EFZ and the ZEC, still
kept their positions neutral (National Mirror, no. 361: 2) on the issue. In
the case of the Catholic Church, they said that:
"It is clear that there is no one 'ideal' political system. No
system has ever succeeded in fully protecting and promoting
the rights of its people and in completely realising the goal of
a just and equitable society. Both one-party and multi-party
systems have their strengths and weaknesses. It is to be
expected that these will emerge more clearly in the public
exchange which will take place before the Referendum on 17
October 1990" (Catholic Secretariat, 1990: 7, emphasis
added),
although the MMD already existed as a civic organisation in July. It is clear
that churches kept their neutrality in order to be adaptable to any
situations. In September 1990, UNIP determined to have multi-party
elections in 1991 without the referendum. In this context, the church,
especially the Catholic Church explicitly showed their favourable attitude
toward multi-party politics:
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"As regards our nation's political situation, we appreciate the peace and
security that we have enjoyed during the first quarter of our independence.
we now welcome the reintroduction of multi-party politics. It gives all
citizens a better chance to take part in decision-making. Political
competition will allow for a greater accountability on the part of our
leaders" (Catholic Secretariat, 1991: 15).
What should be pointed out concerning the church's involvement
in the period of transition is that there were close, but temporary
collaborations between the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and
Catholic churches at the district level to establish branches so as to
mobilise people (Personal Interview with Mr. P. Mulenga and Mr. P.
Chiala at ZCTU Lusaka Office, 20 February 1992). In this process, the
Icengelo which contained articles by Chiluba was quite effectively used for
mobilisation and district committees worked as springboards to get
popular support all over the country. This was one of the important
reasons that the MMD could form vast networks in the country within a
short period (Personal Interview with the Secretariat of the MMD, Mr.
Mwela, 31 January 1992).
Between January and June 1991, there were held several seminars
considering "democracy" and "the churches' role in the Third Republic"
organised by churches and related organisations. These included "The
Zambia We Want Seminar 1991" in January at the Mindolo Ecumenical
Foundation, the EFZ political seminar at the Apostolic Faith Mission
Church in Lusaka in June, and the CCZ Women's Conference in Lusaka.
In these seminars, "churches' roles in politics" were widely discussed. We
can find "Christian thinking on democracy" in a paper presented to the
EFZ political seminar:
"Democratic participation enlarges the horizons of people,
empower them as citizens and limits the power of
310
governments. The expression of opinion through
representative elections, political parties, public debate and
loyal opposition, together with respect for political office
and open and accountable government, are intrinsic to
responsible democracy. No party or grouping may claim
special legal privileges..." (Bishop. Pule, 1991: 1).
In addition, the church, as the voice of the voiceless, the mirror,
"conscience" and the "soul" of the nation, regarded itself "to be free in its
activities to speak out where it is convinced that this or that programme of
a party goes against faith, morals or the dignity of the human person" (Fr.
Mwewa, 1991: 24-25). These seminars offered opportunities to consolidate
the churches' basic stance in the transition period towards the plural
politics and beyond.
The constitutional issue is another area of the churches'
involvement during the period of transition. Basically there were two
involvements. Firstly, it is the church leaders' participation in the
Mvunga constitution commission. Secondly, it was their role of reconciler
between UNIP and the MMD on the constitutional issues to avert political
impasses. Concerning the first issue, among 22 members of the
commission appointed by the UNIP government, two church leaders,
namely Bishop Tresford, the Vice Chairman of the ZEC, and Rev. P.
Simuchoba, the Chairman of the CCZ, were included. On this
appointment, some church leaders showed their displeasure, by saying
that:
"The government should have approached the Zambian Episcopal
Conference (ZEC) on behalf of the Catholics, Evangelical
Fellowship of Zambia (EFZ) for the Pentecostals and the Christian
Council of Zambia to make nominations out of which the government
could have chosen our representatives from... That's the way we
understand democracy" (National Mirror, no. 365).
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This problem of appointment caused the feeling that the commission
represented only a narrow part of the political community l 1 . In addition,
the process of submitting the draft constitution to the Parliament was
further narrowed by the White Paper of the Government, which ruled
out, without any wide discussion and consultation, important points like
the point if Ministers would be appointed from Members of Parliament
among the commission's recommendations for the proposed constitution.
This constitutional issue caused a big political impasse between UNIP and
the MMD in which the MMD continued to refuse the meeting with
President Kaunda in spite of his invitations to discuss the proposed
constitution. It was churches' leaders that averted this political impasse.
"Being the 'Mirror of the country', the Church leaders found it
necessary to bring together the two parties" (National Mirror, no. 385). On
19th July 1991, representatives from the CCZ, the EFZ, and the ZEC met
the President at the State House. Apart from the constitutional issue 12, the
issues of delayed official announcement of election days, squashing of the
State of Emergency, and unavailability of the registration lists were also
discussed. At this meeting, the church offered to assist in the promotion of
the necessary reconciliation to move the country forward in a democratic
electoral process. Two days later, there was held another meeting with the
President and top officials of the MMD at the Catholic Secretariat. The
single topic of this meeting was to promote reconciliation through a
meeting between UNIP and the MMD to discuss the constitution. The
agreement reached at this meeting was that the meeting between UNIP
and the MMD would be chaired by the church in order to keep it neutral.
Immediately, the three church bodies hosted a meeting from 23 to
25 July at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka, which provided an
11This means rather that the commission is dominated by UNIP cadre.
12see, National Mirror, no. 385 on the agreed contents related to the constitution.
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opportunity for both UNIP and the MMD to discuss the proposed
constitution to facilitate an orderly election. During the meeting, which
was chaired by the Lusaka Anglican Bishop Stephen Mumba with
assistance from other church leaders, a joint committee of experts was
formed to examine areas of the constitutional bill to which the MMD had
raised objections. As a result of the meeting, it was agreed that the
Ministers would be appointed from Members of Parliament and that a
clause be included in the Constitution the introduction of the Chamber of
representatives be considered by Parliament after the 1991 presidential and
general elections. Also some other important matters like the squashing of
the State of Emergency were discussed. This churches' involvement
redirected the Zambian democratic process in the right way.
The church in Zambia was also involved in election monitoring.
Even though there was one local monitoring team, namely the Zambia
Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT), including three church leaders,
this team was criticised by the public which expressed doubt to its
neutrality and credibility. Against this background, the three church bodies
called a meeting on 19th September 1991, when there were less than six
weeks left before the elections, at the Catholic Secretariat to review the
political situation of the country and the growing problems arising with
the preparation of the coming elections, when 15 representatives met and
talked about the churches' role in election monitoring. It was at this time
when they formed the Christian Churches' Monitoring Group (CCMG).
Almost immediately, five other organisations, namely the Press
Association of Zambia (PAZA), the University of Zambia Student Union
(UNZASU), the National Women's Lobby Group (NWLG), the Non-
Governmental Organisations Coordinating Committee (NGOCC), and the
Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), joined with the CCMG to form an
umbrella body, the Zambia Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee
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(ZEMCC), whose stated objective was to ensure that the elections of 31
October 1991 and any other elections would be free and fair.
The first action taken by the CCMG was the circulation of a "Letter
to All Christians Before the 31 October Elections" dated 23rd September
1991 to inform people of the importance of the elections, to call the
churches to promote peace, reconciliation and justice in Zambia, to
outline some key electoral principles, and to stress several key electoral
guidelines. More practically, ZEMCC's activities before the elections
included the monitoring of the nomination process for President
candidates at the High Court as well as that for Parliamentary candidates
in several constituency offices in Lusaka and the sponsorship of a two-day
Training Session at the University of Zambia in early October, which was
attended by about 250 participants who became the core of local monitors
recruited and trained. The ZEMCC also prepared Summary of the Electoral
Act and Electoral Regulations with experts of law in the ZEMCC, and
Monitor's Manual, and Quick Count Team Manual with technical
assistance from Z-Vote (a project of the United States-based National
Democratic Institute and the Carter Centre).
Apart from these practical involvements, the ZEMCC, especially the
CCMG, cautioned all church pastors and leaders to avoid directly partisan
remarks as they encourage members to participate responsibly in the
elections and condemned strongly violence disrupting the peaceful
process. In addition, the CCMG held several meeting with President
Kaunda and MMD President Chiluba and their associates for the purpose
of creating a peaceful environment necessary to assure free and fair
elections, even though their strong efforts to bring both President Kaunda
and Chiluba together for a pre-election meeting in order to have them
issue a joint appeal for peace and ready acceptance of the election results
did not materialise. However, on October 20, both Kaunda and Chiluba
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were at Lusaka's Cathedral of the Holy Cross to pray for peaceful electoral
process following efforts of the CCMG (Times of Zambia, 21 October 1992).
Just before the elections, on 27th October, the churches distributed a prayer
format to assist in the church sponsored National Day of Prayer. On the
day, special services were held throughout the country emphasising the
theme of confidence in choosing leaders of integrity and justice, and
praying for peaceful acceptance of the results of the elections. On the
election day, about 3500 trained monitors were involved in nine
provinces mainly made up of church members, students, members of
Rotary and other civic clubs (see ZEMCC, 1991 in detail).
In the first press statement of ZEMCC after the elections, Chairman
Rev. Sakala said that:
"... we are aware that the efforts to build true democracy in our land
has only just begun. As President Chiluba has consistently reminded
the Zambian people, there are times of great difficulty and tasks of
hard work facing us all. For this reason, the Board of ZEMCC, are
seriously considering our next steps. We are currently in the process of
forming a new institution which will serve the nation with the
broader aims of civic education" (ZEMCC, Press Statement 26
November 1991).
In the Third Republic, which is supposed to be the phase of "democratic
consolidation," the church has shown the importance of the new political
culture of civic responsibility through civic education to attain true
democracy from below. In this new political culture, what are considered
to be important are accountability in the sense that those who have been
put into office would see as their task the improvement of the lives of
others, overcoming political apathy and economic lethargy which have
developed over the years, and doing away with vandalism (ZEMCC, Press
Statement 26 November 1991). For this purpose, ZEMCC transformed
itself into the Foundation for the Democratic Process (FODEP) in 1992.
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Such terms as civic education, accountability started to be used in the
document of ZMECC, and eventually those of FODEP 13. However, it
remains to be seen how this institution will work so as to consolidate
newly introduced multi-party system.
Apart from the formation of the new church-initiated institution,
churches' "symbolic" and "practical" influences can be seen in several
events after the elections. In early November 1991, the newly elected
Chiluba was anointed at a Church service ceremony at the Cathedral of the
Holy Cross in Lusaka. At the anointment, the Anglican Archbishop
Mumba told the President:
"be strong and show yourself a man, keep the charge of the Lord your
God, walk in his ways, keep his status, his commandments, his
precepts and his testimonies as it is written in the first and second
testaments" (National Mirror, no. 397).
At this ceremony, the new government ministers, top church leaders, and
various members of parliament attended. This set the church a influential
position on the newly elected president, Chiluba, who is also a religiously
influenced person. One example happened when some houses, which
were illegally built in Lusaka's Kanyama compound, were demolished by
the Lusaka Urban District Council. On this occasion, one church leader
Rev. Sakala directly phoned to the State House to stop it effectively
(Personal Interview with Rev. Sakala, 23rd December 1991).
It is apparent that in this process the four factors, especially the
educational background of the leadership, churches' mobilisational power
through their "political tools", as described in the previous section, were
working. The Christian church was the only actor which could reconcile
13According to Bratton and Liatto-Katundu (1994), there was limited improvement of
democratic attitudes among voters.
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both UNIP and the MMD as mediator in order to break t hrough the
political stalemate.
4.2 The Case of Botswana
One of the most remarkable .aspects of the Christianity developed in
Botswana is that the Christian congregations grew up around the kgotlas,
which are traditional meeting chaired by chiefs, owing to the early
acceptance of the missionaries by the chiefs (Sales, 1973: 1). Since
Christianity began about half a century before the establishment of a
British Administration, the only way for missionaries to start their work
was, thus, to obtain the sympathy of the chief. For this purpose,
missionaries involvements in the fields of health and education began as
we consider below.
Concerning independent churches in Botswana, there is not so
much well documented work apart from a recent research in Francistown
done by van Binsbergen (1993), who observed their interactions with the
state. These interactions occurred at registration. His observation will be
briefly refered to later.
In terms of political involvement, churches in Botswana have not
been so active as that in Zambia, although they have just recently started
to be involved in the issues of human rights, especially that of Basarwa.
4.2.1 Characteristics of Christian Churches in Botswana
According to Barrett (1982: 184), about half of population in
Botswana (50.2 per cent) is considered to be Christians 14. The Protestant
churches have been a significant force in Botswana since early 19th
14In a most recent study, only about 30 percent of population is considered to be Christian,
and more than 60 per cent of them are estimated to belong to Independent churches
(Amanze, 1994b).
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century. Among Christians, 26.6 per cent are Protestant, 9.4 percent
Catholic, and 11.8 per cent indigenous by the mid-1980s. In Botswana, the
major Protestant denomination is the United Congregational Church, as a
result of the pioneering efforts of the London Missionary Society (LMS).
The Seventh-Day Adventist is the second.
In contrast with Zambia where there are three interdenominational
bodies, there is only one body in Botswana, namely the Botswana
Christian Council (BCC). The BCC membership includes the Catholic15,
but the influence of the Protestant is strong. In addition, the BCC
developed in a unique way, because the BCC includes some African
independent churches (Hambira, 1990: 16), although this does not
necessarily mean that the BCC have had enough assistance to churches at
the grassroots. Internationally, the BCC is associated council of the World
Council of Churches (WCC).
Concerning African Independent Churches in Botswana, there is
general agreement that it is in the past quarter of a century that they
growth remarkably, especially in the north of the country (Barret, 1982:
185; van Binsbergen, 1993: 28). However, there is almost no study that
provide a reliable data on these Independent Churches 16 . It is only van
Binsbergen who provided quantitative data, which demonstrate the
extreme fragmentation of these religious organisations17.
4.2.2 Church Involvement in Development Activities: From a Historical
Perspective
15According to Hambira (1990: 25-6), the membership of the Catholic in the BCC was
influenced by the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).
16 See Amanze (1994a) on the most recent compilation of churches in Botswana, which
includes independent churches.
17There are 233 African Independent Churches having on the average fewer that 800
members (van Binsbergen, 1993: 29).
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There is a close relationship between the territory of each ethnic
group and the mission working there. Therefore development of health
and educational facilities of one mission tend to be concentrated in one
area of the country, which can be typically observed in the field of health. I
will show this relation briefly.
In contrast with Zambia, missions' involvement in education was
quite limited just before independence. But this does not mean that there
had not been any mission efforts in educational development (see e.g.
Parsons, 1983)18. Rather, there had been various missions' activities in this
field, especially at earlier stage and actually the first schools were
established by the London Missionary Society during the first half of the
nineteenth century. By the time of independence, however, there were
only three church-run secondary school in the territory, namely St.
Joseph's at Kale, Mater Sepia in Francistown both run by the Catholic and
Moeding College near Lobatse run by the United Congregational Church
of Southern Africa (UCCSA), although there were few secondary schools
of any sorts in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This is mainly because
Bechuanaland relied on assistance from neighbouring countries, especially
South Africa, for all forms of post-primary education after the LMS
established the Tiger Kloof Institution not within the territory but just
south of Mafeking instead for the purpose of serving the Batswana on
both sides of the Molopo river19. As a result, in contrast with the case of
18According to Grant, after the loss of their primary schools in the early 1920s, the mission
church had been discouraged to run schools and had lost their interests to be involved in
education (Grant, 1980: 41). Therefore the mission church had been most actively working in
education before the 1920s.
19There was a "tribal" enthusiasm for post-elementary education was most evident among
the baNgwato. What they wanted was a college, basically academic, but with industrial
courses. Their idea was to use the substantial stone-built church and mission buildings at
Phalatswe (old Palapye) for an educational complex comparable to Lovedale. The idea
crystallised in 1902, when Phalatswe was finally abandoned for a new capital site. But it
did not materialise in 1902, when Phalatswe was finally abandoned for Serowe, because
the London Missionary Society had set up Tiger Kloof Institution to serve the baTswana as
a whole. (Parsons, 1983b: 30-31).
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Zambia, early leaders were educated in South Africa and were not so
identified with churches in the territory. There were also only 12 primary
schools, as shown in table 4-8, because primary schools were mainly
administrated by the local tribal committees, which were composed of
representatives of the district administration, missionary societies in the
area, and tribal representatives (Annual Report of Bechuanaland, 1958: 49-
50). In technical/vocational education, the Dutch Reformed Church ran
the Homecrafts Centre at Mochudi, which was the only institution in the
Protectorate before the 1960s.
Table 4-8 Mission Primary Schools 1967 in Botswana
Denomi-
nation
Classes Class
Rooms
Students Teachers
Grant Aided
Forest Hill, Khale RC 7 5 98 6
Our Lady of the Desert, RC 16 16 857 17
Francistown
St. Martin's, Papatlo RC 7 4 204 6
St. Conrad's Ramoutsa RC 17 12 992 17
St. Theresa, Lobatsi RC 10 9 440 11
St. Gabriel, Serowe RC 2 4 88 2
St. Peter's, Mmadinare Anglican 7 6 300 6
D'kar DRC 3 2 66 4
Unaided
St. Patrick's, RC 8 4 404 8
Mahal apy e
St. Bernard's, Ramoutsa RC 4 2 82 3
Our Lady of Carmel, RC 6 4 141 3
Morwa
Ramokgonomi Seventh 6 2 138 5
Day
Adventist
Total 12 93 70 3,810 88
National Total 252 1,674 77,577 1,713
% of Missionary schools 4.5 5.3 4.7 4.9
Source: Compiled from Grant, 1968: Table 4.
In the area of health, by 1968, there existed five hospitals run by
missionaries. In 1921, the Seventh Day Adventists established the first
hospital in Kanye, which was the Kanye Hospital, for the Bangwaketse. In
the early 1930s, two important hospitals were established in Molepolole
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and Mochudi. On the one hand, the United Free Church of Scotland
Mission, which selected the Bakwena, opened the Scottish Livingstone
Hospital in Molepolole. On the other hand, the Dutch Reformed Church,
which concentrated their missionary activities on the Bakgatla, built the
Deborah Relief Memorial Hospital in Mochudi. The Hamennsburg
Mission, which chose the Bamalete, established a clinic in Romatswa in
1934, and in 1969 it opened a completely new hospital with financial
assistance from the Mission and Bread for the World. And the Anglicans,
selecting the Bamangwato, founded St. Peter's Mission Hospital in
Mmadinaire in 1959. Apart from these hospitals, there were several health
facilities run by missionaries like a maternity centre by the London
Missionary Society and a clinic run by the Seventh Day Adventists in
Maun (see table 4-12).
In the area of education, as is shown in the tables (4-9, 4-10, 4-11), the
churches' role has been decreasing since independence. It is because the
government has played the major role in (1) planning and supervision,
and (2) provision of education and training. Actually, in 1990, in primary
education 568 our of 636 schools and in secondary school 169 out of 170
schools were directly financed by the government (NDP7: 313).
In the area of health, the role of the mission hospitals is still
important (see table 4-13), even though the role of government has been
gradually increasing. However this does not mean that the church has
played only a limited role in other areas of development. Now I turn to
church involvement in developmental activities since independence,
especially paying attention to the Botswana Christian Council.
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Table 4-9 Categorisation of Primary Schools in 1990: Schools and Pupils
District	 Local	 Grant Aided*
	
Private	 Total
government No.. No. of School	 No. of
of School (No. of (No. of Students) School(No. of
Student)	 Students)
North East
Central N
Central C
Central S
Kgatleng
Kweneng
Southern
South East
Kgalagadi
Ghanzi
North West
Gaborone
Francistown
Lobatse
Selebi-Phikwe
Jweneng
Total
* Schools relying largely on Government funding but being run by the missions and trusts
which started them.
Source: compiled from Republic of Botswana, Educational Statistics 1990 Table Al, p.30.
Table 4-10 Church Secondary Schools in 1967
Student Teachers Classes Class Rooms
St. Joseph's
	
292 15 11 11
Mater Spei	 160 9 6 10
Moeding	 241 11 9 9
Total	 693 35 26 30
National Total	 2,299 128 n. a. 89
Homecraft Centre Mochudi 	 61 3 - -
Source: Compiled from Grant, 1968: Table 5.
Table 4-11 Categorisation of Secondary Schools in Botswana: Recent Trend
Year Government	 Grant Aided *
	Community+Junior	 Total
School	 Class Rs	 School	 Class Rs	 School	 Class Rs	 School	 Class Rs
1978 13 229 5 67 17 125 35 421
1979 15 249 5 89 16 117 36 455
1980 18 287 4 79 16 121 38 487
1981 18 340 4 86 19 141 41 567
1982 18 339 4 86 20 158 42 583
1983 18 338 4 86 20 174 42 598
1984 19 393 4 89 35 207 58 689
1985 19 410 4 127 42 199 65 736
1986 19 483 4 117 50 226 73 826
1987 19 455 4 118 58 327 81 900
1988 19 441 4 101 68 499 91 1,041
1989 18 483 4 121 97 910 119 1,514
1990 19 592 4 139 120 1,134 143 1,865
* Schools relying largely on Government funding but being run by the missions and trusts
which started them. (Rs= Rooms)
+ Includes private schools. Community Junior Secondary Schools (CJSS) are established by
the joint government-Community participation in the construction and management.
Source: compiled from Republic of Botswana, Educational Statistics Table 9. p.18.
32 (11,670) 0 o 32 (11,670)
47 (24,531) 0 1 (126) 48 (24,657)
94 (49,281) 3 (1,744) 8 (1,691) 105 (52,788)
40 (20,720) 2 (1,752) 3 (1,316) 45 (23,788)
31 (12,411) 1 (254) 4 (566) 36 (13,231)
67 (36,021) 0 4 (856) 71 (36,877)
91 (35,719) 1 (161) 0 92 (35,880)
11 (7,408) 1 (107) 5 (939) 18 (8,454)
25 (6,969) 0 0 25 (6,969)
18 (4,232) 1 (276) 0 19 (4,508)
51 (20,886) 0 1 (62) 52 (20,948)
23 (17,459) 0 3 (1,545) 26 (19,004)
11 (9,130) 1 (815) 2 (457) 14 (10,402)
4 (3,453) 1 (644) 2( 723) 7 (4,820)
7 (7,078) 0 1 (381) 8 (7,459)
3 (1,893) 0 1 (240) 4 (2,133)
555 (268,861) 12 (5,753) 35 (8,902) 602 (283,516)
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Table 4-12 Mission Hospitals and Clinics in 1967
Centre Number of Beds Number of
Doctors
Molepolole 166 2
Health Centre, Thamaga 14
Maun Maternity Centre 43
Mochudi 111 2
Mmadinare 40
Ramoutsi 44 1
Khale 6
Kanye 220 2
Total 644 7
National Total 1,626 17
Source: Grant, 1968 Table 3
Table 4-13 Comparison Between Government and Church District Hospitals in Botswana in
1984 and 1990 (Primary Hospitals and Clinics are not Included)
Facility 1984 (Number of 1990 (Number of
Beds) Beds)
National Referral Hospitals:
Princess Marina 273 241
Nyangabgwe 372
Government District
Hospitals:
Jubilee* 187
Athlone 133 224
Sekgoma 194 164
Mahal apye 95 99
Scottish 166 264
Mental 111 111
Selebi-Phikwe 65 65
Maun 181 181
Mine Hospitals:
BCL Limited 27 27
Orapa 61 97
Jweneg 40 72
Sub-Total 1,497 1,873
Mission Hospitals:
Seventh Day Adventist 167 167
Deborah Relief Memorial 130 131
Bamalete Lutheran 107 117
Sub-Total 404 425
Total 1,901 2,288
% of Mission Hospitals 21.3 18.1
* Jubilee Hospital, which was a district hospital in 1984, lost that status during NDP 6
with the commissioning of Nyangabgwe.
Source: Compiled and calculated from Table 15.11 NDP7, p.371.
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4.2.3 The Establishment and Development Activities of the Botswana
Christian Council
4.2.3.1 Establishment and Activities
More active church involvement in development works, which are
not limited to the areas of education and health, was initiated by the
establishment of the Botswana Christian Council in 1966, which was
formed largely through the initiative of churches leaders in Francistown
who had already been responsible for the creation of the Northern
Bechuanaland Council. Externally, the formation of the BCC was
influenced by the formation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in
1948 and the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC) in 1963 (Amanze,
1994b: 24). Internally, the social concern to cooperate in relief efforts in
times of drought, famine and epidemics necessitated the formation of an
inter-church relief programme, which promoted the formation of the BCC
(Amanze, 1994b: 24). This formation was also "to seek ways of co-operating
so as to speak in one strong voice which will have an input on
government policy" (Hambira, 1990: 13).
In spite of its original organisational weakness in terms of its
membership and composition (see Grant, 1968: 3, 11), at the time of
independence, this council was the only "indigenous non-governmental
support agency." In fact the BCC General Secretary pointed out to the Inter-
Church Meeting on the Projected Mining Areas in March 1969, "(t)he BCC
came out into existence out of an emergency need like in the issue area of
refugee - and imposed from outside - it did not come into being due to a
drawing together of the churches" (Flood, 1974: 327-328). Between 1968 and
1974, however, it has gradually been involved in many projects in the
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country and strengthened its structure. Currently it has the structure
shown in figure 4-2.
The General Assembly, which is represented by up to six delegates
of each member church and a maximum of two delegates of member
organisations, is the top decision making body and is normally held once a
year. The Executive Committee, which is the governing body of the
Council, substantially decides on policy matters, appoints sub-committees
and three members in addition to the Treasurer to serve a financial sub-
committee, keeps full and accurate minutes of all its proceedings,
convenes at least quarterly between each ordinary General Assembly, and
decide the establishment of new department. As is shown in figure 4-2,
there are three major department involved in developmental activities in
collaboration with Standing Committees in respective areas. The
Administrative Committee, which is composed of the elected members of
the Executive Committee 20, acts on behalf of the Executive Committee.
The General Secretary is the Chief Executive Officer of the Council who is
responsible for the execution of the decisions of the General Assembly, the
Executive Committee and the Administrative Committee.
Grant, who was the development organiser of the BCC, wrote its
importance just after independence as follows:
'This particular development greatly improved the non-government
agencies range of external contacts and sharply increased the
resources available to them. In 1968, for instance, the Christian
Council had a development income of P16,000. By 1974 this had
20The Executive Committee of the BCC is composed of (1) one correspondent from each
member of the Council appointed accordingly and (2) office bearers being, the President, fist
and second Vice-Presidents, the treasurer, the General Secretary who shall be non-voting
member of the committee and the moderators from each existing standing committees.
Among them, the President, first and second Vice-Presidents, and the moderators of the
various standing committees are elected at the General Assembly by secret ballot. The
treasurer is appointed by the Executive Committee at its first meeting after the general
Assembly and the General Secretary is appointed by the General Assembly. An
Administrative Committee is composed of office bearers of the Executive Committee.
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become 166,000 and in between these years it had committed a total
of P607,000 to some 60 different projects finding partners in the
churches, the new Brigade Trusts, the District Council and
government itself' (Grant, 1980: 42).
The projects sponsored by the BCC shortly after independence were
comprehensively documented by Flood (1974). At this stage, the Christian
Service Department was the only department directly involved in the
projects. In this process, the BCC, backed by three major partners, namely
the Church World Service, the Christian Aid and the Bread for the World,
was the agency which could support pioneering and experimental projects
and could take important new development initiative.
In addition, after a Catholic Bishop Muray joined the Christian
Service Committee and became chairman of the BCC, which had been
mainly composed of the Protestant churches, in 1970, "inter-church
development cooperation began to be a reality for the first time" (Grant,
1980:43). Also this cooperation was followed by the establishment of the
Association of Medical Missions of Botswana.
In practical terms, the issues of the steady growth of the settlement
at Selebi-Phikwe, where a new copper and nickel mines had been
developing rapidly, and the increasing tempo of various activity including
building of town itself and laying of new roads and rail offered an
opportunity for the BCC and its member churches to establish a more close
working relationship. It is because in such issue areas as refugee and
famine rel i ef, the BCC's main partners had been foreign counterparts,
while in the area of urban mission, the BCC inevitably would involve
itself in activities of local communities where member churches were
working. Therefore more concrete demarcation of responsibility was
necessary (Flood, 1974: 328). It was from this necessity that the BCC's Urban
Industrial Mission (UIM) was set up and its project started in 1972. As
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figure 4-2 shows, it is a part of the Christian Service Department. This is
one of the projects in which the BCC has been involved for a long time. So
far it has covered the following components: Adult education (i.e., Adult
Night Primary School), a regular day primary school at Botshabelo,
Carpentry training, textile training and secretarial training (BCC, 1991: 36).
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Figure 4-2 Structure of the Botswana Christian Council
Source: BCC Assembly Book 1992, p.3.
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The other projects of the Christian Service Department in which
the BCC has been involved for a long time are the Etsha Ecumenical
Community Project and the Old Naledi Upgrading Project. The former is
originally a refugee settlement projects of the BCC for some 3,500 people of
the Mambukushu tribe who came across the Caprivi Strip into Botswana's
northern western corner, where they were resettled in 13 sub-villages
fringing the swamps at Etsha. The BCC has supported a resident
missionary and has employed the Settlement Officer since April 1972. The
activities in Etsha have four aspects: strengthening the worshipping
community that resulted from the mission of Father Wynne (1970-1982)
and the Etsha Team (1982-); Bible translation; Adult Education;
Development. In the area of adult education, it includes literacy classes,
English classes, courses on cooking, hygiene, sewing, gardening and so on.
These courses are integrated with the fourth activities of development,
especially projects to help people to generate some cash income. The Old
Naledi Upgrading Project, which started in 1979 concerning house
upgrading in Old Naledi after some conflict with the government as
mentioned below, has developed into integrated community
development with various components. It covers house upgrading,
training in brick laying, social work and income generating activities in
order to benefit the low income groups of Old Naledi and around
Gaborone. In spite of some problems with the government at the initial
stage, currently, these involvements have been recognised by the
government. One of the indication was that the BCC was invited to
important conference on housing by the government (BCC, 1991: 36). In
this area there are collaborative relationship with the government.
Furthermore, the BCC has concerned itself with the Remote Area
Dwellers (RADS) development since 1981. There have been a lot of
projects undertaken with the financial assistance of the BCC's ecumenical
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partners (BCC, 1991: 34). These projects include health post, water supply
and primary school hostels at Kokotsha and Kang, income generating
activities and seven small cooperatives around Gantsi District.
At the 1991 assembly, the Christian Service Department (CSD)
presented a document whose aim is to create a holistic and
comprehensive tool which can be used by the CSD and the BCC to
stimulate projects by the churches in the local communities. This is
probably the first one in which the BCC showed its development
philosophy comprehensively. According to the document, the basic
development philosophy of the BCC is:
"to fulfill the diaconical work of the churches as it is rooted in the
Holy Bible. Through the diaconical work in the field of
development, the BCC/CSD strive to fulfill the calling of the Triune
God to promote justice and life in all its fullness for all humanity"
(BCC, 1991: 38).
The document also said that the programmes of the BCC should "reflect
the churches' 'preferential option for the poor', the marginalised and the
disadvantaged in our society" (BCC, 1991: 38). It is because they
"aim at participating in the creation of a more just and sustainable
society for all" (BCC, 1991: 38).
For this purpose, the BCC/CSD will act as a facilitator for participation in
development by the Botswana churches and local congregations. "In doing
this, BCC/CSD will stimulate action in the local communities through
work-shops, needs-assessment, project advice, funding of locally based
projects, cooperation with other NGOs and advocacy with district and
central governmental structure". In this document, three main
programmes are (1) Programme on Urban Poverty, (2) Programme on
Rural Poverty, and (3) Programme on Remote Area Dwellers. This is the
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first time that the BCC clearly showed its vision for development and its
priorities.
Based on this development philosophy, the BCC has evolved areas
of their activities. In addition to the Christian Service Department, it
established the Social Concern Department in August 1984 to work in the
fields of women and children, youth, refugee, education, human rights
and general social concerns. For this purpose units which work in
respective field have been created. This does not mean that there had not
any efforts of the BCC in these areas before that time, but this was an
institutional expansion of the BCC's activities in social problems which
had been also churches' concerns.
In 1992, another Department for Faith and Unity, whose
responsibility is the implementation of the BCC's constitutionally based
work for unity among the churches in Botswana, was established. This is
the department which will be involved in mentally- or spiritually-
oriented development projects in cooperation with the SCD which is
catering for material needs of the disadvantaged.
The BCC has also been involved in publishing the newsletter
Mokaedi which contains news from member churches, the BCC itself, and
social issues through its Communication Department. This used to be
issued only two or three times a year, but from April 1992 Mokaedi became
tabloid in four pages monthly paper distributed with a private weekly
Minegi.
4.2.3.2 Financial Resources
The BCC received funds from "ecumenical partners" through its
projects and individual division of the departments as in the case of the
CCZ in Zambia.
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According to a recent financial statements approved by the
Executive Committee of the council in the 26th annual assembly of the
BCC in 1991 (BCC, 1991), 50 per cent of central administration income was
funded by "external contribution," although details were not disclosed.
Etsha Ecumenical Community Project was 100 per cent funded by the
Reformed Church of Netherlands and the Methodist Church Overseas
(UK). This is also true in the cases of youth and refugee division in the
Department of Social Concerns and Refugees. the World Council of
Churches and the Reformed Church of Netherlands are main
contributors. Other departments also nearly totally funded by "ecumenical
partners" overseas.
Therefore, even in comparison with the case of CCZ, the BCC
depends almost totally dependent on funds from overseas.
4.2.4 Cooperation and Conflict with the State and Other AOs
4.2.4.1 The Case of the BCC
As stated in the previous section, just after independence, the BCC
was the only non-governmental agency which support many projects all
over the country. It is because the BCC had the advantage of getting
resources from external counterparts. Also the government could not
offer enough facilities, for example, in medical service as we can find in
the first development plan:
"While recognising the inadequacy of the existing medical
facilities, the Botswana Government is unable to allocate sufficient
resources to the health sector to raise the standard of medical
services to an internationally acceptable level. Faced with limited
resources and pressing demands for productive investments in all
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sectors, the Government is forced to restrict medical plans to modest
targets" (NDP2: 60).
But the surroundings of developmental activities of the BCC have
been changed since around the 1972/73 financial year when Botswana's
recurrent budget was balanced without requiring grant-in-aid from the
British Government and financial situation was dramatically improved,
as stated in chapter 2. After the establishment of sound financial basis, the
Botswana government started to be involved both in development
projects which were originally initiated by churches or other non-
governmental agencies, and in other new projects.
In addition, this government involvement in these areas have to be
considered in terms of political calculations of the ruling BDP (see, e.g.
Picard, 1987: 240-243). It was, in November 1973, about a year before the
1974 election that the Accelerated Rural Development Programme
(ARDP), which emphasised the implementation of a highly visible,
physical infrastructure spending program in all ten districts during the
twelve months prior to the election, was announced. There was a clear
contrast between the financial year 1972/3-1973/4 and 1974/5-1975/6 (see
table 4-14).
Following this change, there arose the problem of uncertainty of
intentions of both the government and non-governmental agencies. In
this situation, the BCC tried several times to bridge this gap by asking the
government to give it five priority areas from which it could select two or
three for action and support. However, the responses from the
government was that interested groups could only refer to the
development plan and that government had no wish to point them in
any particular direction (Grant, 1980: 46). This was a quite puzzling attitude
of the government, which caused inevitable misunderstandings and
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conflicts between non-governmental agencies, including the BCC, and the
government.
Table 4-14 Accelerated Rural Development Programme (Achievement)
Item	 Units Provided	 Units Provided
1974/5-1975/6
	
1972/3-1973/4
Primary School Classrooms 	 489	 44
Teachers' Houses
	 425
	
68
Primary School Stores
	 80	 -
Health Posts	 42	 -
Clinics	 21	 2
Maternity Wards
	 8	 -
Nurses' Houses	 30	 -
Council and Government Staff
	 178	 17
Houses
Village Water Supplies 	 31	 11
Boreholes	 190	 57(approx.)
Dams	 30	 12
Livestock Saleyards	 6	 -
Rural Roads	 133(km)	 30(km)
Major Village Roads	 76(km)	 0(km)
Source: Botswana, Republic of, NDP4: 75, Table 4-2.
There are two contradictory cases which occurred between the BCC
and the state (Grant, 1980: 46). One case concerns the establishment of
Lentswe la Odi, which is one of non-governmental agencies. At first, the
detailed proposals of the creation of this agency was rejected by the
Ministry of Local Government and Lands and the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, whose advice was accepted by the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning. However, this decision was eventually reversed.
According to Grant (Grant, 1980: 46), this reversion happened especially
because the Botswana Development Corporation, CUSO, the BCC, the
Kgatleng District Council and the District Development Committee
strongly supported the establishment of Lentswe la Odi. Therefore, the
BCC, in collaboration with some other actors, including both
governmental and non-governmental organisations, was influential on
the decision of the central government in this case.
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The other case concerns BCC's housing project in Naledi. At first,
the BCC was allowed to publicise its intention in 1976 to start the project of
supporting those who would not qualify for Gaborone Town Council
Loans to build houses, but a confusion arose because both the government
and the Town Council were also starting the same task. As a result, the
BCC was asked to withdraw and clear the field in 1978. There arose a
disruption of a good relationship between two parties. However, after a
new negotiation with the Gaborone Town Council and Self Help Housing
Agency and settling this problem, there has developed a collaboration
between the government and the BCC in Old Naledi projects, as stated
above.
Apart from these cases, the government has taken over several
church projects. As can be observed in tables above, the ownership of two
big hospitals, namely the Scottish Livingstone Memorial Hospital in
Molepolole run by the United Free Church of Scotland and the Maternity
Centre at Maun run by the London Missionary Societies was transferred to
the government in late 1970s. According to Grant, who used to be secretary
of the CSD/BCC, these projects were taken over by the government after
the increased communication which led to a better understanding of their
respective wishes and needs (1980: 47) and thus with good reason. In fact,
the Scottish Livingstone Memorial Hospital faced a financial problem.
Therefore, in the issue area of health, there has been a collaboration as is
written in the NDP6:
"...The policy towards mission health facilities is that they are
integral part of the health care system and that they should be
treated as such. The Ministry (of Health) has cooperated with them
satisfactorily over the years. They have been plagued by financial
problems and have negotiated for a yearly subversion from the
Government through liaison with the Association for Medical
Missions for Botswana (AMMB)" (NDP6: 312).
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As far as development activities are concerned, there has been
collaboration between the church and the state in Botswana. The
churches' significance in the development scene in Botswana has been
less in the more specific fields of formal education and health, and more
in other areas like rural development. It is basically because of the
government sound financial situation which have supported its
accomplishment of development plans in these fields effectively.
The BCC has been also in cooperation with other A0s. For about a
decade after independence, when there were not national service
development associational organisations (NSDA0s), the BCC worked
collaboratively with brigades. Especially for the Kweneng Rural
Development Association (KRDA) established in 1969, the BCC had been
the only major donor at the initial stage as Flood documented (1974: 65-
81). Up to the end of October 1972, the BCC's investment to the KRDA
composed of almost 85 per cent. But the pattern of collaboration has been
changed, and after the establishment of NSDAOs since around early 1980s,
there has established a project-based working relationship with them.
Some recent cases include Low Cost Income Housing Committee which is
coordinated by the Botswana Technology Centre involving such
organisations as the Cooperation for Research, Development and
Education (CORDE) and the Rural Industry Innovation Centre (RIIC), and
the inter-sectoral Committee on income generating activities at Naledi
coordinated by the Christian Service Department. The latter involves
CORDE and Bana Ba Rona Trust, apart from some governmental bodies
(BCC, 1991: 35).
But as mentioned above, the BCC has been concerned about various
social problems as in the case of Zambia. Even so, in fact, there have been
few political conflicts between the church and the state since
independence. What is necessary to be pointed out is that there were quite
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limited political awareness among churches just after independence. This
can be found out in a document of BCC in the early 1970s, concerning
churches' relationship with the government:
"During the early development of this Council it was seen that it
had an important function to perform on behalf of the Churches in
relationship with the Government. We are a young country, standing
on the verge of major changes and developments necessitating new
legislation which can be quite strange to the average Motswana.
With the absence of adequate communications, particularly a
national newspaper, and an efficient Hansard system, legislation
comes into being effecting Churches without the majority of Church
member knowing anything about it" (BCC, 1972: 3).
In this context, as I wrote in the previous section, the BCC was the main
actor to bridge the gap between the government and other actors. One of
the issues in which the BCC was involve to influence the National
Assembly's decision was the early case that in 1971 the executive
committee of the BCC sent a letter to all members of the National
Assembly on the issue of the casino bill which would make the Assembly
legal for casinos to be established in Botswana. The church's concern was
such social problems caused as a result of casinos as crime, heavy drinking.
However the bill had become law. At this stage, the BCC was the only
voice.
There were a few recent cases. Let me begin to quote words of the
General Secretary of the BCC. In the reports of the 26th annual assembly of
the BCC in 1991, he wrote as follows:
"The role of the Church ... must not get lost in an utopian vision, but
use this vision to challenge and encourage of this reality towards a
more egalitarian liberated society where people can articulate
their own needs and can act together to meet their needs..." (BCC,
1991: 2).
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and
'The good news is for every person regardless of location or situation
in life. But since the good news is news of liberation it has a definite
bias toward those who are most in need of liberation - the poor, the
weak, the defenseless. For Christians, our primary role is to aid in
the process of liberation... Christians therefore have an advocacy
role, to proclaim the good news and to work towards the fulfillment
of its promise" (BCC, 1991: 3, emphasis added).
Recent involvement in a few issues of the BCC seems to be based on this
idea of advocacy. One of them is concerning "Abortion Bill" (Bill no. 25
1990: Penal Code Bill Section 160). On this issue, however, the BCC could
only issue a comment. It is because of the nature and composition of the
BCC as well as the nature of the issue itself. The BCC is no more than a
coordinating body of churches of Botswana including the Roman
Catholics and the Protestant churches altogether as members. Therefore,
member churches have different point of view on this issue. As a result,
they could not get unanimity. As can be imagined, the most fierce
opposition came from the Roman Catholic Churches. But the majority
view of the BCC was that under certain circumstances Abortion can be
accepted. Even so there was an attempt to stop the passing of the bill which
was mounted a part of the BCC when its member staged a peaceful
demonstration outside the Parliament and read out a petition, criticising
the introduction of the bill in vain.
One of the most effective actions taken by the BCC in cooperation
with Emang Basadi was on the issue of Mrs. Dow's case. It is a legal issue
concerning the 1984 Citizenship Act. According to the Act, her two
children cannot be accorded Botswana citizenship because their father is a
non-Motswana. On the other hand, a Motswana man will have his
children as Batswana irrespective of where they were born. Mrs. Dow's
argument was that the 1984 Citizenship Act was contrary to the
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Constitution and should therefore be amended to enable her to pass
citizenship rights to her children. On this issue the BCC issued a press
statement to support Mrs. Dow and has financially supported her. In this
case, Mrs. Dow won the first round. Related to this issue, the BCC has set
up a Human Rights Special Funds which can be used in similar cases or
any case that hinges on human rights (BCC, 1991: 31). Apart from this
fund, there have published several occasional papers concerning poverty
and human rights of Remote Area Dwellers (RADS) to set up agendas for
further involvement.
Exemplified by these cases, recently the BCC has been involved in
the protection of human rights, especially of the marginalised. At the BCC
Roundtable Conference held at the Anglican Cathedral in Gaborone 23rd
and 24th in March, 1992, there set an agenda for churches to take actions.
In this conference, the president of the BCC, Rev. Matshego called
churches to voice the problems of the marginalised and speak out loudly
against policies that destroy the poor and trample on their human rights"
(Mokaedi, April 1992: 1). It remains to be seen what actions the church
will actually take, but this can be a start for the church in Botswana to
strengthen its position in civil society.
4.2.4.2 The Case of Independent Churches
In this part, examples of interactions between independent churches
and the state are briefly refered to by citing cases researched by van
Binsbergen (1993).
An interesting phenomenon was observed in interactions between
independent churches and state officials (notably the Registrar of Societies)
in the context of the Societies Act (van Binsbergen, 1993). It is that the
Registrar imposed the far-reaching demands on churches, particularly
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during churches' registration phase. In this phase, the threat of non-
registration was used to change their constitution favourable to the
Registrar's demand (van Binsbergen, 1993: 32), or, in other words, in order
to accommodate these churches to the state. This is a case of St. Anna's
Church in Francistown.
There were also cases which show interesting dimensions of state-
independent churches relations. Among them, Guta Ra Jehova was the
case that its registration was cancelled because of its failure to submit a list
of annual returns (van Binsbergen, 1993: 32). There were also cases that
changes of names of churches were imposed (van Binsbergen, 1993: 33-37).
These practices of the state can be considered that the state has a
strategy "not so much to prohibit but to control" these churches (van
Binsbergen, 1993: 35) in order to exercise influence over these
organisations by encapsulating them in a bureaucratic structure. It is quite
correct that van Binsbergen concluded that "the state seeks to co-opt non-
state organizational powers without the slightest insistence on its
prerogatives or hegemony" (van Binsbergen, 1993: 43) by controlling
independent churches in a variety of ways, not by using forces.
The growth of Independent Churches has an aspect of symbolic,
organisational and healing responses to the emerging deteriorated socio-
economic conditions. Therefore, the case of responses of the Botswana
state shows some ideological struggle to show its, apparent, strength.
4.3 Christian Churches in Civil Society in Zambia and Botswana: From a
Comparative Perspective
There is a logic of the church concerning their choice to be involved
in "politics" in the sense that it refers to activities so as to influence on
policies of the state, which are areas of churches' concerns. For the church
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the ultimate source of authority is that it is derived from the God. The
state thus is supposed to derive its authority from God. Even so, in fact,
both the political structure and the appointment of rulers are left to the
free choice of the people from whom authority comes from. As far as the
state uses its power in a morally acceptable way and keeps its eyes on the
common good, people are obliged to obey the state (churches' view of
legitimacy of the state). However, they can stand up for their rights if
"power" is abused. In fact, there is never the unitary approach among
different churches to political and socio-economic problems 21 , as stated
earlier part of this chapter. In this context, the, mainly mainline, church
becomes an important vehicle to express people's will as the mirror of the
nation in Africa. In the recent process of democratisation, therefore, as
Gifford stated, "churches have become so important to Africa's
democratization" (1994: 533), because the state has lost its legitimacy from
their criteria.
Therefore, it is quite apparent that "visions" (ideological base) of the
Church and attitudes and approaches to development and politics are
closely related. And the churches' network in both countries and its
relati,,e financial autonomy from the state have put it in a unique
position in civil society, to which will be refered later. Based on what has
been written in this chapter, I will argue several important points which
are relevant to consider conditions of "growth" and "stagnation" of civil
society.
4.3.1 "Visions" of the Church and Political and Economic Involvement
21 As Gifford offered one of the interesting developments in African Christianity in the
1980s. It was, what he called, the new Pentecostal wave, which has North American
background (1994: 517-518). He ob ,-;ered that, as a result of this "wave," the mainline
churches lost their young people to new churches. Therefore, the 1980s can be considered a
decade when there was a big change in African Christianity. In the case of Zambia, he
quoted a case of the United Church of Zambia, the largest Protestant community, which
split in August 1993 over Pentecostal practices (Gifford, 1994: 521).
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In both countries, it was only recently that documents have set out
both churches' recognition of socio-economic and political conditions and
their basic attitude to the problems which they thought that they faced.
According to these documents, we can find similar tendency of churches'
basic attitudes in their development activities, although there are various
approaches by different Christian churches, as briefly refered to earlier in
this chapter. In terms of terminology, they use such words as "injustice" to
describe real situations, and "liberation" as the mission of the mainline
Church22. For the purpose of overcoming "injustice" and promoting the
process toward "liberation," they set the poor, the weak and the
disadvantaged as target groups and take people-oriented and people-
centred approaches. This partly reflects the influence of their "ecumenical
partners" overseas which offer financial support, especially projects
initiated by people themselves because there projects are more viable than
those initiated from above (NGO-isation of churches). Therefore we can
find the features which are common in churches' development activities
as follows, including both advantages and limitations (e.g., Henkel : 193-
195):
(1) Emphasis on "grass roots" initiatives.
(2) Centrality of the principle of self-help.
(3) Disadvantaged people as the main target group.
(4)Access to the level of motivation of communities.
(5)Time and patience to wait for developments.
(6) Lack of fundamental strategic decisions, just mirrors of the mission's activities.
(7)Limited resources to carry out integrated programme.
22As I raised earlier, the fundamentalist churches do not share the similar development
approach as those mainline ones.
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The first feature is mainly because churches can use existing structures and
forms of organisation. Therefore administrative costs are normally lower
than those of other organisations which have to establish necessary
infrastructure at the beginning. The second one arises not because self-
reliance is the aim but rather as a prerequisite for development projects
from the standpoint of the western counterparts which offer aid. In fact,
this is one of the important criteria which determine viability of projects.
The third characteristic is that churches' main concern is to benefit those
who are often neglected by the government programmes. The fourth is
that the churches can influence people's commitment by stressing the
ethical side of the Christian belief. The fifth is that people, who have been
working as missionaries have developed and can develop the trust of
people over a long period. However churches have limitations. As the
sixth feature indicated, some institutions developed over a long period
and have become fossilised despite the necessity to adapt themselves to
new circumstances. And the problem of resources holds true for the case
of churches. It is because they are financially dependent on their domestic
and overseas "ecumenical partners" as stated above.
However, it is apparent that the scopes which were covered by the
document Christian Liberation Justice and Development by three main
church bodies of Zambia was much wider than that of the BCC.
Apparently there reflected differences of churches' economic and political
experiences in both countries as I have described so far. There is a clear
contrast between Botswana, on the one hand, where multi-party system
with rarely growing economy in Africa have existed, and Zambia, on the
other hand, which had one-party system creating problems of political
corruption and deteriorating economy. It is thus natural that churches'
concerns became, eventually, much wider in Zambia than in Botswana.
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What should be pointed out here is, therefore, the factor of "crises,"
whether "to a nation" or "to churches," in which churches are given
opportunities to consolidate their unity. The controversy of the
introduction of scientific socialism was a crisis in which the Church had to
defend its own interest against the state. In the 1980s, the mainline
churches continuously expressed their areas of concern in the form of
pastoral letter, Christian Liberation, Justice and Development, as stated
above, which contained a variety of issues (agenda) which related to the
recent process of democratisation, emphasising the importance of political
participation as well as human rights and actors in "civil society" in
democracy, although there was not any clear indication to support the re-
reintroduction of multi-party politics in the document. In the period of
transition to the multi-party politics in the early 1990s, it was when there
occurred a political stalemate concerning the constitutional issue and
some prospect for violence at elections that the church explicitly appeared
in the political scene as mediator and monitor.
In contrast, Botswana has been relatively free of this kind of "crisis"
since independence, even though the BCC was the most active actor in
development activities in Botswana until around 1974 when the
government's financial condition was dramatically improved. Thus, it is
also by economic conditions and the financial capacity of the government
that churches' involvement in development activities are conditioned. In
Botswana, especially in the fields of health and education, churches'
significance have been diminished after they handed over their projects to
the government since independence. In this context, the BCC's
recognition of realities can be found in an address of the president of the
BCC, which not only recognised economic and political stability in the
country, but also pointed out not crises but emerging problems created
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behind the stability in whose solutions the member churches and
organisations have to fully and aggressively participate as follows:
"Having enjoyed relative peace and political stability that
prevailed in the country, these developments have been accompanied
by massive urbanisation, disintegration of the traditional extended
family, discarding of Setswana traditional values, atomising of the
family, breakage of families through divorces and a general
tendency to play down Christian values and principles... While
there has been showing some negative signs: the wealth of the
countryis in the hands of a minority; the various aid schemes have
resulted in benefiting the well-to-do-people at the expense of the
needy; the gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider; there
are policies that may lead to most of the usable land in the country
being owned by a few citizen; the number of landless citi7ens is likely
to rise; the poor groups in our society such as Basarwa are being more
and more marginalised" (Mokaedi, April 1992: 1).
Although there has been relatively limited political involvement, this
new vision has let the BCC to be involved in more actively in the field of
the protection of human rights as we have seen.
On the other hand, in Zambia, as we have seen, enfeebled
government's financial conditions, which have caused "crises," have
enforced churches to expand their activities, or "NGO-ization" of the
mainline churches (Gifford, 1994: 521). It was clearly stated in the
document as follows:
"Our contribution to the solution of the present crisis is offered on
three different levels. First, we call our church members to action.
Secondly, we present general principles for social, economic and
political development. Finally, we make suggestions for special
areas of concern. As we respond to the demands of the situation, we
constantly strive to maintain a positive and constructive attitude as
we make our measured contribution towards the development of our
country" (CCZ, EFZ, ZEC, 1987: 10, emphasis added).
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4.3.2 Autonomy, Cooperation and Advocacy
In both countries, the Church has never been coopted into the state
structure, although there seemed to be one case in Zambia that the UNIP
intended to use the church as an instrument to attain its objectives, which
was fiercely criticised by the church (organisational autonomy). This is one
of the most important characteristics in Africa where, according to Gifford
(1994: 520), many churches effectively lost much of t heir ,idependence.
One of the advantages of churches is that they have "ecumenical
partners" based in de elopPri countries who support activities of churches
in developing country in terms of finance and personnel (financial
"autonomy"). These assistances are in some case directed to specific
projects, and in others to churches themselves or the councils. In the case
of the BCC, as briefly stated above, they have financial supports derived
from "ecumenical partners," including Christian Aid, World Council of
Churches and Methodist Overseas Division (BCC, 1991). In addition, some
new projects are all financed by them. For example, Human Rights Special
Funds, whose establishment was decided by the BCC Executive in 1991, are
financed by Dan Church Aid. Also in the case of the CCZ, its members in
programme/project financing is largely dependent on contributions from
"ecumenical partners" as mentioned above. Although this does not mean
that there is no financial constraints on the churches' activities 23, the
existence of "ecumenical partners" at least have kept the church
23For the church in both countries, it is a big concern to overcome their financial dependency
on "ecumenical partners" and to be financially independent. In fact, they can only manage to
run limited number of projects financially supported by "ecumenical partners", and it is
impossible to be involved in more integrated programmes to combat the factors which have
been hindering "development." Also in the case of the CCZ, there was financial deficit in
the 1980s.
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financially independent of the state. Therefore the church has stood on its
own feet24.
Based on this relatively autonomous position, churches has kept its
basic collaborative relations with the state in Zambia. They stated as
follows:
The specific response of the Christian churches to the
challenge of today's reality is preceded by a general outline of
the Christian mission. Particular reference is later made to the
distinct and in dependent, though complementary, relationship
of church and state to one another" (CCZ, ZEC, EFZ, 1987: 11,
emphasis added).
'The work and activity of the churches is different from that
of the state. While church and state depend on each other in
many ways, nevertheless the two are quite distinct and
independent of each other. They have their own particular
missions to perform for the total human development of the
nation. It is thus important that the autonomy of each be fully
recognised and accepted" (CCZ, ZEC, EFZ, 1987: 13, emphasis
added).
Also in Botswana, there has been much cooperation on independent basis
between the BCC and government department as exemplified by the
financial support from the Ministry of Local Government and Lands for
the marketing of handicrafts survey for remote area dwellers (RADS)
which was facilitated by the BCC's Service Department (BCC, 1991: 35).
As we have seen in this chapter, however, churches in both
countries have also taken the tactics of "advocacy" in its relation with the
state. It is clear that church autonomy has made it possible to take this
option. In Zambia, it was more "resistance," which accompanies
24In more recent research by the author, the BCC's financial resources from "ecumenical
partners" overseas have been dwindling, so that its activities have been inevitably scaling
down (interview with, J. Potter, the Acting General Secretary of the BCC, 8 August 1996).
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"mobilised" people, than just "advocacy" in the case of the controversy of
the introduction of scientific socialism. In the situation of crises, the
church in Zambia, especially the Catholic, has used the form of "pastoral
letters" directed not only to the state but also to all Christians in the
country. This style seems to have worked well not only to avert "crises,"
but also to generate pressure to the state especially in Zambia where the
influence of Christianity on political leaders has been strong. Actually this
combination of collaboration and advocacy has progressively strengthened
churches' position in civil society in Zambia, and also it has made
churches in a unique position in the process of democratic transition in
Zambia. Furthermore, the FODEP, whose role is supposed to spread civic
education so as to share democratic values among Zambians in the
consolidation phase, seems to be one of the important actors.
In comparison, from the experience of the church in Botswana, it
has never attained its strength in civil society to the same degree as in
Zambia. The administrative capacity of the state owing to the sound
financial basis has made the government possible to keep it as the main
agent of development, and, therefore, there remained relatively less room
for the church to work. Moreover, lack of severe confrontation between
the state and the church and the legitimacy of the elected government has
not offered opportunities to consolidate unity among churches as
happened in Zambia. Although there have been several "statements" or
"comments" on government policies, these are only directed to policy-
makers.
In addition, there is a difference of organisational strength between
churches in Zambia and those in Botswana. Although there are three
different mother bodies of churches in Zambia, they acted quite
cooperatively, mainly at the time of "crisis." As was exemplified by the
cases of the Catholic involvement in the formation process of the MMD
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and election monitoring, there have existed well-connected networks in
Zambia. Because of these networks, people can be symbolically and
practically "mobilised."
In Botswana, however, as is pointed out by the president of BCC,
which is the coordinating body of the mainline churches including
Catholics, at an opportunity of the Roundtable Conference, the BCC has
not yet reached out to many local churches, which are not members of the
Council (Mokaedi, April 1991: 1).
It is these independent churches that have interacted with the state
in so interesting a manner as briefly refered to above. These churches are
not only challengers against the mainline churches which have relatively
collaborating relationship with the state, but also symbolic challengers
against the relatively strong Botswana state. These interactions actually
shows the state's intention to effectively control these churches and keep
its hegemony.
4.3.3 Difference of the Degree of Institutionalisation in Civil Society:
Factors
Generally the church has been institutionalised in the historical
process. It is, however, apparent that the degree of institutionalisation of a
type of AO, even a church, in civil society in one country is likely to be
different from that in another country. As we have seen in this chapter,
the process of institutionalisation is influenced both by internal factors of
AOs and external factors. The former includes the churches'
organisational network for "mobilisation", and the significance of
development activities in a country. The latter refers to economic
conditions, administrative capacity of the government, and the state's
policies. Also as we have seen, the church's tactics are influentially
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working to be more deeply entrenched in civil society by asing its political
tools like "pastoral letters" to Christians in a country.
In the case of Zambia and Botswana, there has been a clear contrast.
In Zambia, where the church has become one of the most influential
components in a relatively vigorous civil society, the church has
strengthened its organisational structure and firmly entrenched itself in
the society through its continuing contribution in the fields of health,
education, which produced early political elites in the territory in
historical terms, and rural development. As a result it has also
strengthened its influence on political leaders, complementary
development role in cooperation with the post-colonial state in
deteriorating national economy and enfeebled state's administrative
capacity, and effective advocacy and "resistance" by using established
networks for "mobilisation."
In Botswana, on the other hand, where the churches are voices in
its incipient civil society, the churches' roles in civil society have been
limited because of a relatively narrow space for their activities regulated
and controlled by the financially and ideologically relatively strong state,
which has been guaranteed by the dramatic improvement of the
government administrative capacity owing to its firm financial bases, and
Botswana's political stability. In comparison with Zambia, it is also
possible to point out that early political elites were educated not in schools
in the Protectorate but in South Africa in historical terms. Also the
autonomous activities of independent churches, which are very much
fragmented themselves, have been effectively intervened in by the state.
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CHAPTER 5
NATIONAL SERVICE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONAL
ORGANISATIONS: EXPERIENCES FROM ZAMBIA AND BOTSWANA
Chazan gives us a useful vision on the state, considering the issue
treated in this chapter, when she wrote:
"Viewed from below, the state is seen as both a distributor of
benefits and an intruder" (1988: 333, emphasis added).
In general, the state in most of Africa seems to have been functioning only
as an intruder and seems to have failed to distribute many benefits to the
ordinary people. This has been one of the most characteristic phenomena
in the post-colonial period. It has occasionally been referred to as the
"failure of the state." It is against this background that the importance and
popularity of non-governmental actors has been recognised in distributing
services as well as in facilitating or promoting development.
In Zambia and Botswana, there have been a variety of National
Service Development Associational Organisations (NSDA0s), which
serve others, as detailed in chapter 2. In this chapter, based on the data and
materials obtained during the field research, I will consider (1) how
NSDAOs' emergence and activities are related to the capacity of the state as
a major distributor or supplier of services in a country, (2) what kind of
achievements and problems NSDAOs have experienced, and (3) how the
state regards NSDAOs activities and what kind of relations there are
between the state and specific NSDA0s. In addition, in the latter part of
the chapter, NSDAOs working in the issue area of family planning will be
comparatively analysed from these points of view.
My main argument is (1) that the NSDAOs tend to appear and work
in a "policy vacuum," where the state has been expected but has failed to
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offer sufficient services because of scarcity of resources (decline of material
bases), and (2) that the relationship between the state and a specific
NSDAO is better in the area where there is less competition between the
state and an NSDAO both in terms of practice and ideology, and therefore
that the state tends to rigidly control NSDAOs which are involved in the
areas of the state's concern and which have different ideological
inclinations from the state, so that the state may keep its hegemony.
For the purpose of analysing the aspects of NSDAOs mentioned
above more in depth, it is also necessary to consider NSDAOs in their
relationship with, especially, poor people l which they have been
targeting2 . The one reason for taking target groups into account is that
NSDAOs as intermediary organisations can be evaluated not only in terms
of the effectiveness of their organisational management but also in terms
of their impact on target groups and results derived from their activities.
The other reason for taking target groups into account is that NSDAOs'
impact on rural community is never "neutral." In other words, activities
of one NSDAO impact favorably on only a part of community. In fact, in
some cases, NSDAOs activities are against the poorest among the poor. As
de Graaf correctly pointed out from his experience in Zimbabwe,
"undifferentiating strategies [of NSDAOs approaching 'rural poor] in an
environment which is in fact differentiated might in the end benefit only
the strongest group or class" (1987: 290).
It has been a recent general assumption that what are called NGOs
are more effective instruments to uplift the poor in developing countries
through their flexible approaches and comparative advantage in "micro-
1 The concepts of the poor adopted by a variety of NSDAOs are differ nt in terms of area of
concern of each NSDAO. In some case, the poor means those who are the poorest peasants in
rural areas, and in other cases, the poor means those who are living in urban squatters.
Therefore, it is necessary to be careful to use the concept by various NSDA0s.
2If the poor is targeted, NSDAOs tend to be more involved in activities of advocacy and
the promotion of participation.
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development" than the post-colonial African states which have failed to
come up to people's expectation. It can be true that NSDAOs have been
important actors providing benefits otherwise not available. But it is also
true that people among the "NGO community" in Southern Africa felt
that:
"(t)hroughout Southern Africa we see examples of a pretense at
organisation which is in the end a betrayal of the 'grassroots' that
NGOs claim to serve. The institutionalisation of grassroots
development must mean the increasing empowerment of popular
organisations rather than then increasing bureaucratisation of the
development process by unrepresentative and self-serving
intermediary NGOs" (Andersson, 1989: 1).
NSDAOs are intermediary organisations (e.g., Carroll, 1993) whose success
can be assessed only in the degree to which their activities and their
(un)intended results have improved people's capabilities to obtain and
maintain access to and control over the resources they need to solve their
problems. And proper evaluation requires paying attention to what
happens after the delivery of services (de Graaf, 1987: 282-283). Therefore
some effort will be made to consider the effect of NSDAOs on the
"grassroots" by using self-evaluation reports of specific NSDA0s, to
identify both positive and negative roles of NSDAOs in rural
democratisation.
In this chapter, firstly several NSDA0s, which do not necessarily
have their own counterparts in the other country, are considered as case
studies after reviewing the general characteristics of NSDAOs in both
countries. Secondly, NSDAOs involved in the issue area of population
and family planning will be comparatively analysed.
5.1 The Case of Zambia: Characteristics of NSDAOs
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In Zambia, apart from such associations as the Red Cross, the Girl
Guide and the Boy Scout which were formed for the purpose of "social
welfare" with international influence before independence, most
NSDAOs were established in the 1970s and the 1980s. In the early 1970s,
the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), and the Zambia
Pre-school Association were formed by progressive people who eventually
became leading members of these associations. But it was after the
establishment of the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) in
1974 that the emphasis of NSDAOs was changed from "social welfare,"
which had been the main objective of non-governmental sector, especially
missions, since the colonial period and which had focused on assistance to
orphans and the disadvantaged, to "self-reliance" of, especially poor,
people. The ZCSD had been the umbrella and coordinating body, to which
local NSDAOs were affiliated, during the period of one-party politics.
In the 1980s, there appeared NSDAOs like the NGO Coordinating
Committee (NGOCC), which coordinates activities of DAOs working in
the issue area of WID, and the Human Settlement of Zambia (HUZA),
which involved themselves not only in providing services but also in
projects for the purpose of empowering target groups. Also some NSDAOs
like the YWCA, which used to be involved in leadership training and
establishment of its own institutions, have started programmes of a
conscientisation (awareness rising) nature to empower target groups.
It was these NSDA0s, especially those involved in "women in
development," and which have had empowe, ment-oriented programmes
like the NGOCC and the YWCA, that have been actively working both in
the transition period in the area of election-monitoring and in the Third
Republic on issues area constitutional amendment (New African,
December 1993).
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Therefore, using Korten's "four generation category" 3
 (1990: 117),
NSDAOs in Zambia seem to have evolved into the "second generation"
aiming at small scale self-reliant local development, out of the "first
generation" aiming at relief and welfare by distributing benefits.
5.1.1 Failure of the State in a Declining Economy: Emerging Areas of
Activities of NSDAOs
It is in the declining economy as described in chapter 2 that the state
has failed to provide social services such as education and health care. The
"quality" of education has been deteriorating due to lack of material,
facilities and personnel and the functional literacy programme has been
constrained by a shortage of fund (Freund, 1986: 877). In terms of the
proportion of government expenditure on education, there had been a
range between 5.1 per cent (in 1986) and 11.1 percent (in 1980) in the 1980s,
and 8.6 percent in 1990 (World Development Report 1992) 4, which is quite
unstable, as table 5-1 shows.
In the financial problems, primary and secondary education
suffered relatively more than university education, with their share of
recurrent educational funds falling from 68.9 per cent in 1970-75 to 61.1 per
cent in 1985-86. As a result, especially at the primary level, the allocation
for teaching materials has been decreased, even though currently all
educational materials that reach primary schools are funded by donor
agencies (Hoppers, 1989: 17-18). In this situation, the community has by
and large been responsible for the extension of many primary schools to
3 According to Korten's earlier article, the first generation NGOs are involved in relief and
welfare, the second generation NGOs in small-scale self-reliant local development, and
the third generation NGOs in sustainable systems development (1987: 147-149). In his more
recent work (1991: 117), he added fourth generation NGOs which are involved in "people's
movements."
4 In more recent issues of World Development Report, data on the proportion of government
expenditure on education have not been appeared.
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become "basic schools" through the addition of two extra grades (8 and 9)
(Hoppers, 1989: 17-18).
Table 5-1 Government Expenditure on Education in Zambia (Current), 1980-1990*
Year (K'000) % of Government
Expenditure
1980 120,377 11.1
1981 83,005 6.7
1982 107,997 8.2
1983 120,043 10.4
1984 110,869 10.1
1985 173,788 8.0
1985 275,270 5.1
1985 279,109 6.2
1986 474,539 5.7
1987 936,756 9.7
1988 2,274,239 8.6
* Includes Capital Expenditure from January, 1985.
** 1990 Total is up to September.
Source: Compiled from Monthly Digest of Statistics April-June, 1991 Table 32b.
In the area of health care, the consequences of a deteriorated
economy have been also severe, so that the quality of service has been
declining. This has been reflected in such examples as increased morbidity
and mortality from diseases and malnutrition, reduced physician to
population ratios, and decreased real government expenditure per capita
as the following tables show (Freund, 1986).
Although the proportion of total expenditure on health has recently
grown up to 7.4 percent in 1990 (World Development Report, 1992) and 8.4
percent in 1992 from 5.1 percent in 1987 (African Development Indicators
1994-95), annual average of the proportion has been declining from 6.9
percent between 1975 and 1979 to 6.7 percent between 1980 and 1985, and to
6.3 percent since 1986 (African Development Indicators 1994-95). Also, the
per capita health expenditure has, in general terms, declined drastically for
15 years, as table 5-2 shows. This is one of the consequences of the serious
financial constraints derived from the reduced Zambian economy.
Actually, new capital building projects had virtually stopped, maintenance
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backlogs became more acute. In addition, the problems extended and came
to have serious consequences for planned PHC programmes where
projected expenditures exceeded expected revenues (Freund, 1986: 878).
Also as table 5-3, which is based on collected data at the University
Teaching Hospital (UTH) in Lusaka, shows, there has been a tendency for a
general deterioration of the nutrition situation. The malnutrition
mortality for the 1-14 age group comprised more than 62 percent of the
total mortality in 1984.
Table 5-2 Trends in Real Government Health Expenditure per Capita in Zambia
(Kwacha)
Year Recurrent Capital Total
1970 16.1 5.8 21.9
1971 17.1 6.0 23.1
1972 17.3 3.9 21.2
1973 17.1 1.9 19.0
1974 16.9 1.8 18.7
1975 17.4 2.1 19.5
1976 17.2 2.0 19.2
1977 16.4 1.4 17.8
1978 14.3 0.6 14.9
1979 12.2 0.2 12.4
1980 13.1 0.7 13.8
1981 12.4 0.6 13.0
1982 13.6 1.7 15.3
1983 12.0 1.3 13.3
1984 11.6 0.3 11.9
1985 6.0 0.2 8.2
Source: Freund, 1986: 897 Table 1.
These economic constraints, which became more severe under
structural adjustment, have consequently exacerbated the phenomenon of
"poverty" and have most severely hit children and women as recent
researches have shown (GRZ/ UNICEF, 1986; Clark and Allison, 1989;
Muntemba, 1989; Banda, 1990).
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Table 5-3 (a) Malnutrition Mortality, UTH (1974-1984) (Zambia)
Year	 Mortality	 Malnutrition
0-11 months
	
Mortality
Malnutrition as
Percentage of Total
Mortality
1974 1243 32 2.6
1975 993 29 2.9
1976 1155 49 4.2
1977 1129 31 2.9
1978 1219 33 2.9
1979 1423 38 2.9
1980 1331 32 2.4
1981 1606 42 2.6
1982 1631 61 3.7
1983 1708 98 5.7
1984 2161 123 5.7
Source: Freund, 1986: 885 Table 9
Table 5-3(b) Malnutrition Mortality, UTH (1974-1984) (Zambia)
Year Mortality
1-14 years
Malnutrition
Mortality
Malnutrition as
Percentage of Total
Mortality
1974 573 106 18.5
1975 370 73 19.7
1976 563 93 16.5
1977 351 134 24.3
1978 857 305 35.6
1979 815 321 39.3
1980 769 292 38.0
1981 874 329 37.6
1982 985 484 49.1
1983 1301 698 53.7
1984 1659 1032 62.2
Source: Freund, 1986: 885 Table 9
It is in such areas as education and health, where the state has failed
to meet people's expectations, that most NSDAOs as well as northern
NGOs have been working 5 . In the area of health, NSDAOs working
include the Child Care and Adoption Society of Zambia which has
provided substantial assistance for homeless children, adoption facilities,
and a nutrition rehabilitation centre for malnourished children refereed
from the University Teaching Hospital (UTH), the Family Life Movement
5As discussed in chapter 4, churches and related organisations are also important actors in
this regard.
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of Zambia (FLMZ), which has promoted family planning by using natural
methods, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), which
has been involved in activities of disseminating information on family
planning and population issues and of providing family planning services
as we consider at a length in later in this chapter, and the Red Cross
Society working in broad areas of health and emergency relief and some
other church sponsored organisations like the Christian Children's
Association.
Also in the area of education including "non-formal education,"6
various NSDAOs have been working. Among them, the Zambia Pre-
school Association (ZPA) is a case of an NSDAO actively working in
"policy vacuum" where the government involvement is weak. Actually
"pre-school education" 7 has constituted an integral part of Government
policy, but the Ministry of General Education and Culture has not run pre-
schools and its role has been to provide a grant to the ZPA for payment of
staff and organisation of in-service courses and coordination of pre-school
activities. This is because financial constraints have limited the state's
actual involvement in pre-school education (GRZ/ UNICEF, 1986: 110). In
fact, District Councils have been considerably involved in pre-school
education in coordinating pre-school institutions in the district, while the
ZPA has been working in the training of teachers, organising national
6"Non-formal education" was defined as "any organised, systematic, education activity
carried on outside the framework of the formal system to provide selected types of learning
to particular sub-groups in the population, adults as well as children" (Coombe and Ahmed,
1974 quoted in GRZ/UNICEF, 1986: 112).
7"Pre-school" has been defined in a government document, the Education Reform document
(1977), that pre-schools are organised institutions that cater for the total development of
the child before the attainment of seven years of age. They look into the social,
educational and health aspects of the growing child and strive to assist him in his all-
around development; this is, his physical, mental, social, emotional, moral and
aesthetical development. Thus, pre-schools do not primarily exist for the preparation of
the young to enter into formal primary schools as participation in pre-school education is
not a pre-requisite for entry into Grade 1 in Zambia.
359
level workshops and seminars, producing play materials, and providing
pre-school services to the marketeers' children.
Some other A0s, especially church related ones, have been active
both in the areas of health and education. In practice, health and
education, as detailed in the previous chapter, are closely intertwined and
inseparable in such cases as family health education and home economics.
Therefore it is relevant to consider that working areas of service-oriented
A0s, including both NSDAOs and other A0s, are more or less
concentrated in the area where the state has not sufficiently served.
It is necessary to point out that the role of NSDAOs in the area of
service provision has been also enhanced under the implementation of
structural adjustment, which eventually stimulate NSDAOs to fill the gap.
Under structural adjustment, with neo-liberal orthodoxy, the World Bank
and the IMF emphasised the withdrawal of the state from the economic
activities and de-emphasise state-led development strategies (Gary, 1996:
150). Against this ideological background, the promotion of "NGOs"
activities in development field was also emphasised. Therefore, the factor
of structural adjustment will be necessarily include to consider the state-
NSDAOs relation in the 1980s later in this chapter.
5.1.2 Some General Characteristics of NSDAOs (including quasi-NSDA0s)
in Zambia
The main initiators of NSDAOs in Zambia are relatively diversified
and include the government (e.g., the Village Industry Service, the Small
Industry Development Organisation), international agencies or groups
from overseas (e.g., the Zambia Association for Research and
Development, the Human Settlement of Zambia), churches and some
church leaders (e.g., the Family Life Movement of Zambia, the Makeni
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Ecumenical Centre), and progressive people with the assistance of
international bodies (e.g., the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia).
Organisationally, NSDAOs in Zambia have relatively similar
structures. Constitutionally the top decision-making bodies are the general
meeting/conference, held regularly, but in practice the main policies are
made by the executive committee composed of members elected at the
general meeting, namely a chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary, and
treasurer, and several coopted members. Under the executive committee,
there are usually some committees to formulate projects, the number of
which depends on the areas of activities of individual NSDAO. The
projects made by these policy-making bodies are implemented by an
NSDAO's administrative body headed by the executive secretary (director)
and other staff members. Even so, this organisational structure does not
guarantee effective organisational management. In some cases, members
of the executive committee as the top policy-making body are not active
because of relative lack of enthusiasm 8, as in the case of the Self Help
Development (interview with the project coordinator of the SHD, 6/1/92).
Also lack of skilled manpower has hindered activities and self-evaluation
of NSDAOs as pointed out below. In addition, many NSDAOs had been
more or less controlled by UNIP in the Second Republic. During this
period, members of the Central Committee of UNIP often occupied posts
of executive committees of various NSDA0s, and President Kaunda
himself took posts of "patron" of NSDAOs like the Zambia Council for
Social Development. In particular, quasi-NSDAOs like the Village
Industry Service were controlled by politically appointed executives.
Therefore, the organisational structures of such NSDAOs as the ZCSD and
81n the case of SHD, members of the executive committee are nearly voluntarily involved in
the activities. Therefore, it often happens that they are reluctant to attend monthly
meetings.
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the VIS have been changed to adapt themselves to multi-party politics
following the period of political transition.
In terms of finance, NSDAOs including quasi-NSDAOs like the VIS,
have got quite limited grant from the government which has also faced
severe financial constraint. In the cases of the Zambia Pre-school
Association and the Girl Guides, which received relatively big financial
support from the government, the amount is 100,000 kwacha consisting of
less than 10 percent of the annual budgets of the associations. Even in the
case of the Village Industry Service established by President Kenneth
Kaunda, the government annual grant consists no more than 10 percent
of its annual budget. Normally, the NSDAOs have depended heavily for
their financial resources on several donors or international organisations,
including NORAD, CIDA, OXFAM, NOVIB, CUSA, the European
Foundation, and UNDP/UNIDO.
Generally speaking, NSDAOs in Zambia have also faced serious
problems in the deteriorated economy. One observer regarded the
situation where NSDAOs have been as follows:
As the economy changes radically, NGOs and agents of
development are affected. The programme of work of NGOs is
affected, and as it lives within the environment, the NGO itself is
internally affected. To both the external and internal effects, NGOs
react. They adjust and overcome, or just manage to survive, or
sometimes they are overwhelmed and made to decline by effects al
programme work and the NGO. Sometimes NGOs end up
concentrating on their own survival" (Bzulda, 1990: 114).
Actually most of the NSDAOs with which I interviewed have felt
the shortage of funds. 10 out of 11 9 (90.9 percent) of NSDAOs have faced
9 These are the Village Industries Service, Red Cross Society, the Human Settlement of
Zambia, the Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia, the Pre-school Association of
Zambia, the Family Life Movement of Zambia, the Self Help Development, the NGO
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the problem of the shortage of funds to operate their programmes. The
only NSDAO which has not felt the problem is the Human Settlement of
Zambia which has received enough financial assistance from the
European Foundation. Therefore it often happens that the monthly salary
for staff is below the poverty datum line. Moreover, more or less, the
problem of shortage of fund has caused a difficulty in recruiting qualified
full-time personnel (63.6 percent). The lack of qualified manpower has
also caused another difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of NSDAOs'
past programmes (interview with the director of HUZA, 21/1/92). Also
lack of transport (90.9 percent), which derived from the shortage of fund
and quite bad condition of roads, has made the monitoring activities of
NSDAOs quite difficult. There is actually a "vicious circle." In this
situation, NSDAOs are often criticised as follows:
"NGOs have failed to keep pace with the people's own effort at
survival. NGOs executives still sit in their offices designing
development while the people are engaged in their own
development initiatives that are usually at variance with the
NGOs perceived programmes" (Weekly Post, 7-13 February, 1992: 9,
emphasis added).
In Zambia, the main posts of NSDAOs have been almost completely
localised, which is one of the main characteristics in comparison with
Botswana as we see below, although NSDAOs depended on expatriates at
the initial stage. This effort of Zambian NSDAOs seems to sustain
autonomy from, so called, Northern NGOs and international agencies.
However, this does not mean that the manpower shortage has been
solved. For example, the YWCA experienced a serious manpower problem
with the end of the contract of their expatriate staff members and the
Coordinating Committee, the Zambia Association for Research and Development, and the
Boy Scout Association.
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resignation of other staff members (Touwen, 1990: 49). Therefore, the posts
which require technical knowledge and skills have occasionally been
occupied by expatriates. More recently to cope with this manpower
shortage, several NSDAOs have started to share an expatriate staff
member with special skills such as in bookkeeping (personal
communication with the General Secretary of the NGOCC, 4/12/1991).
As stated in chapter 2, there has been a coordinating body of
NSDA0s, the Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD), to which
most NSDAOs as well as social service departments of district councils,
and community service divisions of Mining Companies have been
affiliated. Also organisations working in the areas of WID have had their
coordinating body, namely the NGOCC. Apart from the coordination
through the ZCSD ad the NGOCC, there has been a variety of cooperation
among NSDAOs at project level and in such issue areas as AIDS.
In addition, there has been established, what can be called, a sort of
"NSDAO community," where main staffs working in NSDA0s, especially
progressive women, know each other, and share information concerning
activities of a variety of NSDAOs and potential donors for their
organisations. Especially for newly formed NSDA0s, it is difficult to get
information of fund available for their activities. Therefore, it is
important for them to keep in touch with relatively "established"
NSDA0s. This informal interaction has been usually taking place through
participation in seminars and conferences. These occasions have, in fact,
offered good opportunities to exchange information and to establish
future cooperation (personal observation by participating in two
seminars). These gatherings are considered to be functioning as an
alternative to the national coordinating bodies of NSDA0s.
5.1.3 The State and NSDAOs
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In Zambia, during the one-party era, what should be pointed out is
that it was not "non-political associations" but "political parties" that were
constitutionally prohibited. This is why various actors in civil society
could exist, which is not the case in many other authoritarian political
regimes. In the Report of the National Commission on the Establishment
a One Party Participatory Democracy (1972: 8), it was written that:
"We came to the conclusion that it was not in the interest of the
nation to prohibit the formation of non-political associations based
on tribal loyalties. Such an action would retard the cultural growth
and development of Zambia... WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND
that apart from the freedom to belong to the only political party,
people be free to form and to belong to non-political associations
provided they are not prejudicial to the national interest."
Therefore, in effect, the formation of NSDAOs was constitutionally
guaranteed.
During the period of one-party politics, however, there was control
of NSDAOs by the United Independence Party (UNIP) in various forms.
Basically NSDAOs have to register at the Registrar of Societies and submit
information on their annual turnover. Therefore registration and
monitoring have been basic tactics of the state. In addition, by occupying
top policy-making posts of several NSDA0s, members of the Central
Committee of UNIP influenced activities of NSDAOs to some extent.
Apart from these controls, NSDAOs involved in women's issue
have to affiliate to the Women's League of UNIP, which used to be the
Women's Brigade before 1983. The Women's League has the task of
implementing the party side of women's activities, and therefore
NSDAOs working in the area of Women in Development had been
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almost coopted into the party structure, although in the transition period
these NSDAOs delinked themselves from the party structure.
Moreover, it was quite difficult for NSDAOs to work beyond the
policy framework of the UNIP government, which can be observed even
in the quotation above, which emphasises the importance of the national
development priorities and the government intention to monitor
activities of NSDA0s. One of the examples which the Zambia Council for
Social Development faced, in its relation to the Ministry of Labour and
Social Services is as follows:
"On 14th April 1977, a delegation of the Council met senior officials
of the Ministry to discuss relationships between the two bodies. The
delegation was surprised to hear that the Ministry objected strongly
to certain aspects of the Council's constitution, as well as to some of
its activities, the following were the Ministry's main submissions:-
1. The Zambia Council for Social Development should not be allowed to be
independent and consider itself as the supreme body that should be consulted on
matters related to social development, it has to operate within the Ministry's
overall Social Development policy. In other words the Council should operate
through the Ministry's specialised departments of social Welfare and
Community Development. This is to enable the Ministry to supervise the
activities of the Council in order to ensure that whatever activities the
Council is engaged in are of acceptable standard.
2. The Council's desire to enlist membership of the Director of Social Welfare
and the Commissioner for Community Development is not acceptable since the
Government should monitor the work of the Council through these professional
department and vice versa.
'3. The Council's co-ordinative role should be confined only to the voluntary
organisations and not extend to functions of government agencies carrying out
social development services. The Council should merely be an umbrella
organisation for voluntary organisations contributing to social development....
In line with these submissions the Ministry listed a number of amendments
which it wished to be made to the constitution of the Council' (ZCSD,
Chairman's Report, 1978: 3-5, emphasis added).
In these quotations, it is clear that there was the intention of the
government to tightly control activities of NSDAOs and to limit their
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autonomy within the government policy framework. NSDAOs were not
supposed to be allowed to be working beyond the framework. Therefore,
NSDAOs themselves had to choose their survival strategy deliberately
during the one-party era, especially before structural adjustment was
introduced in the 1980s.
The UNIP government did not recognise the developmental work
of NSDAOs in Zambia for a long time. It was only in 1987, when the
government unilaterally abandoned the first structural adjustment
programme, that NSDAOs (in this study's category) were mentioned for
the first time in government documents as channels to be used in
development efforts in the New Economic Recovery Programme: Interim
National Development Plan. It seems that the government had learned
the importance of NSDAOs in development from experiences during the
first SAP period. In this document, it was proposed to set up an NGO-desk
within the National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) to
improve communication between the government and NG0s. However,
at least until the period of my field research, this proposal had not been
materialised. In the NCDP, there is only women's desk to cooperate with
NGOs involved in women in development (WID).
In the Fourth National Development Plan (FNDP), the government
referred to the importance of NGOs more explicitly and also repeated the
proposal in the Interim Plan as follows:
"The New Economic Recovery Programme (FNDP) recognises NGOs
as vital source of relief and development assistance... the FNDP will
generally aim at defining more clearly, the structures and procedures
for liaison between Government and NG0s. The NGO Unit in the
Department of Economic and Technical Cooperation at NCDP will be
responsible for close monitoring; in consultation with the Zambia
Council for Social Development of the relief and development
activities of NGOs and ensure that their programmes and projects
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are in line with the country's development priorities. The NGO Unit
will also ensure that NGOs submit their projects and programmes as
well as progress reports to NCDP for incorporation in Annual Plan
and Economic Report" (FNDP: 47-48, emphasis added).
In addition, in relation to the issue of WID,
"Non-governmental Organisations in Zambia play a major role in
supporting Government's efforts in integrating women in
development. Non-governmental Organisations ... include ...
organisations working in various fields including health, education
agriculture, family planning, water and sanitation, technology,
specific developmental needs, and focus on certain sectors such as
children, women, hunger, the disabled etc.... Historically, Non-
Governmental Organisations in Zambia, as in many other African
nations, have been pioneers in development and have been channels
for development resources... The objectives of the Fourth National
Development Plan is to promote the existing working relationship
of Non-Governmental Organisations and Government and strengthen
local, indigenous Non-Governmental Organisations so that they
may improve and increase their participation in the integration of
women development process" (FNDP: 47-48: 457-8).
It is possible to insist that during the period of structural adjustment
state-NSDAOs relations became more collaborative and less conflictive,
which will be shown in the cases of HUZA and PPAZ later in this chapter.
More recently there was close collaboration between the state and
NSDAOs in formulating the Social Action Programme (SAP) in the New
Economic Recovery Programme: Economic and Financial Policy
Framework 1991-1993. SAP is a programme in the areas of health and
population, education, and protection of vulnerable people, where the
state has failed to be accountable for people and the activities of NSDAOs
have been concentrated. On this occasion, NSDAOs in collaboration with
donors formed the NGO Forum in early 1991 with the initiatives of the
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World Vision International and NGOCC. One of the reasons to form this
body was because the ZCSD was under reconstruction. Apart from the
main forum, there were several sub-fora composed of NSDAOs and
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the NCDP in order work
on specific issues (interviews with an official of the NCDP and officers of
NSDA0s). Therefore, a collaborative relationship between the state and
NSDAOs has been gradually developed.
5.2 The Case of Botswana: Characteristics of NSDAOs
According to Grant (1980), the period 1962-1980 falls into three
distinct parts in Botswana - that from 1962 to 1968, from 1968 to 1974, and
from 1974 to 1980. What was recognised as "non-governmental
organisations" in this stage were basically the Brigades, the Botswana
Christian Council, the Botswana Council of Women, the Young Women's
Christian Association (YWCA), the Red Cross and so on. In this
periodisation, what can be pointed out is that there is a clear contrast
before and after 1974 when "the inspiration which had galvanised so
much of this non-government development effort began to fade,"
suggesting that "one period was ending and a new one starting" (Grant,
1980: 43). At this stage, NSDAOs in Botswana were still in the "first
generation" (Korten, 1987). One of the important changes was that the
government began to be more involved in development works like
refugee relief, the brigades which were initiated by non-governmental
efforts before 1974, when Botswana faced desperate shortage of cash and
qualified manpower.
In the 1970s, a few quasi-Service Associational Organisations
(NSDA0s) like the Rural Industries Promotions (RIP), the Rural
Industrial Innovation Centre (RIIC), the Botswana Technology Centre
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(BTC) were formed, which were initiated by the government. It is actually
in the 1980s that a number of NSDAOs were established in Botswana.
Since then, NSDAOs in Botswana has gradually moved into the "second
generation" by emphasising self-reliance of local people.
5.2.1 Working Spaces for NSDAOs in a "Well-Managed" Economy
In the good economic performance, as stated in chapter 2, public
services including health and education have been effectively delivered
(Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 283-292). This tendency can be also confirmed
by the relatively stable proportion of government expenditure in these
areas as shown in the following table 5-4, which is contrasting with
Zambia. Also several data available from the World Development Report
1992 show drastic improvement of standard of living. The infant mortality
rate, which is a number of deaths per 1000 live births, has been improved
from 112 in 1965 to 38 in 1990, which is the lowest in southern Africa. The
primary net enrollment has also been improved from 58 per cent in 1975
to 93 per cent in 1989.
Table 5-4 Proportion of Total Expenditure in Health and Education in Botswana
(Percentage)
Year	 Education	 Health
1982/83	 15.8	 4.4
1983/84
	
16.7	 4.8
1984/85	 14.9	 4.1
1985/86	 15.8	 4.4
1986/87	 16.6	 5.3
1987/88	 16.2	 6.6
1988/89	 16.5	 4.5
1989/90	 17.1	 4.0
1990/91*	 15.5	 4.4
1991/92**	 17.1	 4.4
* Revised
** Estimated
Source: Compiled from Central Statistics Office, 1991: 30
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What has been shown in macroeconomic and other national level
indicators is actually a rare and good performance of the government by
African standards, which is "good governance" in the sense that public
affairs have been effectively, responsibly and accountably managed, as
commented by an observer (Diamond, 1992: 40). Therefore, working
sphere for NSDAOs has been relatively limited in contrast with Zambia,
because the state has preoccupied more working space with its
administrative capacity.
However, it is also true that there have been inequality and
"poverty" in Botswana in the process of development as have been often
criticised (see, e.g. Cliff e, 1984 and especially on education, Kann, 1984).
And some other "new" problems have been emerging in the context of
"development" of Botswana which the state has not effectively coped
with. For example, a 1989 Poverty Datum Line (PDL) 10 study based on data
from the 1985/86 Household Income and Expenditure Survey estimated
that 64 per cent of rural households and 30 per cent of urban households
had income below their PDL. Also there is the regional difference in the
proportion of households living in poverty, although such differences
have been quite poorly reported. In addition, poverty is more severe and
widespread in remoter areas of the country where employment
opportunities are more limited (Kgosidintsi, 1992: 6-7)11.
It is in these working spaces that Botswana NSDAOs which
emerged have been working since the 1980s. Therefore it is valid to
consider that NSDAOs have been emerging in response to a perceived
10The PDL can be defined as the basic minimum income needed to maintain a decent
standard of living. The first poverty datum line for Botswana was derived from the
findings of the Rural Income Distribution Survey of 1974. From this survey it was
determined that 45 percent of rural households had incomes equal to or below their PDL. A
study of households in four urban areas in 1976 determined that at least 36 per cent and
possibly as many as 47 per cent of urban households had incomes below their PDL
(Kgosidintsi, 1992: 6).
liAccording to Kgosidintsi, the regional differences are still poorly documented because of
the tendency to focus on national level data (Kgosidintsi, 1992: 7-8).
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need and working in order to tackle issues which had not been properly
managed by the state and other existing social institutions. In other words,
NSDAOs tend to appear in issue areas "newly" perceived, especially by
progressive people in urban areas. NSDAOs like Thusano Lefatsheng have
been involved in projects of income-generation for the rural poor,
especially women in remote areas where there are otherwise limited
chances for employment and income-generating activities. NSDAOs also
appeared in such issue areas as environment, street children in urban
areas, and the promotion of self-managed producer groups.
5.2.2 Some General Characteristics of NSDAOs (including quasi-NSDA0s)
in Botswana
Considering initiators of NSDAOs in Botswana, there is a variety in
Botswana. Although there are a few NSDAOs initiated by the government
and some by international efforts, what is characteristic is that
organisations are often led by the "founding father/mother" as Inger
pointed out (Mmegi, 24-30 May 1991: 2). One of the examples of "founding
fathers" is Patrick van Rensburg, who was the founder of the Brigade
movement. The idea of education with production or employment has
been kept alive in such NSDAOs as the Foundation for Education with
Production (FEP) and the Co-operation for Research, Development and
Education (CORDE). In addition, the Mmegi Publishing Trust which has
issued a popular weekly Mmegi has its origin in the Swaneng Hill School
where Mmegi used to be a small school paper. Thusano Lafatsheng (TL)
(Terre Aide Botswana) was also formed "largely as a result of the
enthusiasm and vision of an expatriate, Francoise Horenburg" (Thusano
Lefatsheng, 1990: 2). Apart from these, such NSDAOs as the World View
International and the Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA)
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were established as a branch of international bodies, and some others were
formed by groups of expatriates and thereafter were localised like the Child
to Child Foundation.
Most of NSDAOs in Botswana, which are composed of voluntary
members who are interested in activities of each NSDAO, have their own
decision-making body. The regularly held general meeting attended by
members is usually the ultimate policy-making body. But in practice the
executive committee composed of both elected and coopted members
makes policies and in some cases it is assisted by the steering committee
meetings held more occasionally. Policy implementation is conducted by
its administrative body. Even so, there is a variety of, in some cases
unique, organisational structures and experiences of NSDAOs derived
from their organisational structure. TL, which is not a membership
organisation, has only the board as decision-making body but it has been
dormant, causing disorganisation of TL's activities as stated later in this
chapter. CORDE, whose members are producers' cooperative societies and
agricultural management associations, has the management committee as
policy-making body, which is composed of elected members of member
cooperatives and associations, as well as staff of the Technical Support
Team which is headed by the coordinator and supports activities of
members. Therefore, in principle, support staff who are normally
supposed to be administrative staff, are "employees" of "target groups" for
which they are working.
According to my survey based both on interviews and on written
documents, NSDAOs in Botswana have faced relatively fewer problems
than those in Zambia. Among 11 NSDAOs researched 12, 5 have felt the
12These include the Botswana Family Welfare Association, the Cooperation for Research,
Development and Education, the Botswana Technology Centre, the Foundation for
Education with Production, the Mmegi Publishing Trust, the Rural Industries Promotions,
the World View International, the Red Cross, Thusano Lefatsheng, the Child to Child
Foundation, and Bana Rona Trust.
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problem of the shortage of manpower, and also 5 the problem of shortage
of funds. Also in Botswana, transport or the shortage of vehicles to access
to their target groups is not so serious a problem as in Zambia. This seems
to be partly because NSDAOs are relatively free from their financial
restraints to get vehicles and because access to the rural area is easier
because of well-maintained road condition and therefore the maintenance
of vehicles is better.
In terms of finance, among 10 NSDAOs from which some financial
data were obtained, 5 have received financial assistance from the
government. Among them, quasi-NSDA0s, namely the Botswana
Technology Centre gets 90 percent of its budget from the government and
the Rural Industries Promotions 50 percent. The Botswana Family
Welfare Association receives 20 percent from the government and the
Thusano Lefatsheng gets some. 9 out of 10 NSDAOs received funding
from foreign donors 13. Concerning the problem of funding, Inger, who is
the Executive Director of the RIP pointed out,
"One of the biggest mistakes therefore, and one that has been made
by several NGOs in Botswana, is to rely exclusively or primarily on
one donor; when the donor pulls out, the NGO collapses" (Mmegi, 24-
30 May, 1991).
One of such cases, which is not an NSDAO, was that of the Southern
Rural Development Association (SRDA), which has been facing the
collapse because of withdrawal of the main donor, the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation.
There is a striking contrast with the case of Zambia in terms of
manpower, in that in the case of Botswana important management posts
13The Bana ba Rona Trust, which has only started its activities and therefore has still
limited scope of activities, has been dependent on individual subscription and donation
from American and British Embassies and other NSDA0s.
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of the most active NSDAOs have been occupied by expatriates, mainly
white Europeans. These NSDAOs include the Botswana Family Welfare
Association, the Co-operation for Research, Development and Education,
the Forestry Association of Botswana, Rural Industry Promotions, and
Thusano Lefatsheng. This phenomenon of "expatriate dependency" shows
us that there is still a problem of shortage of qualified Batswana
manpower in non-governmental sector. Also this dependency has caused
organisational weakness as happened in the case of TL as stated later.
In terms of cooperation with other NSDA0s, there have been
"informal" cooperation among NSDAOs in forms of joint participation in
various projects, although formal "networks" 14 have not yet been
established. Even so, as in the case of Zambia, there has been, what can be
called, an "NSDAOs' community" composed of prominent activists in
developmental fields. This community is composed of expatriates, and
Batswana with progressive ideas. They knew each other quite well
through their participation in various seminars and they are relatively
well informed on situations of other NSDA0s. Also there is cases that an
occupier of top management post of one of the NSDAOs is a member of
other NSDAO's executive committee or chairman15.
5.2.3 The State and NSDAOs
Generally speaking, the Botswana state has taken registration and
monitoring as basic tactics. It is necessary for NSDAOs to register under
Societies Act or Companies Act. Apart from registration, the state has
"During the period of field research, there was a movement to establish a formal
coordinating body of local NSDAOs involved especially those in projects for community
development and disabled persons. On 23 March 1992, representatives from 17 NSDAOs met
to discuss this issue. There was also another meeting on 26 May 1992 to set up the body
(information from the public relation officer of the Red Cross, 3/4/92).
15 For example, Mr. David Inger, who is Executive Director of the RIP (the top management
post), is at the same time a chairman of the Forestry Association of Botswana.
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monitored their activities by consulting with NSDAOs and through
kgotla. This attitude was exemplified in an interview with a senior official
of the Ministry of Local Governments, Lands and Housing as stated below.
Financial control has been also used towards AOs involved in "Women
in Development" because all donor money is offered not directly to
individual AOs but through the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs.
The case of the NGO consortium was that collaboration among NSDAOs
was eventually collapsed as a result of the state intervention, as stated
later. Therefore there is a tendency that the state is relatively a strong
"intruder" as well as a strong "distributor of benefits" in Botswana.
At any rate, it is only in National Development Plan 7: 1991-1997
that the roles of NGOs were mentioned for the first time. Even so, such
roles were mentioned piecemeal rather than systematically. Examples are
as follows:
"NG0s, such as the Forestry Association of Botswana, are
particularly active in forestry, and successful development will be
assisted by active collaboration. The possibility of contracting out
certain research activities is being explored. In addition, in
recognition of the need for people's participation in forestry
activities, provision will be made during NDP7 to assist individual
farmers, groups, communities and NGOs to undertake forestry project"
(NDP7: 269)
"[In the issue area of Maternal and Child Care Health/Family
Planning] To deal with the problem areas identified..., NG0s, such
as the Botswana Welfare Association, the Botswana Christian
Council and women's organisations, will be encouraged to disseminate
information about family planning, population and teenage
pregnancy" (NDP7: 377).
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From the point of view of senior government officials, NSDAOs
have been recognised as no more than developmental "assistants" or even
"tools." In fact, one undersecretary of the Ministry of Local Government,
Lands and Housing (MLCLH) responded to me that NGOs are allowed to
work as far as the government knows their activities (interview, 5/5/92).
Therefore it is difficult for NSDAOs to work beyond the knowledge of the
government to mininise the conflict with the government. Inger wrote
the Botswana government's attitude from his experience as follows:
"Government's attitude to development NGOs (including the
brigades and so on) has been ambivalent, but generally 'laissez-
faire'... A positive aspect of the Government-NGO relationship is
that Government, as in most democracies, has responded to lobbying
on the part of NG0s, to greater or lesser extent, especially on such
issues as conservation and the environment. On the other hand, there
have also been some conflicts, and a lack of understanding on the part
of some government officials as to the resources that NGOs have to
offer in support of government development policies" (Mmegi, 24-30
May, 1991: 11, emphasis added).
Although the government's attitude toward NSDAOs has not been
very clear, there are several observable tendencies. First, an NSDAO which
has been involved in an issue area which does not overlap that of the
government, and which has similar development strategy as that of the
state, tends to receive more favourable responses from the government.
This is the case of the Thusano Lefatsheng (TL) which has been involved
mainly in providing job and income-generating opportunities through
collecting grapple plants, and researching and developing the production
and processing of wild and cultivated medical and aromatic plants.
Among the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the TL's
activities have been highly appreciated (personal communication with
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several officials of the Ministry). In 1991, half of the African Hunger Prize
awarded to President Masire, 50,000 pula were personally gifted to this
association. In addition, the General Manager of the TL was the only
participant from the "NGO community" on a government trip organised
by the MLCLH to Europe to consult the Remote Area Dwellers
Programme (RADP) (personal Interview with the General Manager of the
TL, 12/4/ 92).
The reverse is also true. In other words, NSDA0s, working in the
areas where the government also has been involved and having different
development strategy, have experienced some problems. One of the
examples is the Cooperation for Research, Development and Education
(CORDE), which is made up of 21 producers' cooperative societies,
agricultural management associations and so on, and has been involved
in providing extension services to member cooperatives. This means that
CORDE's area of work "falls within the domain one regarded as the sole
province of the Department of Cooperative Development (CODEC)"
(Andersson, 1989: 4). In order to avoid conflicts with the department,
CORDE have continued to inform CODEC of its programmes and progress.
Also CORDE asked to appoint two of CODEC officers to the CORDE
Consultative Committee. Despite these efforts, even medium-level
cooperative officers are ill-informed about the organisation and on
occasion have attacked CORDE and attempted to curtail its activities
(Andersson, 1989: 4). In these case, CORDE responded to these actions by
appealing to the Commissioner of Cooperatives for assistance. Responding
to my questions on CODEC's stance to CORDE, medium-level officers in
particular showed their hostile attitude to CORDE by insisting that
"CORDE has no legal power for audit (of its member cooperatives)"
(Personal Interview with officers of CODEC, 20/5/92). This is also the case
of the Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB). The FAB is in a
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competitive position with the Forestry Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Its field officers occasionally face a "negative and hostile attitude" from the
government's (Ministry of Agriculture) extension workers derived from
"jealousy" (Personal Interview with Officer of FAB, 25/3/92). Also the
FAB has experienced uncollaborative attitudes on the part of the Ministry
of Agriculture by excluding the FAB's involvement in a big forestry
project in the North which should have been more effectively managed by
cooperating with the FAB which has accumulated vast knowledge and
experience (Interview with the Director of the FAB, 5/5/92).
The second tendency, which is related to the first one, is that, as
CORDE felt, lack of understanding and being viewed with suspicion by the
government have been one of the major hurdles the local NGOs faced
(Mmegi, 24-30 May, 1991: 11). This tendency was clearly shown in the
recent case of the NGO consortium as we consider later at length.
Thirdly, there is quite limited, in fact almost no opportunities for
NSDAOs to take part in national policy-making process although there
has been collaboration between the government and NSDAOs in the
policy-inzplementing process. The government stance in this sense has
been quite clear and it is that the planning and decision-making process,
especially in rural development, be dominated by top rank bureaucrats. It
is proved by considering the membership of important "Inter-ministerial
Committees and Institutions for Coordination of Rural Development"
that there are almost no representatives from NSDAOs in 16 committees
(ROB, 1988). The only exception is that the Botswana Technology Centre,
which is a quasi-NSDAO, has a capacity send a representative to the
Industrial Extension Coordinating Committee.
5.3 Case Studies
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In this section, several NSDAOs' experiences in Zambia and
Botswana will be considered in order to identify the problems and
achievements by reviewing some individual experiences.
5.3.1 Human Settlements of Zambia (HUZA)
The Human Settlements of Zambia (HUZA) is one of the NSDAOs
which can be classified as a second generation NGO (Korten, 1987: 148).
HUZA's guiding projects philosophy is as follows:
"Human Settlements of Zambia's project guiding philosophy is
based on helping the communities to help themselves. Playing the
role of service organisation not a control power, for the benefit of all
those community development projects based on realistic community
participation in planning implementation and maintenance of their
human settlement in all endeavours of human life" (HUZA,
undated: 3, emphasis added).
In addition, one of the purposes of HUZA is "not to speak out for people
but to help people to speak out by themselves" (interview with the
director of HUZA, 21/1/92).
5.3.1.1 The Origins and Pre-history of HUZA
HUZA's origin is traced to the initiation of a small-scale self-help
housing project in Kafue, by one international organisation, namely the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 1968, which was invited
by the government to participate in the housing project (Rakodi, 1990: 10-
12). In this project, which was based on notions of community, self and
mutual help, as a means of enabling poor people 16 to improve their
16 I1L the case of HUZA, the poor is basically poor people in urban areas.
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residential conditions in urban areas, 19 groups, containing 228 low-
income household were able to successfully build improved houses of
local materials with technical assistance of community development
workers (Rakodi, 1990: 10).
In the 1970s, when the problem of housing became more serious
because of rapid growth of population in Lusaka derived mainly from
rural-urban migration, a proposal for the upgrading of a large squatter
settlement (George) was developed (see, e.g., Rakodi et al., 1981). It was in
1973 when the World Bank began to consider partial financing of a sites-
and- services and upgrading project in Lusaka that the AFSC and its local
workers, who had already been involved actively in upgrading projects,
were drawn into the project planning process. In project making and
complementation process, local residents themselves had become
involved on a small scale in community projects to which they
contributed labour and on a wider scale in house construction and
improvement although people's involvement was only partially fulfilled
for a variety of reasons (Rakodi et al., 1981).
The AFSC had not regarded its role either purely in terms of
providing services to the upgrading project of housing in low-income
areas or as a permanent development programme externally controlled. It
had both a wider interpretation of the role of NGOs in improving the
conditions of low-income urban residents and a long-term intention of
handing over to a locally run organisation (Rakodi, 1990: 12). It is against
this background that HUZA was formed.
5.3.1.2 The Formation and Development of Human Settlements of Zambia
and the Areas of Concern
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It was in mid-1982, when the World Bank funded project was
drawing to a close, that HUZA was formed. At this time, the AFSC pulled
out from its immediate support, leaving HUZA with six Zambian staff
and a budget of 54,000 kwacha for HUZA's first year operation (Rakodi,
1990: 12).
The essential element of HUZA's project strategy is the
participation of the target community in the development programme.
"This approach implies that true development can succeed only if the
members of the target community have control over their situation; it
makes them more self-reliant" (HUZA, undated: 1, emphasis added).
Therefore, all projects undertaken by HUZA give the members of the
target community decision-making power; by increasing their skills,
freedom of choice, and economic independence through self-help house
building and other economic promotion ventures; and by building a
stronger community through community action and development
programmes (HUZA, undated: 1).
Membership of HUZA is open to anyone who subscribes to the
objectives of the organisation. HUZA is administered by the executive
committee which is a policy-making body composed of eight invited
members chosen to represent a range of skills and necessary contacts,
including a lawyer as chairman and an architect as vice-chairman, an
accountant as treasurer, a private school-owner as publicity secretary, a
member of the UNIP Central Committee, a former teacher and trade
unionist, and the General Manager of the Credit and Savings Union as ex-
official members in the one-party era (Rakodi, 1990: 13). "HUZA employs
a nucleus number of full time field staff engaged in teaching skills to target
communities" (HUZA, undated: 4). HUZA started with six staff in 1982
and it has grown, deliberately slowly, to about 20 staff in 1992. Since its
inception, there has been a close co-operation between HUZA and the
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Lusaka Urban District Council (LUDC), because the projects undertaken by
HUZA have been within the Council's boundaries. In addition, HUZA
has been provided an office in the Council headquarters in return for
HUZA's role as advisors to elected ward councilors (Rakodi, 1990: 13).
HUZA has been an exceptional case in Zambia in the sense that it
has not faced a serious financial problem because adequate funds have
been obtained from several overseas donors17, but HUZA's problem is
shortage of qualified manpower, especially to conduct some evaluation
research in order to be "accountable" to donors (interview with the
director, 21/ 1/ 92).
HUZA's projects, which have been changed from its original
emphasis on settlement up-grading and sites-and-services programme in a
declining copper-based economy, cover three main areas, (1) economic
promotion focusing on income-generating activities, (2) conservation of
natural resources, (3) community health including health and nutrition
education. All these projects are carried out in settlements around Lusaka,
e.g. Kalingalinga, Chawama, George, Chipata, and Kanyama compounds
(HUZA, undated: 2).
In the first area, until 1984 HUZA had been involved in training,
research and development activities at a community centre in
Kalingalinga, one of the squatter areas in Lusaka. Training programmes,
which were supplemented by research and development to improve
materials and methods of manufacture, were to improve productive skills
of those who want to establish their own enterprises. In 1984, HUZA
withdrew from Kalingalinga and subsequently continued ) promote the
development and use of locally produced materials by means of training,
credit provision and dissemination of innovations. Since then, three types
17HUZA's major partners and long-term contributors to its core budget are Oxfam UK (25 per
cent), EZE of Bonn (37.5 per cent), and ICCO of Zeist, Netherlands (37.5 per cent) (Rakodi,
1990: 13).
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of training programmes were offered at the Chawama Skills Training
Centre, which offers skill training to women and the youth. These full-
time 18 month courses are (1) tailoring and designing, (2) carpentry, (3)
income-generating like producing soaps, cement-blocks, cradles, cooking-
oil, fibre-cement roofing sheets and coffee substitute from soya beans. In
addition, another centre was newly established at Bauleni to offer a
training course to produce building materials (Rakodi, 1990: 13-14;
interview with the project coordinator of HUZA, 21/1/92).
In the second area of the conservation of natural resources, HUZA
has placed emphasis on people taking responsibility for their own
environment. Therefore its work has focused on community education,
tree planting, involving residents and primary school children in these
activities and the manufacture of improved charcoal stoves. Tree planting
has been encouraged by HUZA in all the serviced and upgraded areas.
Since Zambia adopted a national conservation strategy, HUZA has been
particularly actively involved in tree planting in Lusaka. HUZA's first tree
planting exercise was during the first tree planting on 15th December 1986
to 15th January 1987. And in 1987/88 tree planting month, HUZA
encouraged the wider community to participate in tree planting activities
(Energy and Environment, vol. 4: 1). In addition, one of the quite
important projects is that of the manufacture of improved charcoal stoves,
which have been widely used in cooking and heating in daily life, because
the improved one enable a 30-40 per cent saving in charcoal, which means
efficient use of energy and potentially conserve forests and a way to reduce
the monthly household charcoal expenses (see a case in Clark and Allison,
1989: 33-35). However, production itself is constrained by the availability of
raw materials (Energy and Environment, vol. 4: 5). However, in
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theoretical terms, there is a problem of public/ collective goods18
management in forestry/environment conservation, which is a big issue
beyond the scope of this study.
In the third area of community health, or more generally,
community development, HUSA's programmes have three components:
health and nutrition education, a project for food production and
processing, and a project for urban self-help (PUSH). As Rakodi properly
pointed out (1990: 15), in local communities, ignorance of health, hygiene
and nutrition is only a part of the problem and in fact it itself is not a
problem because people know what is necessary but they do not have
enough resources to carry it out. Therefore what is important is to tie
health and nutrition education to practical solutions to generate income
and products. HUZA's approach is based on the idea of integrating three
components. PUSH is a new attempt to support self-help improvement of
community infrastructure, including road, drainage, bridges, pit latrines.
In order to motivate people to be involved in works, HUZA offers food
stuffs, namely 25 kg mealie meal, 1 kg beans, 750m1 cooking oil, 1 kg sugar,
and 2 kg soya beans every ten days (interview with the project coordinator
of HUZA, 21/1/92). This attempt was working well.
Therefore, HUZA has expended its working space from its original
settlement projects to the areas of conservation, community health and
nutrition education where there were not sufficient services from the
UNIP government in the 1980s, supplementing the declined Zambian
state in economic stagnation in the 1980s.
5.3.1.3 HUZA's Relations with the State and Target Groups
18A public or collective good is a good, the significant benefit of which cannot be denied to
those who do not help bear the costs.
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HUZA has recognised its advantage and its relation with the
government as follows:
"HUZA now concentrate on community-based activities, maximizing
local resources, since NGOs are better placed to promote these vital
grass-root activities than government. HUZA also recognizes that it
must act in ways that match, enhance and complement local
government services and programmes" (HUZA, 1988: 24, emphasis
added).
One of the cases of comparative advantage in an NSDAOs's role which
HUZA has experienced was that of the incinerator. In 1984, Lusaka Urban
District Council built the Chawama Urban Health Clinic with government
funds. However the incinerator for the maternity wing was not in the
plans and the clinic could not be used until one was provided. Even so,
local councillors were told that an incinerator could not be built until the
next financial year because the expenditure for it was not included in the
government budget. In this situation, it was HUZA that was able to
mediate, negotiate permission for the community to build one by
themselves and mobilise resources for this purpose (HUZA, 1988: 24). This
is a case which illustrates not only the comparative advantage of NSDAOs
but also the role of NSDAOs in a "policy vacuum" at the micro-level.
However this does not mean that HUZA has been a competitor of the
government. Rather it has been a mediator between people and the
government as well as a promoter of community organisations, and as
shown in the quotation above it has been an actor to complement the
government, whose capacity to respond people's demands has been
limited.
Generally speaking, in its relationship with the state, HUZA has
taken a deliberate strategy. Especially during the UNIP control, HUZA's
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approach was to establish relationships not only with target groups like
squatters, trainees, informal entrepreneurs but also with local councillors
and local UNIP leaders, and local authority officers in the areas where
HUZA was actually working. It is because building up and maintaining
these relationships is to secure HUZA's working space by preventing party
leaders or officials seeing HUZA's activities as representing a desire to
preempt their responsibilities and by defusing the resentment felt by
officers when presented with evidence of problems with service operation
and maintenance (Rakodi, 1990: 16). Therefore HUZA's survival strategy
is to let the state know their purposes and activities, and to support and
collaborate with it. In political terms, HUZA has continued to let both the
government and the party its political neutrality. This is the only
practicable strategy for small NSDAOs like HUZA to achieve more
effective results from their programmes given that an NSDAOs' network
has not yet established. From the state's point of view, this is more or less
to allow the state to control HUZA, by "monitoring" HUZA's activities.
In internal organisational terms, by taking deliberate and limited
process of bureaucratisation, HUZA has gradually consolidated its
organisational strength. HUZA's participative and self-critical
management style, and emphasis on accountability within the
organisation and to donors (Rakodi, 1990: 16) have contributed to HUZA s
relatively successful performance. Therefore, HUZA has been the only
NSDAO in Zambia which has not experienced any difficulties in obtaining
funds. In this process of consolidating its position, HUZA has also started
to exercise an influence, "by being consulted on policy and the initiation of
community programmes outside Lusaka" (Rakodi, 1990). HUZA was an
advisor on natural resource conservation during the preparation of the
National Conservation Strategy and also represented on the NCDP
subcommittee on women and development. Therefore, even in the one-
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party politics, there is room, although it is not unlimited, for NSDAOs to
participate in the policy-making process, with their background and field
experience, which makes NSDAOs' role more meaningful in policy
advocacy. This is quite contrasting an experience in comparison with
NSDAOs in Botswana.
However, there are still problems which NSDAOs cannot easily
overcome, which is applicable to the case of HUZA. One of them is that
HUZA's impact in local communities is inevitably limited because of its
"smallness," although its performances themselves have been successful.
Also, in a declining economy, it is often difficult for entrepreneurs trained
in HUZA's programmes to find both appropriate markets for their
products and the materials necessary for their manufacture. These are
problems in the economic environment which HUZA can neither
manage nor influence effectively (see Smith et al., 1980)19.
5.3.2 Thusano Lefatsheng (TL)
Thusano Lefatsheng (TL), which was formed in 1984 as a non-profit
trust, is one of the "typical NGOs in Botswana," in the sense that it was
established by a founding mother with an excellent idea but has not been
well maintained (interview with the General Manager of TL, 12/4/92).
Actually, while the first years of its existence have seen the organisation
earning acclaim for its success in providing alternative sources for income
19 Smith et al.(1980: 8-9) classified three levels of environment where the organisation is
working as follows:
(a) The "controlled" environment: this consists of the baseline activities that produce the
results intended.
(b) The "influenced" environment: this is the entities external to the organisation whose
activities can influence organisational and management performance. The basis of the
relationship is a source of mutual influence between the focal organisation and the external
entity.
(c) The "appreciated" environment: this includes institutions that produce activities
affecting organisational performance, but that can neither be controlled nor influenced by
its management.
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to rural people, mainly through sales of the grapple plant 20, this period
was also characterised by confusion and organisational disarray (Thusano
Lefatsheng, 1990). TL can be also categorised as a "second generation"
NSDAO, which is involved in developmental activities for people's self-
reliance (Korten, 1987). This section is written based on materials obtained
from the organisation itself.
5.3.2.1 The Origin and History of TL
The establishment of TL was largely as a result of the enthusiasm
and vision of an expatriate, Francoise Horenburg and a small group of
people. It was this lady who directed and designed structures in the initial
stage. TL's main stated purposes are:
To provide "new" agricultural training (for semi-arid land) and income earning
opportunities for subsistence farmers and the rural poor;
To provide job opportunities for rural women;
To contribute towards the economic, cultural and health developments of rural areas
and to promote and support development of new small rural industries;
To research and develop the production and processing of wild and cultivated
medicinal and aromatic plants, industrial plants, fruit trees, and other food producing
plants.
In the initial stages, which was a preparatory phase, TL's main activities
are briefing village organisations and kgotla in Kumakwane, Mmakgodi
and Thamaga, so that the people in these villages were aware of the
purpose of the organisation, and started to work at Kumakwane where a
viable horticultural project existed. The Village Development Committee
(VDC) agreed that the VDC plot be used for TL's first pilot project,
2()This is a kind of medical plant which grows in veld areas of the Kalahari (see fn. 20 in
chapter2).
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experimenting with the cultivation of exotic medical plants and herbs and
the propagation of wild medical plants. At this time, Ian Martin, a
horticulturist, joined TL. This project was financed by a loan from the
Botswana Development Corporation. In October 1984, a second pilot
project, which involved experimentation with a variety of indigenous and
exotic fruit and nut trees as well as other crops, was started with fund from
HIVOS.
In the second phase, when TL started to be more actively involved
in various areas of concern, TL's relationship with donors were tightened.
In March 1985, TL made a proposal to Appropriate Technology
International to request support in a grapple processing project. Also in
the same year, USAID and TL reached an agreement which saw TL linking
with Ben-Gurion University in Israel on research into fruit and nut crop
for arid lands. In December, a project document, in which five main areas
of activity were outlined, was submitted to HIVOS, requiring support for
TL's core budget as well as costs of all research and extension programmes.
Five areas are (1) assistance for small farmers within 15km of TL's project
site, (2) researching at the TL's project site the viability of alternative
farming systems of producing crops which may create a significant source
of new income while requiring little outlay of capital and little
management, (3) growing crops at the project site which could provide TL
with real revenue to finance its ongoing activities, (4) the organisation of
harvesting of wild plants and buying these Veld Products from harvesters,
and (5) ensuring the processing and marketing of these Veld products. In
response to this request, HIVOS agreed to support TL and has continued to
be the major donor since then.
With the financial support from HIVOS, TL started to establish a
centre for activities, which was named "Thusego" by the chief of
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Mmankgodi. The VDC plot at Kumakwane was at this stage handed over
to the VDC with the balance of pilot project funds.
In 1986, other relationships with donors were established. But
problems started to emerge. The United Nations Industrial Development
Organisation (UNIDO) and the Swedish International Development
Authority (SIDA) agreed to fund a large project designed to ensure the
development of phytochemical and pharmaceutical capacity in Botswana,
and the introduction of TL products to the international pharmacopoeia.
In this work, there was a collaboration between the University of
Botswana and TL in training of a selected candidate. However, because this
individual joined the private sector at the completion of training, the
project was suspended. Loss of trained manpower continued in the
following years, since people trained in Israel and Germany for the
purpose of improving capacity of TL with collaboration with overseas
universities eventually joined the government.
Also toward the end of this year, after investigating the situation of
TL, the Board of TL, which is the body of direction, came to the conclusion
that Mrs. Horenburg, the founder of TL, was misplaced as General
Manager of the organisation, and that TL would benefit more if she could
work in her area of pharmaceutical skill while the post of GM was filled by
someone with training and experience in management. However she did
not accept this proposal and resigned from TL itself in April 1987. This
means that TL lost her wide knowledge of plants and their medical use
which has been an essential component of the work of TL and TL's
development was severely hampered by this event. Also as a result,
limited contacts were made with a number of organisations. Moreover, TL
was left without a GM for more than two years. Another blow to TL at this
time was the resignation of Ian Martin, the horticulturist. In spite of all
the difficulties which TL faced, staff under the Acting GM attempted to
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adhere to the original plans. However there was a growing sense of
frustration at the inability to direct the organisation and answer the
pressing problems confronting TL.
After the new General Manager, Francis Johnstone, who is Scottish
with a long experience in development management, was appointed, TL's
activities became organised again. But it is still considered to be in the
stage of formation and development (Garilao, 1987)21.
5.3.2.2 Structure and Management Procedures: Assumptions and Realities
Thusano Lefatsheng is not a membership organisation composed of
those interested in the activities of the organisation. It is directed by a
Board of Trustees who meet four times a year 22. The Board of Trustees23
selected an Executive Committee, which is composed of a Chairperson,
Secretary and three additional members, from among its members. The
General Manager of TL is not a trustee, but attends all meetings of the
Board and Executive committee. The General Manager is in charge of the
daily management of TL.
As stated above, TL's founder became General Manager of the
organisation, and she set course of most of the programmes with limited
opportunities for consultation by staff. Therefore it can be said that there
were no set procedures of mechanisms for decision-making. In this
situation, there was little chance for reflection or critical appraisal of
developments. TL at this stage was characterised by a small group taking
many organisational initiatives, pursuing a development vision not
21 In the interview with the GM, he told me that he was shortly leaving for Lesotho and
that Motswana would be a new GM.
22In 1996, members of the Boards meet monthly.
23The Board was originally selected by TL's founders, and since then has been "self-
appointed," i.e., the Board decides if it needs a new member and then approach that
person (TL, 1991: 21). However, the Board's involvement in TL's activities has been quite
limited.
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shared by many of the people who carried out the work, and by poor
communication and inadequate management procedures. The moves to
change this situation was partially made during the period when the post
of GM was vacant, and more comprehensively made after the new GM
took one the post.
Furthermore, the attitude of the Board, which was described "self-
sustained oligarchy" (interview with the GM, 12/4/92) was a problem in
managing the organisation. The Board of TL has taken a laissez-faire
attitude to daily management over the years. In spite of a few key
individuals' effort to mobilise their colleagues' participation in the
organisation's affairs, the records of Board meetings showed a high rate of
absenteeism, indecision on important questions, and a failure to look
beyond superficialities. By April 1989 staff found the continuing inertia of
TL and the staffing problems so intolerable that they submitted a
memorandum to the Board to ask it to work hard to improve the quality
of their participation in TL's affairs. But by the end of 1989, when the self-
evaluation started, there had not been any change. Therefore, in
organisational terms, TL was not well functioned in the 1980s.
In terms of finance, because of the overburden to the accountant,
several necessary books of record were not maintained. In addition, the
allocation of budgets, basically determined by the availability of donor
funding, to activities were done by the accountant alone without any
involvement of project staff.
In this way, the management of TL contained a lot of problems; lack
of communication between staff; lack of proper direction and
communication from the Board; lack of organisational procedure and
structure and so on. Also loss of trained manpower owing to competition
with the private sector, was a serious problem for TL, which caused
suspension of one project.
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5.3.2.3 TL's impact on target groups and other problems in TL's activities
in the long term
One of the most important works of TL has been the harvesting,
grinding and selling of grapple plants (Harpagophytium procumbens)
based on the idea about alternative approaches to agriculture in Botswana.
Until nowadays, the market, which has been mainly limited within
Botswana, has been receptive to this product, and thus there has been
success in promoting its utilisation. Therefore the effect of TL's veld
product programme has created a reliable cash income for people,
especially in the most remote areas where opportunities for employment
is quite limited. Helpful aspects of TL have been recognised by the target
groups, especially harvesters in remote areas, as follows:
'TL helps poor people to earn a living by buying this plant (Grapple)
from us" (TL, 1991: 8)
Similarly farmers in Kweneng assisted by TL have registered their
appreciation of TL's activities as follows:
"TL's agricultural approach is progressive compared with the
traditional system of monoculture. TL encourages intercropping
methods and has introduced indigenous plants as cash crops, bringing
additional income. It brings new agricultural ideas and methods to
us"(TL, 1991: 8).
"Membership of the experimental projects committee is
worthwhile since you can learn a lot in discussions.
Mmankgidi, Thamaga and Kumakwane lands areas are
represented on this committee and this helps communication.
TL consults us in planning activitiesTL, 1991: 8).
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"Helps to provide skill in preservation and propagation of
indigenous plants. Crops like Morama beans will bring money
and are also a source of protein"(TL, 1991: 8).
However, on the other hand, TL's programme, especially the
commercial part, has had some negative impact on people, which lead to
people's suspicion of TL, and also has created the "unexpected"
phenomenon of the emergence of "middlemen," who buy the plant from
the harvesters and then sell it to TL. Some of the complaints from
Takatokwane and Basarwa harvesters, for example, are:
"Rich people in the villages benefit more from the grapple plant
business than the poor people. They simply hire poor people to do
the harvesting then they sell the Grapple to TL at higher prices.
This exploitation is possible because the poor people need
immediate cash for food, tobacco etc" (TL, 1991: 7).
"We suspect TL is making huge profits from us, because they can buy
at P4 and sell at much more. This problem of cheating happens
throughout the Kagalagadi"(TL, 1991: 7).
"Prices, weight and grade of Grapple are not discussed or negotiated
with harvesters"(TL, 1991: 7).
"Some TL staff do not allow harvesters to see the weight of their
product on the scale"(TL, 1991: 7).
"We Basarwa are afraid to ask TL questions about anything. We are
not sure whether we are cheated or not because we can't count our
money after receiving it"(TL, 1991: 7).
These quotations, both positive and negative messages from target
groups, contain important implications. Among them, the emergence of
"middlemen" is directly associated with one of the TL's activities, which is
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marketing of the grapple. In other words, NSDAOs' activities can offer
opportunities of social class differentiation in rural areas. There is a
background condition of this process that some individuals have a regular
source of income while the majority do not. In TL's self-evaluation, two
possibilities were considered; firstly the emergence of "middlemen" was
interpreted as the result that someone buys harvested grapple from others
who cannot wait until the TL truck arrives, but needs ready cash for food;
secondly, this means that there is an operation where someone employs a
number of people to get extraction certificates24, harvest the tuber and
then sell it at less than the market rate. This is one of the issues in which
NSDAOs involved in developmental works have been cautioned, because
"undifferentiating strategies in an environment which is in fact
differentiated might in the end benefit only the strongest group or class"'
(de Graaf, 1990: 290).
However, at the same time, it is true that there were rural
associations emerging as a consequence of TL's work, which means that
TL's activities have promoted and facilitated communication among rural
people to organise themselves. This tendency also means that TVs
activities have contributed to "empowerment" of rural people, which was
partly observed in chapter 3.
Taking both phenomena stated above into consideration, TL's
developmental activities have had ambivalent impacts on its target
groups. Tt is because TL has been involved not only in development
activities but also in commercial ones mainly to sell grapple in the market
in Botswana. The commercial side of TL's work has often been at odds
with its development trust, and therefore the commercial side has
24 In fact, fire rangers are reported to have issued 881 extraction certificates in one village
alone. As a result, the resource has been reported to be becoming scarce.
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negatively impacted on the development side, by causing people's
scepticism towards the activities of TL.
In addition, there was a case that TL's internal dis-organisation,
especially the resignation of the General Manager as stated above, caused
the collapse of economic activities of a cooperative contracted with TL,
Baratani Co-operative in Otse. Under the terms of the agreement, TL
supplied a range of seeds of aromatic and medical plant to this
cooperative. In this project, the central role was played by the former GM
herself, because it was heavily dependent on her knowledge of various
plants. There were periodic verbal reports made to the GM, and a written
record was kept showing dates of planting, progress of the crops, watering
times, and other general observations while she occupied the post.
Therefore, when the GM left, there was no single staff member who had
any idea of the potential uses of the plants they had grown, which led to
the situation that TL could not buy plants. As a result, almost all crops had
to be left to rot and the cooperative's agricultural section collapsed because
the money coming from its activities was not enough to cover the water
costs of the whole agricultural section. This illustrates the fact that weak
organisational structure of NSDAOs and dependence on "expatriate" can
damage self-reliant efforts of cooperatives or other community and
development groups in long terms.
5.3.2.4 TL's Relation with the State
As stated in the previous section, TL is one of the NSDAOs which
has been "favoured" by the Botswana government. This is supposed to be
not because TL's performance has gained legitimacy in targeting areas and
consolidated its position, but (1) because TL's areas of activities do not
overlap those of the government and (2) because of its innovative way of
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involvement in rural development. Therefore, the state's evaluation is
derived not from NSDAO's performance, but from its development
strategy and methodology. In fact, among the circle of the officials of the
Ministry of Agriculture, TL's activities, especially Thusego's research and
extension activities have been highly appreciated, even though in the self-
evaluation, both of activities was evaluated to have been inadequate and
often unlinked to TL's development trust. It seems that it is only after the
process of self-evaluation and the arrival of the new General Manager that
TL's activities have again been gaining ground.
The fact that a half of African Hunger Prize awarded to President
Masire, 50,000 pula was personally gifted to TL also seemed to reflect the
government attitude toward the activities of TL. Moreover this
government attitude can be illustrated from the fact that participation of
the GM of TL in a government trip organised by the Ministry of Local
Government, Lands, and Housing to Europe to consult the Remote Area
Dwellers Programme (RADP) as the only participant from the "NGO
community" in Botswana.
5.3.3 The Case of the NGO Consortium in Botswana
The NGO Consortium was composed of five member NSDA0s,
namely the Permaculture, the Forestry Association of Botswana (FAB), the
Rural Industries and Innovation Centre (RIIC), the Cooperation of
Research, Development and Education (CORDE), and Thusano Lefatsheng
(TL). This consortium was formed around August 1989 for the purpose of
supporting the development of three target farms in Gantsi in
collaboration with the district council. However, the consortium faced
numerous problems, and, as we see below at length, there was a stigma, in
the sense that the "consortium" was no longer a viable implementation
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strategy either for Gantsi or for anywhere else at least in the short term, in
Gantsi District and in certain Government circles against a cooperation
scheme among NSDA0s. "Then intensity of the political problems
affecting the work of the consortium reached a peak about end of 1990 and
early 1991, culminating in the expulsion of the consortium from working
in the three farms by the Gantsi District Council" (Mbere and Symacon,
1991). The consortium became no longer viable and it was eventually
disbanded. This section is based mainly on the evaluation report of the
NGO Consortium and information obtained in several interviews with
government officials and officers of NSDAOs involved in the consortium.
5.3.3.1 The Issue of the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs)
The Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), which are often equated with
"Basarwa" in current Setswana usage, "San" in anthropological terms for
the people known as "Bushman." According to Wilmsen, the image of
"Bushmen," that they are peoples living an elementary form of economic
life" and that they were chasing wild animals, picking wild berries, and
digging for roots whilst we were developing invincible armies," which
has been created by indigenous African, European administrative, and
academic anthropological interests, has had serious consequences today
(Wilmsen, 1990: 21-22). This is because government policies, for example
access to land, which also affect these peoples, have been formulated on
the image of "Bushman". With regard to the rights of San-speaking
peoples who are living on land then being considered for TGLP ranch
development,
"the Attorney General's Chambers ... stated the opinion that
'Masarwa have always been true nomads ... the true nomad Masarwa
can have no rights of any kind except rights to hunting'. Hitchcock
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records that the views of anthropologists who maintain that
'Bushmen had no territories' have been cited in ministerial debates
to support that opinion and thus to serve as justification for moving
San-speaking peoples from lands they have occupied for generations"
(Wilmsen, 1990: 22).
In fact, the Basarwa argue that, historically, they preceded the
settlement of black people (Batswana)25 and white people in the Gantsi
District. And the Basarwa recognised that the land which they had come to
know as "theirs," was taken away from them (Mogwe, 1992: 6). In her
recent report on the human rights situation of Basarwa, Mogwe argued as
follows:
"What emerged very clearly from the experiences of the Basarwa
with regard to the land issue is their alienation. They are alienated
from their lifestyle which was based on a close relationship with
the land, its wild life and products. With the creation of settled
communities, the Basarwa are being fitted into a hitherto alien
mode of existence. The limited access to land directly affects the
Basarwa's access to wildlife and to veld products" (Mogi,ve, 1992: 7,
original emphasis).
The Basarwa have been discriminated against in the government policy.
As Wilmsen interpreted this situation quite well,
"... the imposed pan-national Setswana term, Basarwa, is today at
base a racial classification stereotyped in images of supposed child-
like appearance, homogeneous prehistoric culture, simple social
institutions, and peculiar language although this is masked by the
rhetoric of ethnicity within the class structure of Botswana...
However it should now be abundantly clear that San-speaking
peoples ... have never been remote from economic, social processes
255asarwa describe other Batswana as batho-ba-bantsho ("black people"). They describe
themselves as "red people" (Mogwe, 1992: 3n).
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operating in the larger political entities of southern Africa but have
functioned intimately within these processes. It is in this light that
these people should be seen today" (1990: 32).
In recent arguments, as we can see above, there is a strong tendency to
change the "image" of Basarwa that regards them as living in elementary
forms, which seems to be still held in the government circle 26, or the
RADs. It is in this situation of these peoples that the issue in which the
NGO consortium was involved has to be considered.
5.3.3.2 Areas of Involvement and the Formation of the Consortium
It was in August 1989 when three large farms, namely those of
Hanahai (173 NK), Grootelaagte (154 NK), and Chobokwane (164 NK), was
allocated for development for the Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) in the
Gantsi District that the issue around the utilisation of three farm appeared
and there appeared a signal of the beginnings of the formation of the
consortium. No sooner had the District Council taken responsibility for
these farms than it realised that it did not have the capacity to develop
them on its own. "Development" of the farms includes a process of
developing water resources and infrastructure on the farm, identifying
appropriate and sustainable projects, determining the organisation and
management of the activities on the farms and so on. At this stage, the
council, when faced with this task, felt the necessity to enlist the services
available from some development agencies, both international and local,
26At one conference held during the research period, titled "Sustainable Rural
Development" organised by the Botswana Society, there were representatives from
Basarwa for the first time. One of the officials from the Ministry of Agriculture told me
that she could not understand why these people were there (personal communication,
13/4/92).
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which could offer some relevant expertise and experience in the proposed
areas of activities.
It was through the programme coordinator for the Communal First
Development Areas Programme (CFDA) 27 that Permaculture Trust was
invited to visit the project area and introduce some of its programmes in
the CFDA. Also CORDE was invited to offer their service through
organising a community participation workshop in the project area. What
became crucial to the activities of the consortium and its relationship with
the state later was that this was not an official invitation from the council
at all but an invitation from a council staff member who believed that
involving Permaculture and CORDE in the implementation of the CFDA
programme would enrich the programme content. In addition, it became
gradually clear that there was confusion between the district council and
the Ministry of Local Government and Lands on the intended use of the
farms. In fact, land policy issues were behind the controversy around the
consortium.
Apart from these new programmes, and even prior to the
formation of the consortium, NSDAOs which became members of the
consortium had more or less been involved in and/or connected with the
Gantsi District individually, like Thusano Lefasheng, as stated in the
previous section.
Also in August 1989 NSDAOs were invited by the RAD business
adviser to explore the possibilities of giving assistance to the District
27'The Communal First Development Areas (CFDAs) were designed to shift priorities to
the unrezoned communal lands, both agricultural and grazing, that would have to support
the bulk of Botswana's rural population. The strategy behind the CFDA was avowedly
that of integrated rural development" (Picard, 1987: 258).
In addition several specific actions were embarked on for the CFDA's experiment:
1. linking of livestock and arable agriculture;
2. strengthening the connection between agricultural activities and rural industrial
activities;
3. improving planning and administrative capacity at the local level; and
4. continuing the infrastructure improvements, especially where related to productive
activities (Picard, 1987: 259).
402
Council in the development of the three farms. After this trip, what
emerged were (1) that there was a clear understanding on the part of the
NSDAOs involved that their involvement in Gantsi would go beyond
just the three farms and target all eleven RAD settlements although the
initial focus would be on the three farms, (2) that the NSDAOs involved
had a clear intention to initiate and support the formation of a
development organisation to be responsible for the development of the
farms as a core activity as well as developing all other settlements, (3) that
there was an "NGO-team," referred to several times in the report of the
1989 visit, which was looking at the possibility of working together in the
Gantsi District, and (4) that it was the RAD department of the Council that
was identified as the entry point for all NSDAOs and the focal point for
the programme.
The follow up meeting to the 1989 visit was held on 29th January
1990 at the RIIC offices in Kanye. It was in this meeting that the intention
of the NSDAOs to work not individually but as a consortium and to draw
up a single set of terms of reference for the joint programme, was clearly
expressed. This was the formation of the consortium. Also the consortium
recognised that the three farms were not the raison d' etre for which the
consortium was formed and that these farms were only a catalyst in the
process of the appreciation by NSDAOs of the needs to work with the
council, although the council's intention was to restrict these NSDAOs to
a narrow area of rural development.
Already at this stage, there were potential factors for conflicts
between the council and the consortium. These were (1) that the
consortium had a broader perspective of participating in the district,
whereas the council preferred that the NSDAOs' activities be narrowly
restricted to the three farms, and (2) that the NSDAOs involved intended
to work as a consortium rather than individuals, which was at odds with
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the intention of the council, which eventually caused a explicit conflict
between the council and the consortium, as we see below.
5.3.3.3 The Formation and Dissolution of the Consortium in Its
Relationship with the Council and the Central Government: Before and
After the Gantsi Controversy
Concerning the documentation on the formation of the
consortium, there are three separate documents which state the objectives
of the consortium differently, which illustrates how the activities of the
consortium had been influenced by the council and the central
government.
In the first document entitled "Gantsi NGO Consortium Working
Agreement" (undated), the objectives of the consortium were stated as
follows:
A. To enable the three farms (173 NK, 164 NK and 154 NK) allocated to RADs to
be viable, self-sustaining enterprises, so that they benefit the community in
whose name they have been allocated,
B.To work in the settlements adjacent to the three farms, to ensure sustainability
of the development of the three farms,
C. To support and strengthen the particular programmes of the individual NG0s,
either current or proposed, in the district,
D. To facilitate cooperation with local and central Government departmental
programmes in the district.
As stated above, these objectives, which were beyond the council's
immediate requirements for the development of three farms were not
welcomed by the council. Moreover a draft organisation structure of the
consortium which was presented to the council created the first conflict
with the council. As a result, the NSDAOs involved had to take these into
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consideration, and they started to focus more on the three farms. This was
confirmed in the second document, the "Proposed Terms of Reference for
the Work of the Gantsi NGO Consortium on the Three farms Allocated to
Remote Area Dwellers" (undated). In this document, the only two
objectives are stated:
A. To enable the 3 farms to be viable, self-sustaining enterprises, in order to benefit
the community in whose name they have been allocated.
B.To work in the settlements adjacent to the 3 farms, to ensure the sustainability of
the development of the 3 farms.
These were completely in line with the council's requirements by
restricting consortium's areas of activities into the three farms.
Apart from influence from outside, it was also true that the
consortium itself lacked the organisational capacity in implementing its
plans. Firstly, since the NSDAOs involved apart from the Permaculture do
not have the domestic base in Gantsi, the consortium could not take
"active action." Among members, it was agreed to engage a coordinator to
be placed in Gantsi in January 1990, but it was only in November 1990 that
he was in place. Secondly, even though the consortium recognised the
difficulties of working together, its own agreement was never signed,
which meant the consortium's unpreparedness for coordination and
involvement in the communities. In addition, it was also true that
dependence on donor/ government funding eroded the consortium's
independence.
It was toward the end of 1990 when the consortium and the council
finally reached agreement on the activities to be implemented and when
the consortium opened and staffed an office in Gantsi to facilitate its work,
to liase with local and central government, and to work directly with the
RADs that the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing
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(MLGLH) sent a sudden instruction to reallocate the ranches to the next
people on the priority list to the council, which was the beginning of the
controversy.
This controversy contained some political aspects, which was only
covered in a private weekly newspaper, Mmegi. It reported that:
"Mmegi learns from reliable sources that three farms which were
set aside for resettlement by Remote Area Dwellers (RADs) in the
Ghanzi District will be taken back from them [by MLGLHI and sold
to a syndicate which includes a senior cabinet minister" (Mnzegi, 8-
14 February, 1991).
In fact, one of the farms, NK 173 was allocated to Mochia Syndicate, in
which former Gantsi District Commissioner Andersson Chibua and one
Mogapi, a farm manager in Gantsi were members (Minegi, 26 April- 2 May
1991). What became the main issues at this stage included that NSDAOs
involved had not been invited by the council at all and that there had
never been an agreement between the central government and members
of the consortium. Swartz, MP for the Gantsi constituency claimed that:
"he did not know about the involvement of ngos in the project. He
wondered: 'who invited the ngos to the project in the first place? How
will the farm be run and for...?" (Min egi, 15-21 March 1991).
Also the Permanent Secretary, of the MLGLH, Pelonomi Venson told that:
"there has never been agreement between government and ngos
involving the gantsi farms. She further explained that the
concerned council never passed any resolution entrusting the farms to
ngos" (Mmegi, 15-21 March 1991).
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When the full Gantsi Council meeting was held in early April 1991, the
assistant Minister of the MLGLH, Michael Tshiinare blamed the council
"for having failed to check the word of the central and local government
officials who involved the ngos without the knowledge of the council"
(M me gi, 5-11 April 1991). He also accused members of the consortium of:
"adopting politically-motivated ideas... This government is not
going to abdicate its responsibility just because of these ngos and even
those who want to advise us politically should follow the right
procedure" (Mmegi, 5-11 April 1991, emphasis added)
In response to these attitudes of the central government, the consortium
released a press statement, where it stated as follows:
'The suggestion by central government officials that our advice and
services cannot be given, or received, without a formal Council
resolution does not make sense... It was made clear that the role of
the consortium would be to provide advice and services to the Council
on technical matters. The responsibility for developing the farms
would be the Council's" (Mmegi, 19-25 1991).
After this conflict following the withdrawal of the farms by the
MLGLH, the council turned around and alleged that the NGO consortium
was involved in the district without invitation from the council, and
asked the consortium to cease its involvement 28. Even at this stage, the
consortium still kept its intention of involvement, but its objectives
which appeared in the third document, the "Gantsi NGO consortium
working Agreement" did not mention the three controversial farms at all,
but only the need for a broader development trust as follows:
28As stated above, this is partly true, because invitation was not from the council itself, but
from a council staff member.
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A. To advance the social, cultural and economic development of the Remote
Area Dwellers of the District.
B. To work in the settlements to ensure the sustainability of whatever
developments are undertaken.
C. To support and strengthen the particular programmes of the individual
NG0s, either current or proposed, in the District.
D. To coordinate in planning, and cooperate in executing, their several
programmes in the District, to ensure a non-competitive and mutually-
supportive approach to development and avoid unnecessary duplication of
effort or resources.
E. To facilitate cooperation with local and central government departmental
programmes in the district.
During the period of the controversy in 1991, one of the members of
the consortium, Permaculture attended only one of the five meetings of
the consortium, while 90 per cent of the meetings were attended by all
members in 1990. This illustrates the lack of internal cohesiveness of the
consortium deriving from the fact that the working agreement of the
consortium had not been signed. Therefore it is obvious that the working
environment for the consortium as well as its internal cooperation had
been dramatically worsened after the controversy.
One of the questions which emerged from the controversy is why
the MLGLH issued the instruction to reallocate the ranches just when
everything seemed to be prepared for implementation. There was
relatively good communication between the consortium and the Gantsi
District Council/ Administrative officers including the District
Commissioner and Council Secretary, on the intended use of the farms. It
was only the headquarters of the MLGLH that seemed not to have been
adequately informed. In fact, one of the senior officers of the Ministry told
me that the consortium had worked without their knowledge and
interfered in the government area of activities, i.e., land policy issues
(personal interview, 5/5/92). This is a concerted response in harmony
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with the accusation of the Minister as quoted above. This made the
government wary and suspicious of the activities of NSDA0s, especially
in consortium format. What made the government more suspicious was,
according to an informal communication with the Permanent Secretary of
the MLGLH, the fact that most of the people involved in the farms were
just coincidentally white not Batswana (interview with the GM of the
Thusano Lefatsheng, 12/5/92). In fact, top management posts of the
involved NSDAOs have been occupied by whites, and staff of
international agencies involved, like HIVOS, were also white. Taking
these factors into consideration, the government action seemed to be
taken so as to narrow the working space of the consortium. Actually, after
this controversy, there has developed a stigma against the term of
"consortium" in the Gantsi District and in official circles in Gaborone.
Apart from Permaculture whose involvement in the consortium
rapidly diminished after the controversy and which visibly distanced itself
from the consortium, it was RIIC which withdrew from the consortium
first as a result of the decision of its board of directors. This was because
RIIC has been a quasi-NSDAO which depends heavily on the state for its
funding and the board of directors is represented by the government, and
thus it was obliged to compromise with the state. Consequently, even
though the members of the consortium have been still involved in some
projects individually, the consortium was dissolved.
5.3.3.4 A Failure of Cooperation among NSDA0s: Some Political
Implications
Concerning this case, what was pointed out both by officers of
NSDAOs involved and evaluators was that it was the Remote Area
Dwellers that were the eventual losers. In the communities, in default of
409
almost any active action, the consortium was never recognised as
legitimate. After the ending of the involvement of the consortium, there
has been little development of the farms.
In addition, there was a problem of lack of autonomy of the
NSDA0s. In particular one of the members, namely the RIIC, which is a
quasi-NSDAO, has been heavily dependent on the government for
funding, and can therefore be easily controlled by the state through the
channel of the board of directors. Also the consortium itself had been
dependent on the state in this project, its autonomy was not easily secured,
although individual activities of member NSDAOs were not necessarily
SO.
In terms of political nature of the conflict, what became clear
through the controversy on the three farms in Gantsi was that the main
problem of the NGO consortium was not its objectives stated in its
documents like community development among the RADs, but the form
of "consortium," or the format of working together, in Gantsi. "The
objectives remain valid but the strategy [of implementation] may not be"
(Mbere and Symacon, 1991: 16). There are mainly two reasons for this.
First, the organisational capacity of the consortium was not adequate to
implement its programmes. According to the evaluation report, owing to
the council's rejection of the idea of management committee with
democratic representation of the beneficiaries of the communities, the
NSDAOs involved in the consortium were forced to abandon the idea by
the council (Mbere and Symacon, 1991: 19). Therefore, the consortium was
only an inappropriate system, lacking democratic structure, to tackle
problems in the communities. In fact, apart from the individual activities
of the NSDAOs involved, there were no activities in the communities by
the consortium as such. This was because members of the consortium
failed to prepare a plan of action for implementation or to sign a working
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agreement of the consortium, which led to organisational weakness. This
"unpreparedness" on the side of the consortium clearly caused the
consortium's vulnerability to the central government response as well as
the loss of confidence in the consortium by targeting communities.
Second, NSDA0s, working together in the format of consortium,
were viewed as politically motivated and regarded by the government
with suspicion. In this case, since the area of the consortium's
involvement was development projects promoted and sponsored by the
government, these NSDAOs were left little space to develop their own
agenda to cope with several identified issue areas in Gantsi. Also, the
consortium was vulnerable in the sense that it had not been gaining
ground in the communities and it depended on the government and
international agencies for funding. As a result, as stated above, the format
of consortium was gradually recognised as a stigma and it became
impossible to work together in the region as the NGO consortium.
This case showed us that especially in the area of the government's
concern, it is quite difficult for NSDAOs to be involved in that area in a
competitive way with the government (in this case, in the format of
consortium, which was stigmatised and was used as a scapegoat for the
failure of the government programmes in Gantsi). As far as each NSDAO
are committed in a variety of issue areas in complementary way as in the
case of TL, as stated earlier, the possibility of political controversy is low. In
addition, NSDAOs themselves face the problem of legitimacy and
difficulties of working in targeting areas of activities, when they are not
genuinely represented by beneficiaries. However, in practical terms, this
failure may be a lesson for Botswana NSDAOs' community to formulate
future strategies of action.
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5.4 The Cases of NSDAOs in the Issue Area of Population and Family
Planning
In this part of the chapter, NSDAOs involved in population and
family planning issues in both countries will be comparatively analysed in
terms of their organisational development and their roles in policy-
making and policy-implementing processes.
5.4.1 Population Issue in Africa: From Pro-Natalism to Anti-Natalism
Generally speaking, in sub-Saharan Africa, there has been a
tendency of pro-natalism, rooted in traditional African culture. According
to Banda (1993: 92), there are five reasons why children were highly
valued in African tradition:
(1)source of labour;
(2) source of wealth and old age security;
(3) ensuring the growth and perpetuity of the lineage;
(4) importance of procreation (rooted in African traditional religions);
(5) strengthening family relationship, reducing the burden of child rearing on
biological parents, and thereby encouraging high fertility as a result of child
fosterage.
Therefore, among Africans, it was strongly felt that a large number of
children is a great contribution to the general vitality, security harmony
and prosperity of the whole ethnic and neighbourhood community
(Banda, 1993: 93). These reasons are also considered to explain early
marriage and polygamy in Africa.
In addition, pro-natalism was "intensified" through high infant
and child mortality, "modern" religions like the Roman Catholics which
resists modern family planning, and colonial governments which had a
pronatalist attitudes towards Africans who were a source of cheap labour
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forces (Banda, 1993: 108-111). Even in the early period of independence in
the 1960s, population policies received little attention from newly
independent African leaders. In fact, there were the apparent reluctance to
adopt anti-natalist population policies in African countries.
However, as a result of improved availability of better demographic
data, stagnation of socio-economic development, high levels of infant
mortality rate, high population growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s,
and more recently high rate of HIV infection, it has become necessary for
governments in Africa to change its position from pro-natalist to anti-
natalist to sustain the level of life standard in each country and to pay
attention to the issues of population and family planning.
However "population policy" itself is normally composed of the
several policies which are designed to influence population variables in a
specific way. These include migration policies, mortality policies and
fertility policies (see e.g. Msimuko and Khasiani, 1981).
In fact, many developing countries have not recognised the
necessity to reduce their population growth rate and have not yet adopted
birth control policies. Backgrounds of this are socio-economical, cultural,
religious and political (Jones, 1990: 242-258), which were briefly refered to
above. Therefore, the government, which has adopted some policies, often
make a distinction between "birth control" and "family planning,"
supporting the latter. "Birth control" refers to a fertility-reducing
population policy, while family planning is part of a family welfare policy
whose policy whose purpose is to eliminate abortion and too close spacing
of births to maintain health conditions of mothers and children 29. This is
actually the case in Zambia and Botswana.
The Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ), as we
consider below, has taken the stance that family planning is one of the
290n this controversial issue, see e.g., Lappe & Schurman, 1988.
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components of fertility control, but it is not the same as contraception,
birth control or fertility regulation. According to a broader definition
offered by the WHO, which the PPAZ quoted in its paper:
"Family Planning is a way of thinking and living that is adopted
voluntarily, upon the basis of knowledge, attitudes and responsible
decision, by individuals and couples, in order to promote the health and
welfare of the family group and thus contribute to the social development
of a country" (WHO, 1971: 5).
In practice, family planning is the idea and ways which offer families to
make it possible to determine the number of children and intervals
between births, by using a variety of measures, both traditional and
modern. In Africa, where these measure had not been well known, it has
been one of the important task to disseminate the information of family
planning and the usage of a variety of measures of contraception.
5.4.2 Zambia
5.4.2.1 Zambia's Population Situation, 1963-1990
According to the past national censuses, the population was 3.5
million in 1963, and increased to 4.1 million in 1969 and 5.7 million in
1980 (FNDP: 52). The population had further increased to 6.7 million in
1984 and 7.5 million. The most recent census shows that the population in
1990 is 7.8 million (CSO, 1990: 2). The rate of growth of the population had
been high and increasing by rapid during the period. Between 1963 and
1969, the rate of growth was 2.6 per cent per annum; this increased by 3.1
per cent per annum between 1969 and 1980 and 3.6 per cent per annum
between 1980 and 1985. Between 1985 and 1989, the rate reached 3.8 per
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cent, but there was only a 0.2 per cent increase between 1989 and 1990
(Monthly Digest of Statistics, April-June 1991: 1).
In Zambia, the level of fertility has remained persistently high for
the past four decades and is likely to remain so for some time in the future
(FNDP: 53). The crude birth rate30 was about 49 in 1988. The total fertility
rate 31 has remained at doout 7.2 children. This is higher than the African
average, 6.2, and is among the highest in the world. This is considered by
the policy-makers to be one of the most important factor determining the
country's demographic and health situation (FNDP: 53). Table 5-5 shows
provincial differentials in levels of recent fertility resulted from the 1980
census of population.
Table 5-5 Provincial Variations in Fertility in
Zambia, 1980 (estimated total fertility rate)
Province
	 Total Fertility Rate
Central
	 7.5
Eastern
	 6.9
Luapula
	
8.0
Lusaka
	 7.5
Northern
	 7.7
Southern
	
7.1
Western
	 5.7
Copperbelt
	
7.9
Total
	 7.2
Source: FNDP: 53
Several factors pointed out in the FNDP include cultural and
institutional factors such as low average age at first marriage (which at
present stands at 16 years for females); low educational levels particularly
among females; desire for large families; high levels of infant and children
mortality; the economic rationality of large family size since many
children provide some economic benefits such as insurance in old age and
in times of need; and low socio-economic status of women and so on
(FNDP: 53).
301he Crude Birth Rate is the number of births per 1,000 persons in the population per year.
31The Total Fertility Rate is the number of children a woman is likely to bear in her life
time under the prevailing fertility regime.
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In the case of mortality, the levels of mortality have declined. The
crude death rate32 declined from 19.7 in 1969 to 16.7 in 1980 and was
estimated at 14.0 in 1988. This decline has led to a substantial increase in
the expectation of life at birth among Zambians. In 1988 it is estimated that
life expectancy is 55 and 52 for females and males respectively, as
compared with 47.8 and 44.6 in 1969.
The persistently high level of fertility has led to the extreme
youthfulness of the Zambian population. In the 1980-88 period, almost
half of the population was under fifteen years and nearly 20 per cent under
five years. Those in economically active age groups (15-64) comprised 47.6
per cent while those over 65 years made up only 2.4 per cent.
As a result of migration, Zambia has become one of the most
urbanised countries in Africa in terms of spatial distribution of
population. In 1963 20.5 per cent of the population lived in urban centres
of more than 5,000 persons; this proportion increased to 39.9 per cent in
1980 in contrast to the African average of 28.8 per cent and an estimated 45
per cent in 1985. Table 5-6 shows the change of population distribution
over the period of 1963-90.
Table 5-6 Percentage Distribution of population by Province, 1963, 1969, 1980 and 1990
(Zambia)
Province Percentage Distribution
Year 1963 1969	 1980 1990
Central 14.4 17.5 9.1 9.3
Copperbelt 15.6 20.1 22.1 20.0
Eastern 13.8 12.6 11.5 12.5
Luapula 10.2 8.3 7.4 6.7
Lusaka - 12.2 15.5
Northern 16.1 13.5 13.5 11.1
North-Western 6.0 5.7 5.7 4.9
Southern 13.4 12.2 12.2 12.1
Western 10.5 10.1 10.1 7.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO, 1990: 2.
32The Crude Death Rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 persons in the population per
year.
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5.4.2.2 Attitude of the UNIP Government towards the Population Issue:
Changes between the 1970s and the late 1980s
Due to Kenneth Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism which had
both traditional and Christian backgrounds and that emphasised the
importance of Zambian nationals, or, in other words, the high growth of
population in Zambia's socio-economic development, by the end of the
1980s, when the population policy which has anti-natal stance, the then
President was reluctant to adopt family planning programmes. In fact, by
the early 1980s, Zambia did not have fertility reduction policy and at best it
was described as "laissez-faire" (Msimuko & Khasiani, 1981: 44).
However, the government gradually started appreciating the effect
of rapid population growth after the Bucharest World Population
Conference in 1974.33  It was after a National Urban Household Size and
Income Survey in 1974-75, which revealed increasing household size
(average household size was over 5) and deteriorating monthly income,
that UNIP government officially allowed the PPAZ to provide modern
family planning services, but only to those who voluntarily asked for the
PPAZ (Banda, 1993: 197)34.
In the following year, the Ministry of Health organised a Maternal
and Child Health Care and Family Planning seminar which called on the
government to establish a national population policy. Also in this year,
the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, in collaboration with the
International Labour Organisation (ILO), organised another seminar
focusing on the relationship between high population growth and
economic development. Therefore, at this stage, the UNIP government
33In fact, as early as in 1970, the Vice-President Kapwepwe stressed the need for family
planning during the May Day Rally, reasoning that the high population growth rate led to
massive unemployment in the future (Msimuko & Khasiani, 1981: 44).
34At this time, there were criticisms from the CCZ, the Catholics, the House of Chiefs,
and even UNIP's Women;s League (Banda, 1993: 197-8).
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started to recognise the importance of the population issue in economic
development. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Finance warned that
the continuing high rate of population growth would led to the decline of
the welfare of Zambian people (Msimuko Khasiani, 1981: 44).
In the late 1970s, to cope with the population issue, the Family
Welfare Education Unit was established in the Ministry of Labour and
Social Services, but it focused on industrial workers. In addition, at this
time, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)
supported the Ministry of Health in implementing the Health Family
Planning Programme. However, these programmes were not so
effective35.
It was after the Mexico World Population Conference in 1984 that
the population issue was more widely paid attention to and the necessity
to adopt a population policy was more strongly felt among the
government circle (Banda, 1993: 203). The delegation from Zambia under
the leadership of the chairperson of UNIP's Women's League, Chibesa
Kankasa, attended the conference. At this time, the initiative to establish
counselling units in all districts to introduce sex education came from the
Women's League and this idea was also supported by the Chairman of the
Social and Cultural Committee of the Central Committee of UNIP. It was
around the mid-1980 that the cabinet ministers, including, the then Prime
35According to Banda (1993: 200-201), there are three reasons to explain the poor
performance of the former programme:
(1) concentration of the activities in urban areas;
(2) "Education of Factory workers" was not popularly incorporated in target labour unions
education programme;
(3) labour and family welfare committees, which was intended to educate and motivate
workers into accepting family planning service, were not well set up in labour unions;
(4) the objective of integrating Population Education into the course of the President Citizen
college (PCC) was not fulfilled.
The latter programme's problems were:
(1) traditional birth attendants were not included in the training programme;
(2)people in the remote rural areas had no access to modern family planning services.
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Minister continued to appeal through the media the necessity to regulate
fertility.
However, even at this stage, the government's involvements in the
practical family planning issue area was never comprehensive and rather
sporadic. Main government' programmes included Training of Family
Health Trainers and Zambia Enrolled Nurses were trained under the
Health Family Planning, the establishment of the Zambia Population
Communication Unit (ZAMPOPCOMU) within the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting with assistance from UNEP and UNESCO
to provide communication support to all population and family planning
programmes (Banda, 1993: 214), and the establishment of the Inschool
Population Education Unit at the Ministry of General Education, Youth
and Sports under the support of UNFPA to help Zambian youths learn
how to identify, analyse and resolve family, community and national
demographic and development problems (Banda, 1993: 215). In fact, these
programmes were quite strongly influenced by external actors36.
Against these backgrounds, the first attempt to integrate population
factor in the development planning was made within the National
Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) a year before the Fourth
National Development Plan (FNDP), which was preceded the Interim
National Development Plan (July 1987-December 1988) published in 1986.
Eventually, a chapter on population, health and family planning was
included in the document.
In 1989, the official population policy was announced for the first
time by President Kaunda. In the FNDP, a chapter on "Population and
Development" was included.
In the FNDP, the policy-makers admitted that:
36There were criticisms from members of the House of Chief (Banda, 1993: 215). UNFPA
was also active to support the government to formulate its population policy for the first
time.
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"No systematic attempt was made to integrate population factors in
Zambia's previous development plans" (FNDP: 52).
However,
"More recently, however, it has been acknowledged that the
youthfulness and high rate of growth of the nation's population are
definite constraints on attempts at improving the quality of life and
standard of living of the people. This is reflected in the increasing
inability of Government at all levels to maintain and improve
existing levels of services. It is for these reasons that the Party and
its Government has decided to start, with the Fourth National
Development Plan, systematically integrate population factors into
its development plans. It is expected that this will lay the
foundation for sustained progress and self-reliant development of the
nation" (FNDP: 52).
Objectives of the population were quite ambitious as follows:
(a) to initiate, improve and sustain measures aimed at slowing down the high
population growth rate;
(b) to improve the health of the mother and child;
(c) to integrate population factors into the development planning and plan
implementation process;
(d) to strengthen and co-ordinate institutions that are involved in population
activities;
(e) to establish a National Population Council of Zambia;
(1) to strengthen and sustain the nation's population data base;
(g) to extend the coverage of family planning service to all adults;
(I1) to work towards the reduction of the total fertility rate from 7.2 to 4; and
(g) to reduce the infant mortality rate from the present 97 per 1,000 live births to 75
per 1,000 live births per year during the Plan period (FNDP: 58).
In order to achieve the above objectives, the following strategies were
adopted:
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(a) promoting awareness among all the people in Zambia of population dynamics
and the effects of rapid population growth on development through various
information, education and communication programmes;
(b) providing the necessary information and education on the advantages of small
family size to both the individual family and the nation as a whole in achieving
self-reliance;
(c) educating young people on family life matters, including fertility regulation and
family planning before they enter the ages of marriage and child bearing;
(d) upgrading existing family planning activities to a comprehensive programme
which will aim at increasing the levels of awareness, acceptance, and practice of, as
well as promoting more favourable attitudes towards, family planning. In addition,
more efforts will be made to make family planning methods culturally acceptable
and more easily accessible and affordable for persons who voluntarily want to use
them;
(e) establishing the use of commercial out-reach and community based distribution
channels for family planning in rural areas which are not covered by the current
health care programme;
(f) expanding and intensifying the primary health care (PHC) and maternal and
child health care (MCH) programmes; and
(g) vigorously pursuing training retraining and retention of various categories of
manpower in the various fields of demographic planning, management, health and
family planning, statistics, education, etc. (FNDP: 59)
To implement the population policy as formulated above, the
following administrative bodies were established:
(1) Population Council;
(2)Technical Committee;
(3) Special Task Forces;
The Population Council is the highest advisory body to the government
and is responsible for offering advice an interpreting policy concerning
population and related development issues (FNDP: 59). The Technical
Committee was also established to reinforce the technical skills necessary
to carry out the Population Council's work. The Special Task Forces were
also formed to prepare detailed and technical reports, review specific
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population programme areas like training, service delivery, research and
evaluation and so on (Banda, 1993: 225).
Therefore, the UNIP government had gradually changed its
thinking on the issue of population from pro-natalism to anti-natalism
since the 1970s, and it was only in 1989 that it adopted the population
policy. However, these government policies require basic changes in
people's behavior, so that it remains to be seen how the policy will be
effectively implemented to achieve its objectives.
5.4.2.3 PPAZ: History, Objectives, Activities And Structure
It was only as late as 1986 that the Zambian government included a
chapter on population, health and family planning in its documents like
the Economic Review and Annual Plan. In addition, it was in 1989 that
the UNIP government adopted the population policy. It was in this
context that the PPAZ has complemented the lack of governmental efforts
in the area of anti-natal population policy and family planning.
It was in August 1972, when a group of 44 men and women had a
conference organised by the Department of Social Work of the University
of Zambia at the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation, that the first family
planning association was formed in Zambia. At inception, the name of the
association was the Family Planning and Welfare Association of Zambia.
In the same year, the government approved the registration of the
Association under the Societies Act. The National Headquarters was in
Ndola until 1977 when it was moved to Lusaka. During the first year of
formation, its membership, which is on a voluntary basis, has grown
from 40 to 1,500, and it established six branches at Ndola, Kitwe, Mufulira,
Lusaka, Ching°la and Chipata. In 1979, it changed its name to the Planned
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Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ). Currently, the number of
branches is 34 and its membership is more than 20,000.
According to the draft brochure of the PPAZ, it has six aims and
objectives:
1. To disseminate information on family planning and population issues to the general
public;
2. To provide family planning services and promote the physical and mental health
of mothers through proper spacing of birth;
3. To help improve the welfare of women by finding small scale income generating
projects undertaken by women;
4. To collaborate with other agencies on projects and child spacing and population;
5. To give ad , 'ice and guidance to problems related to fertility and sub-fertility;
6. To stimulate and/or participate in proper research in family planing and related
fields.
In order to fulfill the above aims, the PPAZ has identified the
following area of activities:
1. To extend and expand family planning campaigns among the general public in
order to increase knowledge and practice of family planning;
2. To support the Party and its Government and other Community Service Providers in
their family planning efforts and to establish models of service capable of
replication;
3. To promote family planning by stimulating and supporting the effort of rural
communities to undertake self-help activities;
4. To develop the management capability of Planned Parenthood Association of
Zambia volunteers and staff;
5. To gather information and data aimed at assisting the Association in programme
planning;
6. To create awareness of the needs of young people and to promote family life
education;
7. To expand the programme of PPAZ through Resource Development Activities
(PPAZ, 1989: 13-14).
In practice, the PPAZ has been involved in following areas:
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1. Delivery of contraceptions;
2. Projects for the youth and women;
3. Training of personnel;
4. AIDS prevention.
Firstly the PPAZ's involvement is the distribution of contraceptives
to family planning delivery points like hospitals and clinics. Among the
family planning methods promoted by the PPAZ are condoms, hormonal
methods like the pill, injectables or implants, intra-uterine devices (IUDs),
scientific natural family planning methods, voluntary surgical
sterilisation and tubal ligatio. For the purpose of providing more
comprehensive service of family planning, the PPAZ established a Family
Planning Centre in Lusaka in 1988 which provides high quality
reproductive health services and a complete range of contraceptive
methods.
Second, the PPAZ has also been involved in family life education
programmes for the youth by establishing the training schemes in
Livingstone and Solwezi which also offer income generating
opportunities. The PPAZ has eight income-generating projects for women
ranging from chicken rearing, knitting, sewing, gardening by supporting
local voluntary groups as other NSDA0s.
Third, the PPAZ initiated extensive programmes intended to
develop professional skills in family planning and to train medical
personnel. Fourth, more recently it has also been involved in the activity
of AIDs prevention. The current structure of the PPAZ is shown in figure
5-1 and figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-1 Policy-Making Structure of the PPAZ
Source: Information from the Project Coordinator of the PPAZ, Lusaka.
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Figure 5-2 Administrative Stucture (National Level)
Source: Information from the Project Coordinator of the PPAZ, Lusaka.
Basically the PPAZ is a voluntary organisation which had estimated
20,000 volunteers throughout the country. There is the Annual General
Conference (AGC) which is the supreme policy making body of the
Association and to which each branch sends a representative. At the AGC,
eight out of ten members of the National Executive Council are elected
every three years (two of them are coopted). The Council is under the AGC
and is responsible for the management of the Association's affairs. Also it
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formulates and takes policy decisions on behalf of the AGC. Under the
Council, currently there are three committees, as is shown in figure R-1.
In the administrative structure shown in figure 5-2 which has been
evolved over the two decades of its existence, there are 75 (full-time)
employees. Those who have a wide variety of professional and technical
background, and experience are included. The staff are led by an Executive
Director supported by Assistant Directors of the two department:
Programmes and Finance. Below the positions of Assistant Directors are
Programme Officers. In order to maximise its effectiveness in the delivery
of family planning service, two Regional Offices headed by Regional
Coordinators, who are situated in the Copperbelt and Eastern Provinces,
were created in 1989. At branch level, field officers coordinate the activities
of the Association.
Financially, the PPAZ has been heavily dependent on its
international body to which the PPAZ is affiliated, the International
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). It received almost 90 per cent of
the annual total budget from the IPPF (Interview with an officer of the
PPAZ, 5/2/92). Other donors include CIDA (Family Planning Awareness
Campaign), NORAD (Rural Areas Planning Services Project), WHO.
There is also some financial assistance from the government in the form
of the rebate of duty on imports, and provision of accommodation at
branches. In 1987, there was 130,809 kwacha in the form of the rebate from
the Ministry of Finance and 30,600 kwacha in the form of provision of
accommodation at branches from the Ministry of Health (PPAZ, 1989: 91).
5.4.2.4 Operating Difficulties of PPAZ
As other NSDA0s, the PPAZ has problems of lack of skilled
manpower and lack of fund to expand its activities. Moreover, since the
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PPAZ has no service delivery points of its own, it has to distribute
contraceptives through other organisations' facilities, like Government
hospitals under the Ministry of Health, Mission and Mine hospitals and
clinics as well as the Zambia Flying Doctor Service and District Councils.
When the PPAZ was formed, its activities were concentrated around the
Copperbelt and in urban areas. It was by the end of 1970s that the PPAZ
had expanded its services to the rural areas and almost all provincial
centre were manned by field officers who act as coordinators with other
agencies. Although the PPAZ itself has developed and is currently one of
the most developed NSDAOs in Zambia in terms of organisation, which
has country-wide network, it still experiences such a bottleneck of its
activities.
In addition, the PPAZ has experienced another kind of problems. At
the beginning stage, the association was occasionally misconstrued to be an
organisation that was merely interested in limiting the population growth
of the country so as to perpetuate colonialism: the domination of the
colonialist over the country through the maintenance of a small
population (PPAZ, 1986: 1). This kind of misunderstanding, which was
derived from people's cultural pro-natal attitudes, actually lasted for a
long period. From the experience of the PPAZ, the problem they faced
include (1) scepticism and suspicion by the politicians of the activities of
the PPAZ, (2) interference of local politicians into the PPAZ's field
activities, which takes the forms of both physical and non-physical like
intended misinformation of the idea of "family planning," (3) people's
conservative pro-natal attitude towards the "new" idea and the usage of
modern methods. According to the explanation of a PPAZ's officer, it was
their approach to access to the people first which caused the first problem.
As a nature of the NSDAOs which serve others, or in other wards, target
groups, this approach supposed to be usual. However this example shows
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us that there are difficulties which restrict NSDAOs' scope of activities
beyond the knowledge of political elites. These were main difficulties to
the operation of the PPAZ and the implementation of the programmes.
5.4.2.5 Interaction between the UNIP Government and the PPAZ
As so far stated, although the PPAZ was officially allowed by UNIP
to provide modern family planning service as early as 1975, the operating
environments were not good enough for the PPAZ, because of oppositions
from UNIP members themselves.
In order to solve the problem, one of the tactics which was adopted
by the PPAZ in the early 1980s was to accept the patron at the national
level who was a member of the UNIP Central Committee and director of
the UNIP Women's League, Mrs. C. Kankasa. Also at branch levels, most
of the branches had political local leaders as patrons. There was a
background of 1984 Mexico Population Conference as mentioned above,
which stimulated Kankasa's involvement in the population issue.
These facts have several dimensions in terms of the idea of civil
society. From the point of view of the PPAZ, on the one hand, this tactic
was indispensable for the association's smooth operation and
implementation of its programmes. Also it was tactics for survival of the
PPAZ in the one-party political regime. In fact, it was after the
establishment of the post of patron and the PPAZ's minute explanation of
"family planning" to Mrs. Kankasa that the PPAZ's operation became
more smooth (interview with a officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92).
On the other hand, from the standpoint of UNIP, it had not only a
symbolic and mobilisational importance but also a means of party-control
of the association, although the PPAZ was never completely coopted into
the party structure. Furthermore, interestingly enough, according to
429
Banda's observation, on the side of UNIP, there was no intention to
affiliate the PPAZ to the then ruling party in the 1970s and early, because
the PPAZ is wholly funded by international organisations whose motives
are not clear (Banda, 1993: 209). Also in terms of "ideological" stance, UNIP
did not forced the PPAZ to change its anti-natalism and UNIP had
gradually changed its stance from pro-natalism to anti-natalism.
Therefore the PPAZ chose the option to abandon a part of
"autonomy" in order to continue its activities in exchange for more
favourable working conditions by getting support from a member of the
most highest policy-making body, the UNIP Central Committee, in the
Second Republic. However, it succeeded in keeping its major parts of
autonomy in terms of resources, organisation and ideology.
It was in 1984 that the PPAZ increased and intensified its activities,
including family planning publicity campaigns, family planning
motivation campaigns for industrial workers. In this improving working
conditions of the PPAZ, the PPAZ held two seminars in 1985. One was for
traditional rulers for the purpose of letting them know the idea of "family
planning." The other was for Members of the Parliament. As a result,
these seminars called on the government to assist the PPAZ in its work
and recommended the establishment of a Population Council which
would co-ordinate all population related activities in the country. Another
improvement after these seminars was the increase of the number of
branches, which is currently 34, because traditional rulers and other
leadership have openly supported the idea of family planning and have
urged the PPAZ to go to their villagers and communities and educate the
people on this matter (interview with a officer of the PPAZ, 5/2/92).
5.4.2.6 Involvement of the PPAZ in the Process of Population Policy
Making and Implementation
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In 1989 that the official population policy was announced by
President Kaunda, as stated above.
What can be pointed out additionally in the Population and
Development Policy in the FNDP is that the PPAZ and the Family Life
Movement of Zambia (FLMZ) are included alongside the governmental
agencies as components of the basic institutional framework within which
various programmes and objects designed to achieve the nation's
population policy can be implemented (FNDP: 59). This can be interpreted
that both NSDAOs had been institutionalised as indispensable actors in
the issue area of population and that this institutionalised actors have
been recognised as such by the policy-makers. In fact, both NSDAOs have
been involved in the process of making this population policy, to which
we turn next.
In September 1987, one of the most important consultative
conferences, "Promoting Family Health: Towards Closer Collaboration
between Government and NGOs in Zambia" was held in Livingstone. It
was organised by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
and the PPAZ with financial assistance from the World Bank. This was
the first consultation to be organised for a specific sector in Zambia. And
there were 17 participants from ministries and non-governmental sectors
as follows:
Ministry of Health;
Ministry of Labour and Social Service;
Ministry of Education and Culture;
Family Life Movement of Zambia;
Makeni Ecumenical Centre;
United Independence Party (UNIP) Women's League;
United nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA);
Young Women Christian Association (YWCA);
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National food and Nutrition Commission.
The objectives of this consultation were:
(1) To deliberate with Government and NGOs officials on the importance of
population and family health programmes in national development;
(2) To identify the means to foster stronger and more effective collaboration between
the Government and NGOs in formulating, designing and implementing family
health programmes;
(3) To work out strategies and plans for better collaboration and future action in
promoting family health activities.
This offered the first opportunity for Zambian NSDAOs to consult the
population issue with the government officials (1) to identify areas of
collaboration between the government and NSDAOs and (2) to set up an
agenda to formulate the national population policy which was announced
in May 1989, when the National Population Policy Conference was held.
In fact, it was this workshop that the necessity "to create opportunities for
NGOs to take part in policy formulation process in the government as
well as participate in development programmes" (Report of the
Livingstone Workshop: 31) was found. In addition, in this workshop,
collaborations in the area of utilisation and sharing the manpower and
other facilities, in the area of training personnel as well as disseminating
and sharing of information were considered.
Although collaboration was the main topic, the issue of conflicts
between the government and NGOs was also discussed so as to avoid
them. As ways of mininising conflict, the workshop noted the necessity of
holding regular meeting with government, of drawing up guidelines on
lines of communication and relationships between NGOs and
government and so on.
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Shortly after this workshop, in fact, the PPAZ was involved in the
policy-making process. When the FNDP was prepared, the PPAZ was
invited to sit on the committee preparing for it. In this process, the PPAZ
was requested to submit an input on "Population and Family Planning"
for inclusion in the FNDP and the proposed Population Policy (PPAZ,
Three Year Plan, 1989-91: 8). We can easily understand this involvement,
when we consider the fact that the PPAZ was recognised as one of the
components in the areas as mentioned in the FNDP. In fact, a part of the
policy was drafted by the PPAZ (interview with an officer of the PPAZ,
5/2/92) and the PPAZ recognised its role as "a pressure group" in the
policy formulation process (PPAZ, Three Year Plan, 1989-91: 8). When we
read the objectives and strategies of the population policy carefully, taking
into account the PPAZ's objectives and activities, we can identify the
PPAZ's influence. For example, the Population policy's strategies (a) and
(b), which are "promoting awareness of population and family planning"
have almost the same contention of the PPAZ's strategy (1) and objective
(1). And the strategy (c) of the education of the youth has been a part of the
activities of the PPAZ as stated above.
Moreover, in the area of population, the Inter-agency Technical
Committee on Population (ITCP) was established in June 1989 in the
National Commission for Development Planning (NCDP) with a
membership drawn both from governmental and non-governmental
agencies involved in population activities. Its main purpose is to foster
the effective implementation of Zambia's population policy soon after its
adoption. The ITCP have organised a few workshops in which members
from ministries and non-governmental agencies took part to prepare all
agencies involved in population work for effective population policy
awareness campaigns.
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5.4.2.7 Impacts of the PPAZ: A Question of Institutionalisation in Zambian
Society
When I interviewed officers of the PPAZ, asking "do you think that
the PPAZ has been gainning ground or not?" In response to this question,
one officer answered "yes." This was because the PPAZ has been a main
supplier of contraceptives and the PPAZ has been more and more invited
to workshops and conferences. This shows one of the dimensions of the
process of institutionalisation from a "subjective point of view," which is
shared by the staff of the organisation. However, apparently, this is not
enough to explain the PPAZ's institutionalisation in Zambian society.
Another important dimension is how the organisation has been
recognised by Zambian people. In other words, it is the process of
institutionalisation from an "objective point of view." In order to consider
this dimension, evaluation reports will be useful although the fact was
found there have been few reports of non- governmental agencies because
of shortage of funds and skilled manpower. In the case of the PPAZ, it has
not conducted such kind of research.
Although there is limited data which shows the level of
institutionalisation of the PPAZ in Zambian society, we can find an
example of the people's knowledge of family planning organisation
(ZARD et al., 1988: 75-76).
According table 5-7, 21.7 per cent of the sample of this research could
name the PPAZ. This is the highest percentage among all family planning-
related organisations. The people who know about family planning
organisations are mostly in urban areas. This means that family planning
organisations including the PPAZ are still urban-oriented because the
PPAZ, for example, had difficulties like lack of facilities and manpower, in
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operating in rural areas as was stated in earlier sections and therefore the
penetration into rural area has been still quite new.
Table 5-7 Percentage of Knowledge of family planning activities of different organisations
in Zambia
Urban or Family PPAZ Missionaries WHO Ministry of Number
Rural Life Health
Urban 10.7 39.3 1.4 6.6 3.8 290
Rural 2.1 10.7 0.4 0 0 467
Urban	 & 5.4 21.7 0.8 0.3 1.5 757
Rural
Source: ZARD et al., 1988: 75.
In contrast with knowledge of the PPAZ as a organisation of family
planning, only 1.5 per cent of respondents could identify the Ministry of
Health as being an organisation particularly concerned with family
planning activities. There seems to be a contradiction because the
government hospitals and clinics are considered to be points to provide
family planning methods more than half the sample of this study (ZARD
et al., 1988: 70). "This may well be an accurate assessment of an
organisation which makes family planning methods available to those
that ask for them, but otherwise does little to promote family planning"
(ZARD et al., 1988: 75, emphasis added).
What can be observed from these examples is at least that the PPAZ
has been recognised among people as the most important organisation
promoting family planning in Zambia, although pro-natalist attitudes,
reasons of which were raised in earlier part, are still dominant among
Zambians, which has been shown in several studies (e.g., Banda, 1993;
ZARD et al., 1988).
This shows us strengths of NSDA0s. They have an opportunity to
spearhead the issue areas which are neglected by the, especially weak, state
with limited resources, because they have flexibility in formulating and
implementing their own policy. It is, thus, possible for them to be
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gradually institutionalised in a society as far as there are not oppressive
controls and incorporating tactics from the state.
In this situation, collaboration with the state in formulating and-
implementing the state policy, which is a "democratic" (in the sense of
expanded opportunity of political participation) way, as is described in
earlier sections, is important for effective functioning of an NSDA0s.
However, it is also true that this collaboration is viewed and is criticised as
"being reduced to being just another arm of the state" in the Second
Republic (Weekly Post, 7-13 February, 1992). As I argued in the previous
sections, the PPAZ is a case of an NSDAO which had taken a strategy to
allow itself to be partly controlled by UNIP, so as to survive in the Second
Republic.
Anyway, it remains to be seen how this collaboration between the
state and the PPAZ will generate effective performance in the new multi-
party system under a deteriorated economy.
5.4.3 Botswana
5.4.3.1 Botswana's Population Situation from the 1971 and 1981 Censuses
In comparison with the 1971 figure of a de jure37 population of
650,000 (574,000 de facto 38), the 1981 census yielded a de jure population of
967,000 (941,000 de facto). Over this period, the rate of population growth
rose from 3.1 per cent per annum to 3.3 per cent per annum in 1981. But
more recent data seems to suggest that the population growth has recently
begun to decline (see NDP7 Chapter 2).
37De jure population includes Botswana citizens temporarily abroad and excludes non-
citizens visiting Botswana temporarily.
38De facto population is the number of people, of whatever nationality, actually in
Botswana at the time of the census.
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In terms of fertility rates which are only derived from the 1971 and
1981 census, which are shown in table 5-8, the current fertility rates in
Botswana are not only high, but they have risen during the intercensus
decade in spite of some substantial gains in health, education,
urbanisation and overall economic status of the people (ROB, 1987c: 9).
Also the crude birth rate has been increasing from 44.5 in 1971 to 47.2 in
1981.
Table 5-8 Total Fertility Rates in 1971 and 1981 by Urban-Rural Residence in Botswana
1971	 1981
Urban	 Rural
6.5	 6.019	 7.295
Source: CSO, 1987: 10
As in Zambia, the crude death rate has been declining from 13.7 in
1971 to 13.0 in 1981 (NDP6: 9) owing to the improvement of health
facilities. This decline leads to the change of life expectancy of 52.5 and 58.6
in 1971 to 52.7 and 59.3 in 1981 for males and females respectively.
In terms of population age distribution, Botswana has also quite a
youthful population structure. Those under 15 years made up 47.0 per cent
of the population in 1981 and 19.7 per cent were under five. Economically
active people (15-64) accounted for 48.8 per cent, while those over 64 4.6
per cent.
The urbanisation has been also one of demographic features in
Botswana. Table 5-9 shows clearly this tendency.
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Table 5-9 Growth of Urban* Settlements, 1971-1991 (Thousand) (Botswana)
Actual 1971 Actual 1981 Estimated 1991
Gaborone 17.7 56.7 136.4
Francistown 18.6 31.1 58.2
Lobatse 11.9 19.0 28.4
Selebi-Phikwe 4.9 29.5 54.6
Orapa 1.2 5.2 9.8
Jweneng 5.6 16.4
Palapye 9.6 19.0
Tlokweng 6.7 13.3
Mogoditishane 6.1
Serowe 30.1
Mahalapye 28.8
Maun 19.8
Letlhakane 9.0
Kasane 3.1
Ghanzi
. 6.1
Sowa 2.2
Total Urban 54.4 166.3 441.3
Total population 596.9 941.0 1,334.4
Urban as proportion of total 9.5% 17.7% 33.1%
Source: NDP7: 12.
* "Urban" is defined, for census purposes, as "any settlement of 5,000 or more persons with at
least 75 per cent of the labour force in non-agricultural employment".
5.4.3.2 BOFWA: Objectives, Operation and Structure
The Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA) was
established in 1988 by a group of NGOs in Botswana, which was the
Botswana NGO health coordinating committee, in coordination with the
government. Its establishment was also assisted by the International
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).
In January 1985, there was a workshop organised by the government
and the World Bank in Gaborone to discuss the means of collaboration
between the government and the non-governmental organisation. There
were many participants also from countries in southern and eastern
Africa. This was because it was recognised that the task of reaching the
entire population in the area of family planning could not be
accomplished alone (BOFWA, 1988: 2). This was followed by another
workshop in Harare where an action plan for collaboration was
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formulated and an NGO coordinating committee including YWCA, was
formed. The Botswana NGO health coordinating committee eventually
agreed the idea to establish the BOFWA with assistance of the IPPF field
office in Mbabane, Swaziland. Therefore, the initiative and the idea to
establish a NSDAO and collaboration between the government and the
NSDAO in the issue area of family planning originally came not form
non-governmental sector but the government, although the
establishment of the BOFWA itself was coordinated among NG0s.
In 1988, the BOFWA was registered in June and launched in
September. At the time of the launching, there was a seminar with 45
participants representing schools, churches, private practitioners, chiefs,
members of Parliament, and the following NG0s:
Botswana Christian Council (BCC)
Botswana Girl Guide Association
Botswana Boy Scouts
Botswana Red Cross Society
Botswana Council of Women (BCW)
Botswana Young Women Christian Association (YWCA)
Business and Professional Women's Clubs of Botswana
BoNwana Nurses Association
Emang Basadi
The stated objectives of the BOFWA are:
(1) To collect information and advise education in family planning and responsible
parenthood in the interest of family welfare and community well being;
(2) To increase understanding by the people of Botswana of the demographic
problems of their own country and the world;
(3) To advocate and promote the provision of information and education
particularly human physiology, sexual development and human production;
(4)To advise on premarital counseling;
(5) To assist in the formation, organisation and operation of family planning and
other related health and development services;
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National Finance
& Administrative
Cornmittee
National Programme
Committee
(6) To promote and support family planning through appropriate organisations;
(7)To promote training of appropriate professional workers in the implementation of
its policies and principles (Background Information on BOFWA: 2).
The BOFWA's organisational structure is shown in figure 5-3.
National Council
National Executive Committee
Policy- making
Body
Policy
Implimenting
Body
Executive Director
Executive Staff Office
Figure 5-3 Organisational Structure of the BOFWA
Source: Compiled from the information of the Executive
Staff Office, Gaborone and NORAD, 1989: 6.
In organisational term, BOFWA is a membership associations
composed of persons and institutions. The National Council, which
oversees the fulfillment of objects of the BOFWA and is held once a year,
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is the supreme authority and policy making organ of the BOFWA.
Members of the National Executive Committee (NEC) are elected by the
National Council and it is the management and running body of the
BOFWA. Two standing committees, namely the National Finance and
Administrative Committee and the National Programme Committee, are
appointed by the NEC. In administration, the Executive Staff Office is the
permanent organ which undertake duties assigned to it by the NEC with
an Executive Director as its chief.
The BOFWA is financially dependent for about 60 to 70 per cent of
its annual budget on its international mother body, the IPPF. And 20 per
cent of it is from the government.
However, the BOFWA with its short history is still in the
rudimentary stage of its operations and depends on expatriates in its
management as has often happened in NSDAOs in Botswana. Since its
establishment, the BOFWA formed a few branches and recruitment of
staff is underway. One of the means to attain its objectives is the
establishment of a youth counseling centre for family life education in
Gaborone. This centre's activities are as follows:
(1) A small library with booklets to provide information on family Life Education
and family planning;
(2) Indoor game to provide entertainment and occupational therapy for the youthN
(3) Counseling service provide the youth with an opportunity to discuss problems
related to their emotional, sexual and psychological development;
(4) Short training courses will be organised for the youth (Background Information on
BOFWA: 3-4)
Generally speaking, it remains to be seen what kind of role the BOFWA
will play in this issue area in its relations with the government.
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5.4.3.3 The State-initiated Anti-Natal "Population Policy": The Evolution
of Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning (MCH/FP) and of
Institutional Framework
In the issue areas of population and family planning, basic designs
of programmes have been drawn by the government.
The Botswana government have been motivated to play a very
active role in population programmes since as early as the early 1970s. It
was because of (1) people's concentration in the more fertile eastern strip
of the country which comprises less than 5 percent of Botswana's
cultivative land, and the problem of droughts affecting its agricultural
yields, and (2) inefficient employment. In addition, between 1960 to 1975,
natural increase increased from 3.3 to 3.5 percent per annum. Therefore,
the government was motivated to support family planning programme
shortly after political independence. Against this background, the
Maternal and Child Health/ Family Planning (MCH/FP) Programme was
developed.
Maternal and child health/family planning services in Botswana
originated as early as in 1967, when several women in Francistown asked
the government surgeon for contraceptives. At this stage, contraceptives
were provided by the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)
which subsequently began a pilot project in 1969 to introduce family
planning in Serowe. It was at this time that six middle-aged women with
children were trained as volunteer family welfare educators, who are
normally selected in the Village Development Committee, by an IPPF
visiting team. In addition to human reproduction and family planning,
the training at this time included other subjects such as immunisations,
breadfeeding, nutrition, child maternal care, environmental sanitation,
prevention of some major diseases and communication skills. Thus, from
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the beginning, "family planning in Botswana has been integrated into the
general context of maternal and child health and has never been a separate
programme" (Botswana Family Health Survey II (BFHS-II): 3).
In the National Development Plan 1970-75 issued in 1970, the
policy-makers showed their concerns on a "population explosion to out-
strip the economic expansion" at that time, and their recognition that
improved child care can be achieved through family planning" (p.113,
emphasis added). In fact, the government had sponsored a training
programme run by the IPPF mentioned above "to cater for those who
want to plan the size of their family" (NDP 1970-75). It is also stated in this
plan that the government "wishes to see established, where possible by
Local Authorities, a network of maternal and child welfare clinics at
which family planning advice would be available" during the plan period
(NDP 1970-75: 113-4). In addition, the government set a target for
population growth not exceeded 2.5 percent per annum by 1985 in this
Development Plan. Therefore, it is possible to interpret that this suggested
de facto adoption of anti-natal population policy, although there is no
clear population policy in Botswana.
The Botswana government started to take action to establish an
institutional framework quite quickly to achieve the objective of the plan.
It was in 1973 that the Maternal and Child Health/Family Planning
(MCH/ FP) Unit was formed in the Ministry of Health and a national
programme was established. The policy of the government was that these
services are available to every family. The basic stance was stated by the
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health in 1976 as follows:
"It is a basic right of every family to determine for itself how many
children to have and when to have them. If couples are to exercise
the choice of determining the number and spacing of their children,
then health facilities must provide them with the service, supplies
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and information on how to plan their families" (Ministry of Health,
1976: i).
One of the important decisions, which was made as a key component of
the MCH/FP programme, was to train 60 family welfare educators (FWEs)
every year (BFHSII, 1988: 4). More than 600 FWEs have been trained by the
MCP/FP Unit since 1973. They have played educational and motivational
roles in communities.
In 1979, the Family Health Division was formed with the result that
the MCH/ FP Unit joined with the Nutrition Unit and the Health
Education Unit. The main objectives of the Family Health Division are (1)
to reduce sickness and death among mothers, children and infants, (2) to
promote reproductive health, and (3) to promote the physical and
psychological health and development of children and adolescents. To
attain these objectives, health workers provided services and supervised
deliveries in family planning and so on.
In this institutional development process, the number of service
points has been increased from 50 to more than 441 permanent facilities in
1989 as is shown in figure 5-4, which have made each family more possible
to assess MCH/ FP services.
As in the case of Zambia, influences of international conferences on
population issues also stimulated the government to develop clearer
population policies and implementation strategies. These conferences
included the Second African Conference on Population and Development
in Tanzania in January 1984 and International Conference on population
in Mexico in August 1984. Following these international conferences, a
series of workshops and conferences on population and development
wure held to further conscientise policy makers on this issue in the
country (BFHS-II, 1988: 6). In October 1985, a seminar was held to
disseminate the result of the Botswana Health Survey in 1984. In
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September 1986, there a conference for Parliamentarians and Chiefs. Also
in June 1987, another conference on the same subject was held (BFHS-II,
1988: 6). Therefore, following development in the issue area seems to
have its origin around in 1984, where the necessity for clear pollution
policy was gradually shared among the policy-makers.
Referral
Hospitals-3
District
Hospitals-12
Health
Centre-13
Clinics-163
(58 with
maternity)
Health Posts
(137 with
nurses)
Figure 5-4 Health Care Pyramid
Source: Medical Statistics Unit quated in BFHS-2, 1988:5.
Until 1984 family planning service were offered at only specified
times during the week. Late in 1984, the MCH/ FP Unit tested the
integration of these services on a daily basis at several clinics in order to
increase the accessibility of services. From the initial pilot projects in two
clinics in the Southeast District, integrated services have been extended to
all parts of the country. As a result, in 1988 over 77 per cent of clinics offer
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integrated services. This approach have made it possible that the entire
family can obtain MCH/FP service on one day (BFHS-II, 1988: 4).
Another development since 1984 is an intensification of training in
MCH/FP, both within and outside the country for the purpose of
improving the quality of services. Health workers have used various
opportunities in many areas related to MCH/ FP.
Owing to these institutional developments of family planning on
the initiative of the state, it has become possible to reach the people in
need of MCH/FP services more easily.
Furthermore, in October 1987, in order to improve the quality and
safety of family planning services in Botswana, the Family Health
Division developed the Family Planning Policy Guidelines and Service
Standards, which took effect in May 1988. Also in 1987, the Ministry of
Health engaged a consultant to develop a three-year programme of
information, education, communication (IEC), which is an important
component of any MCH/FP programme, to further promote MCH/ FP
activities.
In January 1989, the government created an Interministerial
Programme Steering Committee on Population and Development to
develop and implement a national population policy. The background of
this establishment was a series of conferences and workshop stated above
to stress the need for the government to develop clear population policies
and implementation strategies (BFHS-II: 6).
In was in this context of the evolution of state-initiated "population
policy" that the BOFWA was launched to collaborate with the
government in policy implementation.
In terms of performance of the state-initiated anti-natal policies, it
can be concluded that they have been relatively successfully done.
Between 1985 and 1988, for example, the percentage of women knowing at
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least one modern method of contraception increased from 75 percent to 95
percent (BFHS-II: 34-36). In addition, a target set by the government in 1985
to increase the proportion of married women accepting family planning
from 20 percent to 30 percent in 1990 was achieved, and the proportion
was 32 percent in 1990. In this regard, Botswana is only surpassed by
Mauritius (46 percent) and Zimbabwe (36 percent) among Sub-Saharan
countries (Banda, 1993: 166).
5.4.3.4 The Government' View on the Role of the BOFWA: A "Tool" of
the State?
At the launching seminar of the BOFWA, top-ranking government
officials were invited to make opening and key note addresses. The one
was P. Venson, the then Deputy Permanent Secretary , Ministry of Labour
and Home Affairs and the other E.T. Maganu, the Director of Health
Services? Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health. Also, Mrs.
Masire attended the seminar.
In the keynote address made by Maganu, entitled "the Role of
Voluntary Organisation in a National Family Welfare programme"
(BOFWA, 1990: 35-39), gives us an image of the BOFWA recognised by the
government. One of the points we can find in the text is the role of
voluntary organisations as innovators derived from their flexible
organisational structure. In this regard, the BOFWA was expected to play a
role in counselling procedures, which is one of the areas of activities. Also,
initiatives of NGOs were expected to impact positively on the
improvement of the quality of life in the areas where current government
services had limited impact (BOFWA, 1990: 38). Therefore, we can observe
that the government expected complementary role of NG0s. However,
what we have to realise is the following phrase:
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"Your success or failure in the initial phases will determine how
much support you get from Ministries dealing with social services..."
(BOFWA, 1990: 39).
This phrase connotes that the activities of the BOFWA in the future will
depend not only on the performance of the BOFWA itself, but also on the
government. This means that quite limited autonomy was allowed for the
BOFWA in its relation with the state at the initial stage of establishment.
Since the establishment of the BOFWA, there was an impression
that there had been "excellent" relationship between the government and
the BOFWA in 1992 (Interview with an officer of the BOFWA, 26/3/92).
It was in the NDP7 that the government started to refer to and
emphasised the importance of "non-governmental organisations" in the
process of policy implementation. In the area of the population, the
government stated as follows:
"The implementation of population policy cuts across the
programmes of many ministries, non-governmental organisations, and
the private sector" (NDP7: 91).
and
"Non-governmental organisations are active in related research and
the provision of private health and education services. They can
assist in disseminating information, distributing supplies, and
monitoring progress" (NDP7: 91, emphasis added).
Furthermore,
"To deal with the problem areas identified, NG0s, such as the
Botswana Family Welfare Association, the Botswana Christian
Council and women' organisations, will be encouraged to disseminate
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information about family planning, population and teenage
pregnancy" (NDP7: 378, emphasis added).
It is clear from these phrases that the government expects the role of
NSDAOs only in the limited areas of activities where the government has
not been involved enough like information dissemination and
counseling. This stance corresponds to that shown in the launching
seminar of the BOFWA in 1988, as stated above.
In addition, in response to my question if there would be any
possibility for NSDAOs like the BOFWA to be allowed to participate in the
policy making process in the case of formulating more clearer official
population policy in Botswana, one of the senior officials of the Family
Health Unit of the Ministry of Health answered that there would be few
opportunities for the BOFWA to participate in the process (Interview,
24/ 4/ 92). Also the official said that there was no prospect for the
government to withdraw from the areas in which it had been working
and to leave them to NSDA0s.
It can be observed (1) that, in the issue areas of population and
family planning, there is a relatively clear boundary between the space of
the government and that of the BOFWA, which is almost regulated and
limited by the state and (2) that it is difficult and almost impossible for the
BOFWA to change and expand the working sphere and to infiltrate into
the area which has been already occupied by the state. Therefore, the
"good" relations kept between the state and the BOFWA from the
BOFWA's point of view can be considered to be partly due to the clearer
boundary of each working space determined almost by the state. In other
words, there is a limited chance of conflicts between the state, as far as the
working sphere is kept. However, this rigidly determined boundary also
means that the BOFWA is regarded as only an instrument or a tool to
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implement a part of government policy, and that there is a limited
opportunity for the BOFWA to advocate policy matters in the issue area.
The BOFWA is, thus, considered to be only "embedded" in a state's policy
design.
5.5 Comparison of NSDAOs' Experiences in Zambia and Botswana
As we have seen in this chapter, there are similarities as well as
differences in the experiences of NSDAOs in Zambia and Botswana in
various aspects. From a comparative point of view, we can draw some
theoretical implications from the experiences of both countries.
NSDAOs are, in their nature, "intermediary" (Carroll, 1992)
between the state and the grassroots (target groups). As considered in
chapter 1, their development depends both on the capacity and tactics of
the state and the socio-economic and political conditions of target groups.
In addition, in terms of their roles in democratisation, they are potentially
important in two ways, because (1) they can become important actors in
civil society by themselves and (2) they are influential within civil society,
in their relation to target groups; first, they have possibilities to influence
national policies, when they have space for policy advocacy; second, they
can contribute to "rural or grassroots democratisation," by empowering
their target groups. However, they also take risks in two ways; first, if they
compete with the state, they have difficulties in securing working
"spaces," and even run a danger of being oppressed by the state, because
they may be recognised challengers to erode the ideological base of the
state; second, if they are not represented by their target groups to some
extent, their involvement rather negatively affected the rural
communities at which they are targeting, which will cause problems of
legitimacy among their target groups. This latter point challenges the
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conventional assumption that NGOs in civil society are synonymous with
democratic forces (see, Ndegwa, 1993, 1996 on this issue in the case of
Kenya). Therefore, NSDAOs' development and roles in democratisation
are necessary to be evaluated from these points of view.
5.5.1 Differences of Organisational Development
As argued in chapter 1, one of the dimensions of development of
civil society is that of organisation. It is now possible to conclude that
NSDAOs in both countries belong to what Korten called a "second
generation" (1987, 1990), considering that their main aim has gradually
been shifted from relief and welfare to self-reliant local (community)
development, by mobilising people. This tendency seems to be more
salient in Zambia, where NSDAOs like HUZA explicitly stress the
importance of empowerment of people. Generally speaking, Zambian
NSDAOs depend less on expatriates in their management and activities,
which means their relative organisational strength, than those in
Botswana. In my view, therefore, one of the differences between NSDAOs
in Zambia and those in Botswana is that Zambian NSDAOs have been not
only organisationally more "developed" in the sense that they have
established relatively well-working programmes, projects, and manpower
than those in Botswana (see, Garilao, 1987:115)39.
As we have seen in the case studies, there are quite contrasting
experiences between HUZA and TL, and between the PPAZ and the
39Garilao (1987: 115) categorised a pattern of organisational development into three
stages. The first stage is the formation and development stage wherein groups of
individuals identify common needs and problems and organise themselves to respond
collectively to these problems. The second is the consolidation stage. In this stage,
'eadership is established and an expertise is developed. The third stage, onto which some
can move, is the institutionalisation stage. In this stage, not only can an organisation carry
out its programmes and projects well, but these have a certain strategic impact in its
geographic locality. The programme can become the model for other organisations and the
government.
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BOFWA. What can be observed from these cases is that HUZA has taken
quite deliberate tactics to develop its bureaucratic organisation and has
gradually expanded and consolidated its areas of activity, while TL had
failed to establish its organisational structure to support its own activities
and once faced a crisis of continuation of its own activity. HUZA has
developed expertise and offered a range of services relevant to mainly
urban communities and has even moved into policy advocacy by advising
on natural resource conservation and making representation on the
NCDP on women and development. On the other hand, TL has not yet
established its final organisational structure o and it has had problems
with its targeting groups as stated above, although it has been regarded as
one of the more important NSDAOs by the government because of its
innovative way of contributing to rural development and is "favoured" in
government circles because it is less competitive with the state. The
experiences of TL illustrates that Botswana NSDAOs' "organisational
weakness" derives partly from their dependence on "expatriates" with
special skills and knowledge, in other words on the shortage of local
qualified manpower. In fact, localisation of NSDAOs has been more
advanced in Zambia.
This contrast is also the case in the experiences of the PPAZ and the
BOFWA, both of which have been involved in the same issue area of
family planning. The PPAZ has established relatively good organisation,
and has gradually consolidated its activities, while the BOFWA is still at a
rudimentary stage in terms of organisation and has limited areas of
activities.
Therefore, in terms of NSDA0s, civil society in Zambia was more
developed in that in Botswana.
40TL was considering whether to transform its organisational structure into a membership
one during my research period.
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5.5.2 Reasons for Different Levels of Development of NSDA0s: Interaction
with the State and Working "Spaces"
5.5.2.1 NSDAOs in Zambia: Survival and Participation in Policy Process
In Zambia, as the case of the ZCSD illustrated, there were attempts
by the UNIP government to control NSDAOs' activities within the policy
framework of the one-party era. In this political context, NSDAOs in
Zambia were obliged to work quite deliberately to collaborate with the state
because it was the only survival strategy in order not to be regarded as
"political oppositions." From the point of view of the state, thus,
NSDAOs' activities had been, at least, monitored. And as far as NSDAOs
worked within the policy framework of the state, NSDAOs' activities,
which were not legally prohibited because freedom for the formation of
non-political associations was one of the constitutional rights, were
allowed to complement those of the state, even during the one-party
period. This means that NSDAOs as actors in civil society can be
developed in the seemingly limited sphere of the one-party political
regime as far as they were not in acute confrontation with the state in
policy and ideological terms.
In addition, as the case of the PPAZ shows, even in the sphere not
occupied by the state as a provider, the state intervenes to control NSDAOs
when they have different ideological inclination (e.g., anti-natalism in the
case of the PPAZ). Especially in the case of NSDA0s, which serves others
and are organised for specific purposes, their raisons d'etre are not to be
institutionalised in a society like churches in a historical process but to
provide services which are not actually provided by the state, by carefully
developing its own programmes and projects. Therefore, in this case, the
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tactics taken by the state are limited to co-optation or less interventionist
ones. In the case of the PPAZ, it could gradually expand their working
sphere, especially in the period of structural development, where they can
be just functionally institutionalised as providers of family planning
services in exchange for some control from the state. What is interesting is
that the PPAZ basically kept its relative organisational, financia141 and
ideological autonomy from UNIP, although there were harassments from
individual politicians with a pro-natal stance. Furthermore, the PPAZ has
not only gradually succeeded in transforming the state ideology on the
population issue from pro-natalism to anti-natalism, but also influenced
the establishment of anti-natal population policy. This is considered to be
an important development in terms of political participation, which is
supposed to be one of the two dimensions of democratisation, as stated in
chapter 1, although the impact of this level of participation is not enough
to promote national political reform and democratisation.
In terms of networks of NSDA0s, the formation and consolidation
of collaboration among NSDAOs has not yet materialised in Zambia. The
Zambia Council for Social Development was once formed as a
coordinating national body of NSDA0s. However, it has never been a
"genuine voice" of NSDAOs in Zambia. 42 In this sense, NSDAOs in
Zambia have not yet become a major actor in the process of democratic
consolidation. In the Third Republic, however, NSDA0s, which have
been delinked from the dominant UNIP political structure, are supposed
to play more roles based on their expertise and knowledge accumulated so
far.4 3
4iin practice, it was difficult for the PPAZ to expect financial assistance from the
government whose revenues became dwindled.
The ZCSD was being reorganised to become the "genuine voice" of NSDAOs in Zambia in
the Third Republic (interview with the General Secretary of the ZCSD, 21/12/1991).
43NSDAOs in collaboration with IAOs and Churches are actively involved in to avert
some political-related problems (See, e.g. Post, 23 May 1996). The case of the PPAZ is also
reported (Post, 4 June 19%).
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5.5.2.2 Relatively "Strong" State: Limits of NSDAOs in Botswana
As experiences of NSDAOs in Botswana illustrated, some NSDAOs
can be collaborative with the state, while others are conflictive. On the one
hand, one of the cases which has gained a favourable response from the
state is, as considered as a cas:? study in the previous section, the Thusano
Lefasheng. This is mainly because the areas of activities of TL do not
overlap those of the state. In other words, TL is not regarded as competitor
by the state. Therefore, some collaboration developed as special financial
support from the President himself. On the other hand, there are
conflicting cases. CORDE's conflicts with CODEC derive from its activities'
duplication with those of CODEC and its difference in approach at the
ideological level from that of CODEC, as it emphasises on the original idea
of the Brigades to create self-managed production cooperatives, such as
Boiteko the adult women's cooperatives. Therefore, CORDE is certainly
recognised as being competitive with the state, which eventually led to its
working difficulties.
The case of the NGO consortium showed that NSDAOs working in
a "consortium format," which can be interpreted "apparently (not
substantially) more politically powerful," tend to be regarded with greater
suspicion by the state. This is because the formation of a consortium in
order to access the "grassroots," especially without the knowledge of the
central government, can be considered as politically motivated to mobilise
people and as a threat to the hegemonic dominance of the state. This
caused the interference of the state in activities of NSDAOs in Gantsi as a
consortium. Although the simple fact was that NGO consortium was
dissolved by its membership, the consortium was "symbolically"
disbanded as a scapegoat in Gantsi as a result of the state interference. In
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addition, a member of the consortium, namely the RIIC, was quasi-AO
heavily dependent in financial terms (financial dependency), which
eventually weakened the collaboration.
Therefore the NSDAOs' activities in Botswana have been regulated
by the relatively strong state as "intruder," as Chazan stated (1988: 333).
Therefore, the Botswana state, with a strong material and ideological base,
seems to have deliberately "divided and controlled" NSDA0s. It is, thus,
quite ironical that NSDA0s, which have attempted to establish
programmes "alternative" to those of the state, faced problems of their
"narrowed working spaces" in Botswana where constitutional freedom of
action is supposed to be more guaranteed.
In addition, NSDAOs' efforts to empower people are also
discouraged by socio-economic factors such as the shortage of market for
people's products. Even so, at the level of the community, activities of
NSDAOs have unexpectedly as well as expectedly impacted on the rural
community as happened in the case of TL. On the one hand, they have
contribute to the growth of rural civil society by helping rural people to
form groups. However, on the other hand, as stated above in detail, TL's
involvement in projects in rural communities also stimulated the social
differentiation. This experience shows us an ambivalent characteristics of
roles of NSDAOs in rural democratisation.
In summary, at the national level, the degree of political
participation of NSDAOs in Botswana was still low. This means that the
nature of the political regime in Botswana was rather exclusive. At the
level of local communities, however, NSDA0s, especially these belonging
to the "second generation" being involved in community development,
had some potential to promote rural democratisation, although they will
fail to do so if they do not sufficiently pay attention to changing social
structures of the targeted communities.
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5.5.2.3 Working "Space" Matters?
From the experiences of NSDAOs in both countries, it became clear
that it is in the area of a "policy vacuum," where the state has been
operating or is "newly" expected but has failed to offer sufficient services
and benefits to the people, that NSDA0s, such as the PPAZ, have emerged
and have been working. This shows us that NSDAOs are actually
important actors in "alternative development," as argued in the first
chapter. Therefore, in Zambia, where the state has became "weaker" as a
distributor of services due to eroded material bases, the working "space"
for NSD NOs has become larger (and expanded under structural
adjustment) than in Botswana, where the state has been relatively
"strong" with a sufficient material base to offer services. Also, the
Botswana state's relatively strong ideologically hegemonic stance has
narrowed "constitutionally free space" of NSDAOs' activities44. As a
result, NSDAOs have been more developed and more active in Zambia.
In addition, as stated above, the NSDAOs in Zambia have to
develop their organisations and programmes quite deliberately so as to
tackle important problems in a deteriorating economy, under the
"apparently" rigid authoritarian regime, which ironically resulted in
relatively well-working organisations. This development was possible
because the political regime in Zambia under UNIP control did not
necessarily totally oppress civil society. Botswana's constitutional multi-
partyism provides at first sight a more favourable condition for NSDAOs
to develop freely. However, as we have seen, this has never been the case.
It was only before the state secured financial resources from diamonds that
44We can find Good (1996a), characterising Botswana "authoritarian liberalism,"
concerning a relatively recent argument related to this point.
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the so called NGO sector played relatively an important role in
development (see Grant, 1980) in comparison with the state. The more the
state's role in development became important, the less opportunities for
NSDAOs to play in ( I
 evclopment. Therefore, as stated in Chapter 1,
NSDAOs are not necessarily more developed in "multi-party democracy,"
which disproved the intuitive assumption that a constitutional democracy
provides more favorable conditions for the development of civil society.
In theoretical terms, these experiences support the argument, which
is closely related to the second hypothesis that civil society develops in the
working space which was created by the failure of the state, caused by both
material and ideological decline, as a provider of necessary services. In
other words, it is difficult for civil society to develop in the sphere which
is completely occupied by the relatively strong state with sufficient
material bases as a provider of services. In this case, we can take it that
civil society is diminished. These insights obviously prove the second
hypothesis. As the case of the BOFWA shows that its working area is
relatively rigidly determined because it operates in an area which the state,
with a relatively sufficient material base, has already occupied.
5.5.3 Political Regimes and Development of NSDAOs
Finally, it is necessary to just briefly mention that it is clearly shown
from the experiences of HUZA, the PPAZ and the BOFWA that how
active NSDAOs are and how much opportunity they have to partake in
policy making and implementation process do not directly depend on the
expected characteristics of the "constitutional" political regime in the sense
that it is democratic (multi-party) or authoritarian (one or no party system,
and military regime). These are more directly related to characteristics of
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the state in terms of both the material and ideological bases, as the present
study suggested in the first chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT AND STAGNATION
OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC
CONSOLIDATION
In this study, the political logic of development of civil society has
been analysed by using case studies of two countries in southern Africa,
namely, Zambia and Botswana. In this chapter, two tasks remain to be
carried out. First, it is necessary to summarise the findings in this study by
testing the hypotheses stated in chapter 1. Second, some implications
derived from this study will be read into the broader theoretical context
raised in the first chapter on African politics: in particular arguments
concerning democratisation and the nature of political regimes.
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Before summarising the findings, it is useful to quote the
hypotheses developed in the first chapter as follows:
1. There are more limited opportunities of the development of civil society
in a country where a regime is established in favour of the state in terms of
power distribution, or in other words, the state dominates material and
ideological bases in the territory. Therefore, there are more opportunities
for civil society to develop in the country where monopolistic tendencies of
the state are relaxed.
2. There are more opportunities of the growth of civil society in a country
where material and ideological bases of the state are eroded and socio-
economic conditions are declined, or in other words, the state is losing its
legitimacy and resources. Therefore, in this situation, IAOs and churches
will become candidates to challenge the state to reform it, and DAOs
agents of "alternative development."
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3. There are more opportunities of the emergence of vibrant civil society in
a country where material conditions have been prepared for civil society as
a result of industrialisation and commercialisation, ideological conditions
have been offered by education, and organisational bases have been
acquired both through historical experiences like a struggle for
independence and by strong leadership in a society at large.
4. The state with ample resources tends to use the "preemptive" tactic to
control, especially, rural areas, which are major political bases of ruling
elite, for the purpose of depoliticising people in a clientelist manner.
5. As far as the state is strong in terms of power distribution, the state tends
to take more repressive tactics toward AOs especially with different
ideological inclinations from the state, for the purpose of securing
hegemony by restricting activities of the A0s.
Apart from the rural sectors where the development of rural civil
society has been deliberately blocked by the state in both countries, as
detailed in chapter 3, it is possible to conclude that civil society is more
developed in Zambia than in Botswana.
As a phenomenon, this was most explicitly expressed in the
"transition" period from the Second to the Third Republic in Zambia,
when the trade unions became the core of the anti-UNIP movement and
the formation of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which
eventually took power, after the election in October 1991. The Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is, as well-known, one of the most
organised labour movements in Africa. In addition, as detailed in chapter
4, Christian churches were quite actively involved in the democratic
"transition phase," so as to avert constitutional stalemates and to conduct
a successful election. Furthermore, NSDA0s, working in the selected issue
areas, are more developed in Zambia in terms of organisation and a
variety of areas of activities, as detailed in the previous chapter.
In contrast with Zambia, in the current "democratisation,"
Botswana has not experienced any explicit "transitions" because it has kept
461
"multi-party democracy" since independence. As we have seen so far,
however, the areas of activities of a variety of AOs have been "narrowed"
by the state.
It is possible just from these findings in the two countries to
disprove a conventional assumption that a constitutional "democracy"
provides more favourable conditions for the development of civil society.
6.1.1 Zambia: The Erosion of Material Bases, the Failure of Ideological
Dominance, and the Development of Civil Society
Zambia, whose economy has been in a bad condition since the early
1970s, due to the decline of the copper price in the world market, and
structural adjustment imposed by the IMF-World Bank in the 1980s
(which is considered to be a symbolical and indirect expression of the
defeat of UNIP's development strategy), is a case which corresponds to the
second hypothesis that there are more opportunities for the growth of
civil society in a country where the material and ideological bases of the
state are eroded and socio-economic conditions have declined.
In addition, it was against the political and economic backgrounds
that NSDAOs such as HUZA an.-1 the PPAZ have been gradually and
deliberately establishing thei, organisations and legitimacy in each
working area of concern, as argued in chapter 5. They have, thus,
relatively successfully become agents of "alternative development"
(hypothesis 2).
It was also in the political and economic crisis that IAOs represented
by the ZCTU challenged the UNIP government so as to reintroduce multi-
party politics. Therefore, these crises also meant that Zambia was a case
where the state failed to impose hegemony over the ruling territory,
which eventually caused the social unrest in the 1980s and the formation
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of oppositions. In addition, as detailed in chapter 4, Christian churches
were involved not only in the reintroduction of multi-partyism, but also
in mediating the constitutional stalemates between parties and in
monitoring election to achieve a peaceful transition.
Both the trade unions and the Christian churches in Zambia, which
were deeply involved in politics not only in the transition period but also
in the one-party era, have been historically institutionalised and have had
organisational strength. The trade unions have their origin in the late
1940s, owing to the development of the copper mines started as early as in
the 1930s. In the liberation struggle, they played important roles. In
addition, in the one-party era, ZCTU was de facto the opposition group. In
comparison with the case of Botswana, where industrialisation was
mainly the post-independence phenomenon, therefore, there were more
favourable material conditions for IA0s, especially trade unions, in
Zambia to establish organisational strength, which corresponds to
hypothesis 3. Christian churches also have been historically important not
only in terms of education, which was important in terms of the
formation of early political elites, and health, but also a "voice" to check
the state behaviour. It is because they have their "visions" on national
affairs (ideological autonomy), as observed in the case of the introduction
of scientific socialism in the early 1980s, and their continuous
involvement in their area of concerns in the form of "pastoral letters" in
the 1980s. In addition, their relative financial autonomy strengthens their
position vis-a-vis the state.
The UNIP government could only secure ample material bases by
the early 1970s, when the government could get sufficient revenue at its
disposal from the export of copper. Therefore, it was only by the early 1970s
that it could manage to use a form of communal cooperatives as a means
of preempting rural areas to achieve "micro-socialism" based on
463
Humanism, and subsidies as a tool to integrate people in rural areas in a
clientelist manner, which proves hypothesis 4. However, as a result of
dwindling revenue, UNIP failed to continue the same tactic in rural areas
after the 1970s, and, thus, partially failed to implant the "ideological"
dominance (hegemony) of the state even in rural areas, although attempts
to preemptive rural areas have eventually suffocated local initiatives of
"development from below," which was shown by the fact that the
cooperative movement in Zambia still had very weak grassroots.
UNIP also failed to keep its ideological dominance in its relation
with the Christian churches, as a result of the defeat in the debate
concerning the introduction of scientific socialism in the early 1980s. This
is also the case in the issue areas of population and family planning,
where the UNIP government gradually shifted its stance from pro-
natalism in harmony with Zambian Humanism to anti-natalism, which
had been promoted by the PPAZ in Zambia. These cases show relative
weakness of the Zambian state in terms of ideology (see, hypothesis 5).
Against the shift of the UNIP government's stance towards the
population issue, the PPAZ successfully influenced the establishment of
national population policy by participating in the policy-making process,
which is one of the positive signs of democratisation in the dimension of
participation. This change was more explicitly observed in the period of
structural adjustment in the 1980s, when monolistic tendencies of the
UNIP government was relaxed and its "socialistic" development path was
clearly defeated (hypothesis 1).
In summary, in Zambia the state did not necessarily dominate
either material or ideological bases (hypothesis 1) and failed to secure
hegemony, which had been gradually eroded. This means that there were
relatively favourable conditions or "political spaces" for AOs to act
autonomously. Relatively developed civil society under these conditions
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emerged as opposition drastically as a counterweight against UNIP in the
transition period, when the "monopolistic tendencies of the state" were
relaxed (hypothesis 1). The ZCTU became the core organisation to form
the MMD, and Christian churches, the Law Association of Zambia, and the
NGO Coordinating Committee which delinked from the Women League
of the UNIP were involved in election monitoring during this period. In
addition, NSDAOs like HUZA and the PPAZ had the opportunity to be
involved in policy-making process in specific issue areas.
However, it is also necessary to mention that there were also
"attempts" of relatively rigid controls from the state during the one-party
era, as shown in the case of the ZCSD and the PPAZ, designed to prevent
these NSDAOs going beyond the policy-framework of the state. Generally
speaking, however, considering the analyses so far in the study, despite its
continuous attempts to control civil society, the power of the state was
gradually weakened since the early 1970s, which allowed the development
of a relatively autonomous civil society in Zambia.
6.1.2 Botswana: The Secured Material Bases, the Success of Ideological
Dominance, and the Relative Stagnation of Civil Society
Botswana is a case that is depicted in hypothesis 1, which is that "a
regime is established in favour of the state in terms of power distribution,"
and "the state dominates material and ideological bases." As depicted in
chapter 2, Botswana achieved "a second independence" around 1972-3,
when it ceased to rely on support from the United Kingdom to finance
recurrent spending (Harvey and Lewis, Jr., 1990: 53), and saw continuous
improvements in its financial situation. 1 This sound financial condition
1 The cash reserves held by the Government in 1985 actually exceeded total recurrent
spending in that year (NDP7: 69), as a result of conservative public spending policy pursued
by the BDP.
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has guaranteed the material bases of the state independent of tax revenues,
owing to which the state can pursue "distributionist policies," targeting
especially rural areas where the dominant BDP's support is based.
In fact, these policies have been a "preemptive" tactic to control
these areas. This tactic can be interpreted as a device to departicipate and
depoliticise people in rural areas by controling them in a clientelist
manner (hypothesis 4). The BDP is also engaged in patron-client
relationships with large cattle owners, some of whom are BDP MPs.
Therefore, people in rural areas, who are politically emasculated in an
clientelist manner and who are organised from "above," are in the
situation where it is difficult for them to organise themselves
autonomously, which has prevented "rural democratisation" in
Botswana.
In terms of ideology, the Botswana state has chosen a capitalist-
oriented development path. An examined in chapter 3, the Serowe
Brigade with its socialist inclination faced intervention by the government
which favoured the commercially-oriented Kweneng Rural Development
Association (KRDA) model. Eventually the Brigade movement itself was
coopted into the lower level of the state hierarchy in education. Therefore,
it is possible to consider that there was imperatives for the Botswana state
to "implant" obedience to secure both its hegemony and security by
coopting the Brigade, which was recognised as a challenger in a changing
and strained regional (southern African) political situation in the late
1970s and the early 1980s. This case corresponds to hypothesis 5 that the
state tends to take more repressive tactics toward AOs especially with
different ideological inclinations from the state, so as to keep its state
hegemony. This tendency of hegemonic dominance was also exemplified
in the case of "independent churches," as stated in chapter 4.
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Against the sound financial resources, the Botswana state has been
involved in relatively wider issue areas than other sub-Saharan African
states which have "failed," and has provided public services, including
clinics and primary schools, which were improved throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, and food, in the case of drought. This wide-range of activity
actually "narrowed" the potential working space where NSDAOs and
even Christian churches are usually actively working in other countries,
as observed in the case of the population issue in comparison with Zambia
in chapter 5. In this situation, it is not so easy for NSDAOs to be
established and to act as agents of "alternative development," which also
stunts the development of civil society. This finding is consistent with the
second hypothesis that it is in the country where material and ideological
bases are eroded and socio-economic conditions have deteriorated that
NSDAOs can emerge as agents of "alternative development."
Generally speaking, the monopolistic tendency of the state has been
relatively rigidly sustained against the background of the ample material
bases and a relatively rigid development strategy in Botswana. As a result,
opportunities for the development of civil society have been politically
restricted. In addition, organisational bases of AOs have been still
underdeveloped because of, for instance, the shortage of qualified
personnel, as stated in chapter 5, and strong leaderships, as we can observe
in the case of Zambia.
6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
6.2.1 Rethinking Political Regimes
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From the findings summarised above, we can develop a view of
political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa quite different from the simplistic
conventional view of political regimes.
As stated in chapter 1, in terms of the theory of political regimes,
what matters to civil society is not the dimension of competition but that
of participation. If democracy is to be considered as, so called, "procedural
democracy," which guarantees only people's suffrage (the minimalist
definition of democracy), it is obvious that Botswana is more democratic
than Zambia under UNIP control, because the degree of competition has
been higher in Botswana than that in Zambia by the early 1990s.
However, as stated in chapter 1, the concept of "participation" is not
necessarily limited to "electoral participation." In this study, this concept
has been treated in a broader perspectives, which includes participation in
public decision-making as well as management of people's own affairs
(empowerment). Therefore, if the concept of "participation" is broadened,
the nature of a political regime can be differently characterised.
Considering the limited autonomous political space in Botswana,
"departicipated" people especially in rural areas, and no opportunities for
AOs to participate in the policy-making process which is dominated by top
bureaucrats and politicians, the degree of participation in Botswana is not
as high as conventionally supposed 2 . As summarised above, this is
derived from a "strong" state, dominating the material and ideological
bases and manipulating social actors to be obedient to the state by using
these resources as its disposal. Therefore, the state has appeared as a
powerful actor in controlling society to maintain its hegemony. This
relatively rigid domination has so far achieved political stability and
economic success at the macro-level.
2See Good, 1996b, for recent issues on participation in Botswana.
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On the other side, Zambia under UNIP control was categorised as,
for instance, "a competitive one-party system" (Bratton and van de Walle,
1994) and "a party-mobilising regime" (Chazan, et al., 1992), both of which
focused on the nature of the single party in power: "competition" among
party members, and mobilisation-oriented nature. These categorisations
are useful to distinguish political regimes under one-party rule. However,
as developed in chapter 1, if the argument of political regimes includes
changing reciprocal patterns of power between state and civil society, we
have to consider the nature of the political regime of Zambia from
another point of view. In this study, Zambia under UNIP rule was not
considered competitive, in the sense that there is no competition among
parties, because political society was absorbed into the state, or in other
words, no other parties than UNIP were allowed. However, the absorption
of the political society does not mean that civil society was also restricted.
In fact, as observed already, quite a variety of A0s, like churches and
trade unions were quite actively working in the one-party era. In addition,
there were opportunities for NSDAOs to "participate" in national policy-
making process at the end of the era, when reintroduction of political
society, or the return to the multi-party politics, was in sight. Therefore,
the content that "the imposition of auth, ritarian 3 [in the conventional
categorisation] rule affects the development of civil society in important,
sometimes contradictory, ways," pointed out by Oxhorn from his Latin
American experiences (1995: 5), is also applicable in the African context. In
addition, ironically enough in the case of Zambia, the UNIP catch phrase
of "one-party participatory democracy" could be interpreted to be half true,
because the level of "participation" became higher at least in the 1980s,
3 In this case, this concept of "authoritarian" means that the state absorbs political society,
say, in a form of one-party system, but not completely oppress all societal actors.
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under structural adjustment, than that of Botswana, although there was a
fundamental contradiction between "one-party" and "democracy."4
Figure 6-1 Regime Variants: Zambia and Botswana in Comparison
Zambia and Botswana may be added into the figure 1-1 as shown in
figure 6-1, which shows as follows:
Zambia under UNIP control was less competitive, but becoming
more participatory towards the end of the one-party era, a political
4 In this case, democracy contains at least competition among political parties.
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regime, which was closer to "inclusionary authoritarianism" than
Botswana. The latter was a more competitive, but less participatory
political regime, closer to "exclusionary democracy." 5 In the Third
Republic, when the multi-party system was reintroduced, Zambia
become closer to "inclusionary democracy," 6 although the newly
introduced political regime has not yet consolidated7.
6.2.2 Civil Society in the Period of the Political Transition and Democratic
Consolidation: Hopes and Problems to Achieve Equilibrium8 of Power
between the State and Civil Society
In the current tide of democratisation in Africa, civil society has
been occasionally recognised to have emerged as an opponent against 9the
"failed" state. As observed in the case of Zambia, the period of political
transition or re-ordering (of "crisis") offers an opportunity for actors not
only to emerge at odds with the state but also to develop networks to cope
with newly forming political realities. This movement occasionally
crystalised into the reintroduction of "political society," namely, multi-
party competition, in the democratic "transition phase.' Therefore, it is
partially true that civil society has functioned to establish new rules of the
game between the state and actors in civil society in this phase. In this
sense, A0s, including trade unions and Christian churches, have been
5This characterisation of Botswana polity is consistent with Good's recent definition of
"authoritarian liberalism," focusing on the institutional aspects of the Botswana state
(Good, 1996a).
6 See, Dryzek, 1996, for one of the most recent theoretical reflections on "political inclusion"
as democratisation.
7The arrows with a dotted line in figure 6-1 suggest the unstable and changeable nature of
"unconsolidated" political regimes in Africa in the era of "democratisation."
8The concept of equilibrium is not necessarily new in democratic theories. However, this
concept has been usually used in the pluralism to refer to balanced relations among a
variety of interests(see, Held, 1987, chapter 6). In this study, this concept means balanced
and tense relations between the state and civil society.
9See fn. 7 in chapter 1 on recent arguments on the concept of civil society in terms of
"opposition" to the state.
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engaged in "norm-setting functions," which are among the most
important roles which actors in civil society are supposed to play. In this
phase, the norm is supposed to re-introduce multi-party politics so as to
tackle political stalemates and economic deterioration under the UNIP
rule. This imperative came from the position of de facto opposition in the
second Republic. In the case of Christian churches, their role in the debate
against the introduction of scientific socialism was also considered to be a
part of this function to "check" the state. They continued to keep their
concerns on a variety of political and socio-economic issues, as detailed in
chapter 4. In addition, the role of the PPAZ in the UNIP's change from
pro-natalism to anti-natalism was another example of the function of
A0s.
Considering these examples of AOs' "norm-setting function" in
Zambia, it seems that favourable conditions on the side of civil society for
the consolidation of democracy have been in preparation. However, as
argued in chapter 1, the development of civil society is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for stable democracy. The state also should be
reformed to be more accountable and less corrupt, so as to achieve power
equilibrium between the state and civil society. Also, the tendency of the
state towards a monopolisation of power must be relaxed to some extent
in favour of A0s. In other words, more participatory opportunities and
channels must be gradually institutionalised. Furthermore, civil society
must be "democratised." In other words, "civility" 10 is to be gained for
democratic consolidation.
10Concerning the issue of "civility" of society in Botswana, du Toit recently argued that
Botswana society is strong because it has been free of looting, civil violence and social
decay. He argued that this strength has been established by the presence of the
institutional rules of tradition, which socially control Tswana custom and law (1995: 153-
163). However, it was unfortunate that a civil unrest happened in February 1995 in
Gaborone (see, Goods, 1996b), which marred his argument. Therefore, it is possible to argue
that "civility" of Botswana society remains to be formed in the precess of democratisation,
which supports the thesis of relatively underdeveloped civil society in Botswana.
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It is in this context that embryonic efforts of self-help in rural areas
and NSDAOs' impacts on their target groups should be considered. As
analysed in chapter 3, there are a variety of efforts of the state in both
countries to control rural areas by organising them in a clientelist manner
by providing patronage and acquiring political support. Local branches of
the dominant party are also commonly used as providing patronage and
controlling rural areas as observed in the cases of UNIP in Zambia and the
BDP in Botswana. As a result, organising efforts came not from "above"
but from "below," which has sustained clientelism and has prevented
"citizenship." As a result, the democratisation process has been more
delayed in rural areas, resulting in "partial democratisation." 11 In this
situation, several groups with relatively strong leaderships have come out
to solve their problems, which will be potentially good signs for "rural
democratisation" in the long run.
It is also necessary to point out that NSDA0s, which situated
themselves in "intermediary positions," have not necessarily positively
contributed to empowerment, but also impede rural democratisation
when they are not well represented by target communities and when they
are not aware of their impacts on "micro-level" social structure. This
finding in chapter 5 challenges the simple assumption that NGOs in civil
society are synonymous with democratic forces.
Therefore, the introduction of multi-party system instead of a one-
party system in the name of democratisation may be a step forward to
democratic consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa in the sense of
reintroduction of competition in a political regime, but, it does not
11 I owed this point to Professor Lionel Cliffe.
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necessarily guarantee a stable democratic transition and consolidation 12 in
Africa, which has already become a big problem in more recent days.
6.2.3 An Evaluation of the Applicability of the Concept Civil of Society in
the Period of Democratisation
As used in this study, the concept of civil society, which does not
necessarily contain the element of "opposition," offers us a useful
analytical point of view to consider the phenomenon of democratisation
in Africa at various levels, especially to consider and to analyse AOs and
their relations to the state and their roles in democratisation. Especially in
the era when so called NG0s, as alternative societal actors, have been paid
attention to not only internally but also externally and internationally, the
perspective from civil society is undoubtedly important.
I oppose the abuse of the concept as a slogan or just words without
any clear content. My stance is, as clarified in the first chapter, that this
concept must be given clearer content that is applicable for analysis, if this
term is to be used in any analytical projects. Only by refraining from the
abuse of the concept, can analysts produce more useful analytical results.
This study is one project in the pursuit of obtaining academically
useful insights from the concept of civil society, as applied to the cases of
Zambia and Botswana.
The attempt for civil society to be more democratised is still under
way. This process as well as reform of the state will be inevitable for
African countries to achieve their long journey to stable democratic
political regimes.
12Recent troubles in Zambia in the Third Republic seems to be mainly derived from the
failure of the reform of the state, which is one of the essential components of democratic
consolidation.
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APPENDIX
Oral Sources: List of Interviewees
ZAMBIA
<Political Parties>
MMD
MMD Secretariat, Mr. Mwela, 28 January 1992.
MMD Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Chitala, 3 February, 1992.
UNIP
Director of the Research Bureau, Dr. Ngwisha, 27 January, 1992.
Research Bureau, Officer of Women's Affairs, 27 January, 1992.
<Government>
National Commission for Development Planning. WID Department. Mrs.
Mutale, 4 February, 1992.
Dept. of Marketing & Cooperative. Food Security Division. Mr. Mundia, 4
January 1992.
Ministry of Home Affairs, Registrar of Societies. Mr. Musonda, 22 January
1992.
<Churches>
Christian Council of Zambia.
Acting General Secretary, Mr. Nkonga, 9 December, 1991.
Women's Development Division, Nellah Sinoya, 4 December, 1991.
Refugee and Relief Division, Mr. Simposya, 16 December, 1991.
Evangerical Fellowship of Zambia.
General Secretary. Rev. Imakando, 21 January, 1992
E.S.D. Coordinator. Mr. Sialwiindi, 9 January, 1992.
Zambia Episcopal Conference.
Acting General Secretary and Secretary for Social Problems, Fr. Calmettes,
30 January, 1992.
Secretary for Development, Mr. Muzeta, 30 January, 1992.
<IA0s>
Law Association of Zambia. Executive Secretary, Mrs. Mulwila, Mr.
Lwatula, 21 January 1992.
Pharmaceutical Society of Zambia. Director, Mr. Mmembe, 24 January,
1992.
Press Association of Zambia. Mr. Phiri, 21 January, 1992.
ZEMCC (Zambia Election Monitoring Coordinating Committee)
(ZEMCC is currently FODEP, Foundation for Democratic Process)
Chairman, Rev. Foston Sakala, 22 December, 1991.
Secretary, Rev. J. Imakando, 21 January, 1992.
Secretariat, Mr. M. H. Nkwilinba, 10 January, 1992.
ZCTU Lusaka Office. Mr. Mulenga, Mr. Chisala, 12 February, 1992.
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<Press>
Weekly Post. Acting Editor, Mr. J. Mwiinga, 18 December, 1991.
<DA0s>
Human Settlement of Zambia. Director, Mr. Jere, Project Coordinator, Mr.
Musowe, 21 January, 1992.
Family Life Movement of Zambia. Director, Fr. Cremins, Programme
Officer Mr. Muchindu, Family Life education Secretary. Mrs. Mvula, 21,
January, 1992.
NGO Coordinating Committee. Executive Secretary. Mrs. Makasa, 4
December, 1991.
Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia. Director of Programmes, Mrs.
Manda, Programme Officer, Mrs. Zambezi, 5 February, 1992.
Self-Help Development. Programme Coordinator, Mr. Banda, 6 January,
1992.
Village Industry Service. Mr. R. Mushanga, 29 January, 1992.
YWCA. National Programme Coordinator. Mrs. Liswaniso, 20 January,
1992.
Zambia Association for Research and Development. Chairperson, 11
January, 1992.
Zambia Council for Social Development. Executive Secretary. Mr.
Munsanje, 11 December, 1991.
Zambia Pre-school Association. Programme Officer, Mrs. Mumba, 22
December, 1992.
Zambia Red Cross Society. Administrative Officer, Mr. Situmbeko, 20
January, 1992.
Cooperatives
Zambia Cooperative Federation, Development Service Division, General
Manager, Mr. Chabala, 24 December, 1991.
BOTSWANA
<Political Parties>
Botswana Democratic Party, Deputy Executive Secretary. Mr. Modipane, 28
April, 1992.
<Government>
Ministry of Health. Family Health Division, 26 March, 1992.
Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs.
Registrar of Societies, 14 March, 1992.
Undersecretary for Cultural Affairs, Women's Affairs & Youth Division,
11 May, 1992
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Ministry of Education, BRIDEC. Deputy Principle, Mr. Nkile, 27 April,
1992.
Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing. Undersecretary for
Rural Development, 5 May, 1992.
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Rural Development
Unit, Ms. Anderson, 12 May, 1992
Ministry of Agriculture.
Several Officials responsible to Financial Assistance to farmers, 10 May,
1992
Several officials of Dept. of Cooperative Development, 20 May, 1992
<Churches>
Botswana Christian Council. General Secretary, Mr. Gape, Deputy G.S.,
Rev. Sommerfeldt, 18 March, 1992.
<IA0s>
Botswana Confederation of Commerce Industry & Manpower. Public
Relations Officer, Ms. Sebonego, 4 May, 1992.
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions. Executive Secretary, Mr. Mazunga.
Emang Basadi. Chairperson. Mrs. Setswaero, 8 April, 1992.
<Press>
Mmegi. Editor, Mr. T. Mbuya 20 March, 1992.
<DA0s>
Botswana Family Welfare Association. Consultant, William Sampson, 24
March, 1992.
Botswana Red Cross Society. Public Relation Officer, 26 March, 1992.
Cooperation for Research, Development and Education. Research &
Project Officer. Pennie Hamer, 19 March, 1992.
Child to Child Foundation. Coordinator, 12 April, 1992.
Forestry Association of Zambia. Officers, 25 March, 1992 ;Director, Mr. Van
Oostveen, Education Officer, 5 May, 1992.
Fc rum on Sustainable Agriculture. Coordinating Secretary, Mr.
Kashweeka, 9 April, 1992.
Foundation for Education with Production. Mr. T. van Rensberg, 6 May,
1992.
Kalahari Conservation Society. Chief Executive Officer, Mrs. Patterson,
Conservation Officer, Mr. Pilane, 18 March, 1992.
Rural Industries Promotions. General Manager. Mr. Inger, 28 April, 1992.
Rural Industry Innovation Centre. Information Officer, Mr. Jacobs, 30
April, 1992.
Southern Rural Development Association. Executive Secretary 7 May,
1992.
Thusano Lefatsheng. General Manager, Francis Johnstone, 12 April, 1994.
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Brigades
Kanye Brigade Development Trust. Coordinator, Mrs. Keoepile, 30 April,
1992.
Kweneng Rural Development Association. Deputy General Manager, Mr.
Masunga, M.B.B. Manager, Mr. Lebure, 8 May, 1992.
Serowe Brigade Development Trust. General Manager, Mr. Sesinyi, 29
April, 1992.
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